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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The central topic of the present work is the relationship between deviance and 
social identity. Our goal is to analyze some situational and psychological factors involved 
in the emergence of negative reactions toward deviant individuals, and how such reactions 
help perceivers to maintain or to reinforce their sense of social self worth. 
Deviance is a broad topic that encompasses sociological, psychological, and social 
psychological theory and research (e.g. Archer, 1985; Duyckaerts, 1966; Gibbs & Erikson, 
1975; Levine, 1980; Levine & Thompson, 1996). It may be viewed as an important step 
towards adaptation, by confronting the majority with new, adaptive forms of behavior 
(e.g., Ben-Yehuda, 1985; Levine, 1980; Moscovici, 1976; Mugny, 1982), or it may be 
equated, for example, with “error”, “illness”, “crime”, or “sin”: 
“In error, failure is due to ignorance or to the lack of control over the 
elements of action. Illness is also a lack of control […] over the body and 
the mind that renders the individual incapable of realizing his value 
commitments and of fulfilling his share of solidarity obligations […]. Crime 
and sin refer to failures to cooperate within the valued collectivities of the 
community or to demonstrate commitment to societal values. They are more 
severely punished than error or sin because the likelihood of their harming 
society is usually greater. […]” (Pitts, 1965, p. 702). 
Deviance may also appear either as a more or less obvious deviation from common 
occurrences, or as a more or less intentional departure from conduct that a community or a 
group considers to be “desirable” or, at least, “adequate” (e.g. Axelrod, 1986; Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998; Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; Hawkes, 1975; Miller & Prentice, 1996). 
Obviously, the psychological concomitants of the perception of these distinct kinds of 
  
2
 
deviance can be very different, let alone their material or social consequences, both for the 
deviants and for normative individuals. 
Finally, the deviant label itself, may denote either a demarcation between 
individuals who are socialized in terms of conventional norms and individuals who are 
socialized in terms of other norms (e.g. DeLamater, 1968; Sutherland & Cressey, 1974), or 
the manifestation of a disruption or disagreement between individuals who share the same 
social definition (e.g. Durkheim, 1893; Levine & Moreland, 1998; Shaw, 1976). Clearly, a 
distinction between normal and deviant groups or social categories would entail more of a 
conflict between distinctive normative systems, possibly endowed with different power 
over the means to define what is deviant and what is normal (Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; 
Inverarity, 1980). 
In the present work, we conceive of deviance as the perception of a disruptive 
process within a social group, rather than as the marginalization of ethnic or cultural 
groups in society, and we are concerned with individuals’ reactions to other members of 
their group who deviate from the standards that uphold that group’s positive image (cf. 
Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). More specifically, we attempt to explore a set of 
assumptions which have been subsumed under the heading of subjective group dynamics 
(e.g. Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998), deal with the conditions, 
internal and external to the group, under which individuals derogate in-group deviants.  
Broadly, subjective group dynamics has a process stemming from individuals’ self-
assimilation to a social category and application of internalized prescriptive norms to the 
construction and validation of beliefs in a positive social identity (Marques, 2004; Marques 
& Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). It has been defined as “a process by which 
people maximize and sustain descriptive intergroup differentiation whilst simultaneously 
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maximizing and sustaining the relative validity of prescriptive ingroup norms through 
intragroup differentiation” (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001, pp. 401-402).  
The simultaneous intergroup and intragroup differentiation process proposed by the 
subjective group dynamics model often arise in terms of hostile reactions towards those 
ingroup members who do not subscribe to valued ingroup standards. These reactions find 
parallel in two important instances of social life. On the one hand, they appear to be the 
psychological equivalent of interpersonal processes occurring in face to face groups (cf. 
Marques & Páez, 1994). On the other hand, they are comparable to the processes described 
by sociologists and historians when large communities have to deal with deviant 
individuals and subgroups (Marques, in preparation; Marques & Serôdio, 2000). 
The foundations of our theoretical reasoning stem from classical sociology and 
more recent social psychological theory and research. From sociology, we borrow mainly 
from Durkheim’s (e.g. 1893) theory of social solidarity and social control. From social 
psychology, we borrow from the classic approach to social influence in face-to-face groups 
initiated by Festinger (1950), and from the social identification approach, including social 
identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1975), and self-categorization 
theory (Hogg, 1992; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987). 
In Chapter 2, we present the above mentioned theoretical foundations. Durkheim’s 
(1893) theory of social solidarity is particularly relevant to our concerns. We attempt to 
describe how this theory’s account for the function of punishment of deviants in the 
promotion of social cohesiveness, and the reinvigoration of individuals’ adherence to the 
violated norms, especially when internal (e.g. anomie) or external (e.g. a threat to the 
group’s definition) require the group’s normative system to be reinforced (e.g. Erikson, 
1966). We argue that social identity may be the equivalent of Durkheim’s (1893) notion of 
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mechanical solidarity as far as reactions to deviants and the reinforcement of social 
identification are concerned. 
Based on Festinger’s (1950) informal social communication theory, we elaborate 
on the process through which members of face to face groups acquire a sense of subjective 
validation of reality by establishing intragroup uniformity, and how they deal with 
deviance of opinions from other members that may jeopardize this validation. We argue 
that, although the processes according to which large communities and small groups deal 
with deviance may certainly be quite different in nature, they are driven by similar types of 
occurrences and their aim is, in both cases, to maintain or reinforce uniformity. 
In applying to the social identification framework, we attempt to draw relevant 
implications from the two above mentioned theoretical fields to the main theoretical issue 
of this thesis: the significance of ingroup deviance for the identity of group members, and 
the external conditions that amplify it. We review research on the so-called “black sheep 
effect” (Marques, 1986; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988), from which the model of 
subjective group dynamics evolved (Marques & Páez, 1994). In line with the subjective 
group dynamics model, we assume that, when individuals define themselves as members 
of a social category, the emergence of ingroup deviance prompts them to adopt a 
prescriptive focus towards the deviants (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; 
Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). We hypothesize that such prescriptive focus decreases 
individuals’ tolerance of ingroup deviance and intensifies hostile reactions towards ingroup 
deviants, specifically when the ingroup is perceived to lack solidarity in terms of the 
breached norms, when the norm’s validity is threatened by lack of societal support, or the 
group’s identity is threatened in the context of intergroup relations. 
We devote Chapters 3-4 to our empirical research. In Chapter 3, we focus on the 
idea that reactions to intragroup deviance are tributary to the more general intergroup 
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context in which they occur. In this chapter, Experiments 1-4 examine how internal and 
external threats to the ingroup increase derogation of ingroup deviants. In all experiments, 
participants judged ingroup and outgroup deviant and normative individuals. In 
Experiment 1, participants evaluated the ingroup deviant more negatively and the ingroup 
normative member more favorably than their outgroup counterparts, when they perceived 
that a relevant majority of ingroup members did not support a valued norm. In experiments 
2 and 3, we found a similar effect when the ingroup status relative to the outgroup was 
insecure. Experiment 4, complemented findings of Experiment 1, by showing that lack of 
societal support, instead of lack of ingroup support, to the norm generates upgrading of 
normative ingroup members and derogation of deviant ingroup members relative to 
outgroup members. 
In Chapter 4, Experiments 5-7 are mainly aimed at exploring the relationship 
between cognitive and emotional processes involved in the derogation of ingroup deviants. 
Specifically, experiments 6 and 7 show that derogation of ingroup deviants is stronger 
when the deviants are good ingroup representatives. In Experiment 6, we found that 
ingroup members, deviant or normative, were, respectively, more strongly derogated or 
upgraded relative to similar outgroup members, when they were typical than when they 
were atypical of their group. Results of Experiment 7, replicate this finding. Experiments 5 
and 7 further show that participants’ emotional reaction to the targets, and their perception 
of the extent to which these targets positively or negatively contribute to the ingroup’s 
image significantly mediate derogation of ingroup members. 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. Based on the collected evidence, we contend that 
an account of the antecedents and functions of normative individuals’ punitive reactions 
toward ingroup deviants requires one to consider the implications of deviance for the 
identity of these individuals, and the external conditions that, amplify the psychological 
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impact of deviance by decreasing normative individuals’ threshold of tolerance and 
increasing their negative experience of the situation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A THEORETICAL OUTLINE OF SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS 
The social psychological study of group processes evolved mainly from two research 
traditions, the small group approach (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Forsyth, 1990; Shaw, 
1976) and the social identification approach, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) 
and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). 
However, in what regards the study of uniformity and deviance, the two traditions differ in 
their assumptions about the processes involved in group members’ perceptions of their 
groups and of other members. 
Firstly, whereas the small group approach has explored in detail the reactions of 
members of face to face groups to internal disagreement about valued opinions, social 
identity research has centered on the process whereby individuals disregard intragroup 
differences in order to bolster clear-cut intergroup differentiation. Secondly, whereas the 
small group approach focused itself on the part played by interpersonal similarity, 
interdependence, and face-to-face interaction in the construction of the group (cf. Lott & 
Lott, 1965; Shaw, 1976), the social identification approach has traditionally focused on the 
group as a representation that mediates inter-individual relationships (Hogg, 1992; Tajfel, 
1978; cf. also, Wilder & Simon, 1998; Prentice, Miller & Lightdale, 1994; for distinctions 
between the two kinds of groups). Thirdly, whereas research driven by the small group 
approach, has centered mainly on processes occurring within the group to the detriment of 
the intergroup context, research driven by the social identification framework has devoted 
attention to the relationships between groups while generally disregarding how social 
categories deal with emerging deviance. In the present chapter, we argue that, although 
these two perspectives have evolved largely through independent paths, they may be 
heuristically combined into a general perspective of the interplay between intergroup and 
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intragroup processes. Interestingly, one way in which such combination can be attempted 
is by reference to sociological work inspired by the seminal theory of Durkheim about 
social solidarity, anomie, and social control (Durkheim, 1893, 1895). 
Durkheim’s Approach to Deviance, Social Control, and Social Cohesiveness 
Durkheim’s functionalist approach to deviance has been recognized as one of the 
most influential accounts of the process whereby groups construct and reinforce internal 
cohesiveness (e.g. Jones, 1981; Marks, 1974; Turner, 1990). The core idea of Durkheim’s 
theory can be subsumed as follows: 
“…Society is essentially a set of ideas shared by individuals. Social facts are 
things, but things that exist only in the minds of individuals. Society, like 
religion, is abstract, normative, and emotional […]. The maintenance of 
consensus ant the maintenance of order are the organizing principles of 
Durkheim’s society.” (Pitts, 1965, p. 686). 
Social Control and Social Organization  
A core aspect in Durkheim’s theory is the notion of social control. The term social 
control refers the set of mechanisms that society puts to work in order to insure 
individuals’ compliance with the principles that regulate the society, i.e., social norms, to 
the detriment of undisciplined individual impulses that, if unconstrained, would create a 
state of anomie, or social disorder. Similar notions were used by other classical authors, 
such as Mead (1925), Ross (1901), Thomas and Znaniecki (1927; cf. for example, Meier, 
1982). 
To Durkheim (1893, 1895), the organization of a community can be approached 
through the observation of how social control operates in that community. The 
characteristics of the social organization would be given by the observation of the 
predominant ways through which the society internally establishes social solidarity, i.e., 
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the necessary uniformity of beliefs, rules for inter-individual cooperation, or latitudes of 
tolerable behavior to ensure its continuity over time. 
Forms of Social Control and of Social Solidarity 
In analyzing how different societies exert social control over their members, 
regardless of whether social control emerges in formal or informal ways1, Durkheim 
(1893) distinguished between two general orientations that he designated as repressive and 
restitutive. Repressive social control, on the one hand, would find its formal manifestation 
in the criminal law, in which the penalty applied upon lawbreakers aims to directly 
punishing them for the harm that, by breaking the link of social solidarity with other 
people, they would have caused to society. Restitutive social control, on the other hand, 
would correspond more to civil, commercial or constitutional law, whose ultimate goal is, 
more than punishing the harm doer, to repair the harm done by bringing society back to the 
state of affairs that pre-existed the norm violation. 
Importantly, Durkheim equated repressive and restitutive social control with two 
different forms of social organization. These two forms correspond to mechanical 
solidarity and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1893). Mechanical solidarity and organic 
solidarity would be two ways in which individuals represent both the social units to which 
they belong and their position as members of those units. 
Mechanical solidarity would be a property of simple communities, in which social 
cohesiveness is a function of individuals’ belief similarity and behavioral uniformity. It 
stands for the automatically, and fully, sharing of the same values, motives, beliefs and 
behavior patterns by socialized individuals. Clearly, this form of social coordination would 
                                                 
1 From Durkheim’s (e.g. 1985) sociological standpoint, the formal social institutions to analyze, would thus 
be the Law, Education, and Religion, that is, the three institutions that more aptly regulate the minds and 
behavior of individuals, by creating, imposing, and ensuring their abidance by social norms. However, 
Durkheim admitted, informal social control mechanisms may be very effective in establishing social 
uniformity (e.g. Durkheim, 1893). 
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be impossible in the simpler group, all the more because differentiation would there be 
largely unaccepted. 
In turn, organic solidarity would emerge in more complex social organizations, in 
which the increasing division of roles and functions (which Durkheim designates as “social 
labor”) leads to a greater differentiation between individuals. In this case, social 
cohesiveness would correspond to the functional complementarity between individuals 
whose different perspectives, motivations, beliefs, and skills would contribute to the 
effective operation of intertwined and mutually interdependent spheres of the social 
organization (cf. Durkheim, 1893)2. 
Anomie, Deviance, and Social Control: the Structuring Role of Punishment 
Durkheim’s approach to social control and his conception of the social function of 
deviance and punishment cannot be dissociated. A core contention in Durkheim’s (e.g. 
1893, 1895) theory is that deviance is a normal fact of social life, a functional aspect of 
every group that is vital for its common existence. In other words, groups create 
themselves their own deviance, without which they would not be able to maintain the 
required level of internal consensus that allow their continued existence. Although, at first 
glance, the theory appears to rest on the idea that groups need internal consensus, it argues, 
in fact, that the emergence of intragroup diversity is a necessary outcome of group life, 
whose crucial function is to bolster social uniformity. Durkheim (1895) exemplifies this 
idea by imagining a “community of saints” where 
“…crime properly said, would there be unknown, but faults which would 
appear venial or current, would raise the same scandal as the ordinary 
offence does to the common mind. If, then, it had the power to judge and 
punish, such a society would qualify these acts as criminal and would treat 
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them as such […] Crime is, therefore, necessary; it is linked to the 
fundamental conditions of all social life and, for this very reason it is useful; 
because the conditions to which it is associated are themselves vital to the 
normal evolution of morality…” (pp. 68-70, our translation).3 
Durkheim defines deviance with respect to the notion of collective mind 
(conscience collective). The collective mind refers to the set of beliefs and feelings that are 
shared by the members of a community. In this vein, an offence or deviant act is an act that 
offends the core aspects (the “strong states”, as Durkheim calls it) of the collective mind. 
The crucial implication of this fact is assumption, is that, to Durkheim (1893) an act 
becomes deviant to the extent it will be blamed by the collective mind, rather than the 
reverse. To put it in Inverarity’s (1980) words, “the social act of punishment has the 
primary consequence not of deterring potential troublemakers but rather of reaffirming 
commitment and solidarity among the virtuous” (p. 194). Deviance would thus be a 
product of punishment, rather than its instigator. Because punishment marks the threshold 
from which deviation from group norms is no longer accepted, punishment should increase 
as uniformity decreases within the group. As a result, deviance should be viewed as a 
collective construction that, by increasing punishment opportunities would force 
individuals to focus on the norm, and even to commit themselves more strongly to it by 
participating, actually, or tacitly, in the punishment of deviants (cf. also Marques & 
Serôdio, 2000). In other words, punishment primarily serves the function of reinforcing 
commitment and solidarity between normative individuals, rather than discouraging and 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 Interestingly, Durkheim (1893) initially conceived the two types of solidarity as the reflection of society’s 
evolutionary transition – i.e., modernity entails a progressive shift from mechanical to organic solidarity. He 
later reviewed his position considering that the two types may coexist (Durkheim, 1895). 
3 In the original version: “… les crimes proprement dits y seront inconnus; mais les fautes qui paraissent 
vénielles ou vulgaires y soulèveront le même scandale que fait le délit ordinaire auprès des consciences 
ordinaires. Si donc cette société se trouve armée du pouvoir de juger et de punir, elle qualifiera ces actes de 
criminels et le traitera comme tells […] Le crime est donc nécessaire; il est lié aux conditions fondamentales 
de toute vie sociale, mais, par cela même, il est utile; car ces conditions dont il est solidaire sont elles-mêmes 
indispensables à l’évolution normale de la morale…”. (pp. 68-70). 
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preventing dissidence. In fulfilling these functions, deviance and punishment are vital for 
the maintenance of social cohesiveness. As Durkheim (1895) put it, 
“If, as societies change from inferior types to higher ones, the rate of 
criminality […] tended to decrease, one might believe that, in spite of 
remaining a normal phenomenon, crime would nevertheless tend to loose 
this quality. But we have no reason to believe in the reality of this decrease. 
Many facts seem to rather demonstrate the reverse phenomenon […]. In 
France, the increase is about 300%. There is no other phenomenon that 
more cogently presents all the symptoms of normality, because it appears to 
be closely associated with the conditions of collective life.” (Durkheim, 
1895, pp. 65-66).4 
In short, deviance is created by the group in order to increase punishment. 
Punishment, in turn, provides individuals with the opportunity to express (or to simply 
feel) their hostility towards those other individuals whose behavior falls aside the limits 
constructed by the group on relevant norms. Participation in punishment will allow the 
former to reinforce their commitment to the breached norm and, by the same token, to 
increase their attachment to the group. 
Deviance thus appears as a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. It strengthens the 
very norms it challenges, by leading normative individuals to engage in reactions towards 
deviants. It “not only revives and maintains common sentiments, but creatively establishes 
moral rules and redefines ‘normal’ behavior” (Coser, 1962, p. 173). Deviance thus 
crucially provides the necessary contrast between behavior that is deemed moral or 
immoral by the community. In doing so, it allows individuals to assess and to govern their 
                                                 
4 In the original version: “Si, du moins à mesure que les sociétés passent des types inférieurs aux plus élevés, 
le taux de criminalité […] tendait à baisser, on pourrait croire que, tout en restant un phénomène normal, le 
crime, cependant, tend à perdre ce caractère. Mais nous n’avons aucune raison qui nous permette de croire à 
la réalité de cette régression. Bien des faits sembleraient plutôt démontrer l’existence d’un phénomène en 
sens inverse […]. En France, l’augmentation est de près de 300%. Il n’est donc pas de phénomène qui 
présente de la manière la plus irrécusée tous les symptômes de la normalité puisqu’il apparaît comme 
étroitement lié aux conditions de toute vie collective.” (Durkheim, 1895, pp. 65-66). 
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own behavior and the behavior of others in light of the community’s standards, and, hence, 
to establish their attachment and altruistic orientation towards the group (Durkheim, 1909). 
If no opportunities to engage in deviance punishment existed, individuals would loose 
sight of the specific values that should, in their eyes, establish their membership to a 
unique, and positively valued, social unit. Such an ignorance of the group’s norms and 
therefore, ignorance of its boundaries (the well-known durkheimian notion of anomie), 
would ultimately lead the social identity of members to fade, and condemn the group to 
non-existence (e.g. Durkheim 1893, 1895; cf. also Akers, 1968). 
Deviance and Social Control as an Intergroup Process 
Maybe due to its richly heuristic contents, research directly or indirectly inspired by 
Durkheim’s theory evolved into, at least, two distinct lines. One such line of reasoning 
views deviance as a disruptive process occurring within the community, and conceives 
social control as a process that opposes normative to deviant groups. To some extent, 
deviance would be a structural property that distinguishes between non-conventional and 
normative groups.  
To some authors, research on deviance ensues from the assumption of a distinction 
between, consistent and consensual, normative individuals and periodically emerging 
deviant groups (cf. Inverarity, 1980). According to this general view, deviance originates 
either from individuals’ socialization in deviant groups, or from individuals’ lack of 
socialization, and thus deviance is viewed as the direct outcome of individuals’ 
membership in a particular social category. As DeLamater (1968) puts it, 
“If one analyzes the background of many deviants, it appears that they were 
not originally socialized into conventional society. In some cases, childhood 
socialization occurred in a deviant subculture, and was explicitly in deviant 
(i.e. contraconventional) norms and values […] More frequently, the 
potential deviant’s socialization as a child was simply inadequate or lacking. 
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Either the parents made no attempt to systematically train the child to any 
set of norms, or there were no parents or other adults available to serve as 
effective socializing agents […] This type of […] socialization prepares the 
individual for deviant behavior fairly directly; it removes the necessity for 
him to neutralize conventional norms or withdraw legitimacy attributions 
from them […].” (p. 447, emphasis in the original). 
From a social psychological standpoint, then, we can say that, conceptualized in 
this way, deviance would be the manifestation of a conflict between “society” (a dominant 
or majority group), and a normative system (or the absence of such a system) adopted by a 
minority or dominated group (cf. Moscovici, 1976). Obviously, in this context, what is 
deemed as “normative”, as “effective” or “ineffective” socialization, or as “non-
conventional”, strongly depends on the normative standards of the group that, at a 
particular historical moment, has access to the mechanisms of social control in society at 
large (cf. for instance, Chambliss, 1976; Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; Inverarity, 1980). 
For example, according to Merton’s (1938, 1968) social disorganization theory, 
society imposes criteria of social success, mainly, material success, to individuals, but fails 
to endow certain groups with the means to achieve success by conventional, socially 
sanctioned, means. This contradiction would create a state of anomie by weakening the 
strength of social norms over these individuals, so that they would attempt to accomplish 
the socially valued goals by using non-conventional procedures. Akin to Merton’s theory is 
Parker and Stonequist’s (1937) account of deviance and marginality. To these authors, 
deviance (which they designate as marginality) would ensue from a contradiction between 
between broad role-commitments and incompatible social memberships. Thus, individuals 
who identify with a role that is not clearly spelt out may sooner or later discover that this 
role is in contradiction with previous commitments to incompatible other roles. This 
inconsistency would be solved either by strengthening their commitment with the present 
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role to the detriment of past commitments, or by deviating from their group, thus adopting 
a marginal position (cf. Pitts, 1965). 
In a similar vein, with differential association theory, Sutherland and Cressey 
(1974) argue that the particular social organization that is found in urban areas weakens the 
more traditional, and more effective, mechanisms of social control that are found in 
primary groups and less complex forms of social organization. An outcome of this process 
is the emergence of deviant sub-cultures. Once individuals associate themselves to these 
cultures, individuals will assimilate their attitudes, motivations, and beliefs, while learning 
deviant techniques. Individuals will become deviant once the strength of attitudes, 
motivations and beliefs that favor the violation of social norms overpasses that of norm 
abiding attitudes, motivations and beliefs. Society would thus be composed by normative 
groups and by groups that differentiate themselves from the main stream in terms of their 
actions, goals, and representations of the world (e.g. Meier, 1982). 
The other line of reasoning that emerged from Durkheim’s seminal ideas views 
deviance more as a process that, not only emerges within every social group, but also, and 
more importantly, as a process that is functional the groups’ very existence, and that 
becomes crucial exactly when the vicissitudes of group life require the reinforcement of 
social cohesiveness (e.g. Erikson, 1966). Authors in this line of reasoning have inquired 
into how individuals that were formerly normative, or considered as such, acquire a 
deviant status. 
In this context, Becker’s (1963) societal reaction theory is a classical example. 
According to this author, society creates itself the very rules whose infraction is defined as 
deviance, following which it labels those who do not abide by those rules as deviant, prior 
to casting them off the group as outsiders. At the outset, then, these individuals are 
normative group members, in that their behavior has not yet been defined as deviant. They 
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become deviants only after their behavior is consensually viewed by others as deviant 
(primary deviance) and even more so when they accept that label themselves (secondary 
deviance). The representation of certain behavior as deviant is initiated through the action 
of “moral entrepreneurs”, that is, individuals or institutions who have the means to impose 
moral meaning upon these behaviors. When these “moral crusades” are effective in 
generating negative feelings about the target behavior in the remainder of society (societal 
reaction), deviants become to be viewed as outsiders and are subject to punitive treatment. 
Societal reaction thus corresponds to the creation of social consensus about which behavior 
is acceptable or unacceptable and, by the same token, about whose individuals are to be 
considered normative or deviant. 
A classical example of this process is provided by Becker’s analysis of the 
criminalization of marijuana use in the United States. Whereas in the 1930s, the possession 
and use of marijuana was criminalized in only 16 North American states, and induced but 
generalized apathy on the part of public opinion and institutions (Becker, 1963), in 1937 it 
became criminalized in all 48 states. This seems to have been due to the action of mass-
media, who started to refer to marijuana as “the killer weed”, “the burning weed from 
hell”, or “the sex-crazing drug menace”, and of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, who acted 
as moral entrepreneurs that generated the labeling of a new social category of marijuana 
consumers (cf. also Archer, 1985).  
Moral panic is a process similar to a moral crusade that occurs when the role of 
moral entrepreneurs cannot be directly assigned to a particular group or institution, but 
rather appears diluted across society (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). The term “moral 
panic” was coined by Cohen (1972) in his analysis of how minor social disorders can be 
amplified based on the exaggeration of the supposedly threatening character of a specific 
social category to society in general. According to this author, moral panics usually emerge 
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following an event that is considered as morally censurable. In being reported, namely by 
the mass-media, the event may be subject to a sensitization process, whereby “harm, 
wrongness, or deviance is attributed to the behavior, condition, or phenomenon that is 
routinely ignored when the same consequences are caused by or attributed to more 
conventional conditions” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 156). Moral panics thus stand 
for the amplification of social concerns that emerge following the exaggeration and the 
misplacement of a perceived threat to society’s values by a specific social category 
(Cohen, 1972) and the consequent increase in hostility towards this category that, as a 
result, moves from the status of relatively anodyne subculture to that of a dangerous 
deviant group. 
In his classical illustration of this deviance amplification spiral, Cohen (1972) 
analyzed the emergence of a large social concern about the “Mod” and “Rocker” British 
youth movements, whose popular images involved, respectively, motor scooter-driving and 
sophisticated clothing wearing, or motor bike-driving and black leather jacket wearing. On 
Easter Sunday of 1964 members of the two groups gathered in a sea resort in southwest 
England and were involved in minor scuffles, following which a few windows and beach 
huts were broken and about one-hundred people were arrested and charged from abusive 
behavior or resistance to arrest. Following mass-media coverage of this event, youth gangs 
and vandalism emerged as a major news theme and as a source of social concern in 
England for at least three years (Cohen, 1972), and mods and rockers became to be viewed 
as potentially threatening deviant groups5. 
The association between deviance and opposing normative systems, or subcultures, 
clearly endows it with an intergroup flavor. For example, Becker’s (1963) perspective 
interestingly overlaps with social identity theory’s idea that the creation and permanence of 
                                                 
5 Perhaps a more interesting example of moral panics is Ben-Yehuda’s (1980, 1985) analysis of witch 
hunting in Medieval Central Europe, a study that we discuss below. 
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a social category requires the generation of social consensus about the category’s 
existence, both by those who categorize (external consensus), and by those who are 
categorized (internal consensus) as members of that social category (Tajfel, 1978). To a 
large extent, then, societal reaction theory subsumes deviance as a social categorization 
process (i.e. labeling) that is followed by a “downward” social mobility process (secondary 
deviance). That is, certain individuals who previously conceived of themselves as members 
of the normative majority, would, by the force of social pressures, be led to 
psychologically and behaviorally join a deviant, lower status, sub-category (cf. Marques, in 
preparation). 
Deviance as a Contribution to Social Cohesion within the Group 
In a previous section, we summarized theoretical perspectives that depict deviance 
in large communities as a process of social differentiation between normative and deviant 
groups. In the above section, we described evidence showing how members of face to face 
groups deal with other members who deviate from the group’s modal opinion, or fail to 
contribute to the achievement of material group goals. However, there is also evidence that 
large communities deal with deviance in a way analogous to that of small, or face-to-face, 
groups. This is illustrated in the following documental studies. 
Threat and Dogmatism in Catholic Canons  
Rokeach, Toch and Rottman (1960) content-analyzed 403 canons issued by the 
Roman Catholic Church in 12 councils that took place between the 4th and 16th centuries 
(from the First Nicea Council, in the 4th century, to the Trent council, in the 16th century). 
These authors then had judges evaluate the degree of situational threat to the Church at the 
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time each council took place6 , the level of religious authority invoked by each cannon, and 
the intensity of punishment prescribed to violators of these cannons. For the 12 councils, 
Rockeach, Toch and Rottman (1968) created three indexes, respectively, for the intensity 
of the threatening character to the Roman Catholic Church of the events that precipitated or 
merely contributed to the councils, the amount of punishment prescribed for violators of 
the canon, and level of authority invoked by the cannon7 The rank-order correlations 
between the three indexes show a significant relationship between threat and punitiveness 
(r = .52) and between threat and absolutism ( r =  .66), even though the correlation 
between punitiveness and absolutism was only r = .46. As Rockeach, Toch and Rottman 
(1968) stated, 
“Undoubtedly, the continued existence of an institution depends upon 
appropriate responses by its leaders to new situations. An important change 
in circumstances calls for the corresponding changes in the institution. On 
the other hand, groups also have to protect themselves against too much 
change, because beyond a certain point, the group would change itself out of 
existence. With too much modification, an Anabaptist is transformed into a 
Mennonite, and a Mennonite into an Amish.” (Rockeach, Toch & Rottman, 
1968, p. 386). 
Although it appeared from a different tradition, Rockeach, Toch and Rottman’s 
(1968) study cogently illustrates the major contention of authors whose research was 
                                                 
6 For example, the Second Lateran Council, the Constance council, and the Basle council, were among those 
rated as being held under the higher threat. The Second Lateran Council (1139), was held during the schism 
that opposed Pope Innocent II to Cardinal Pietro Pierlone’s election as anti-pope, and the Constance (1414-
1418) and the Basle (1431-1449) councils accompanied the emergence of Jean Hus’ and Martin Luther’s 
Reformation. Among those rated to be held under the least threatening conditions was, for example, the First 
Council of Constantinople (381), that took place as Arianism came to an end, or the First Nicea Council 
(325), in which the proper date for Easter celebration was debated (Rockeach Toch & Rottman, 1968) 
7 For example, a canon high in authority and punitiveness is “Desiring with the grace of God to protect the 
recognized possessions of the Holy Roman Church, we forbid under penalty of anathema any military person 
to invade or forcibly hold Benevento, the city of St. Peter” (Rockeach, Toch & Rottman, 1968, p. 384), 
whereas another low in authority and punitiveness is “All the poor and those in need of help when travelling 
shall after an examination be provided with ecclesiastical letters of peace only and not with commendatory 
letters, because commendatory letters ought to be granted to those persons only who are in high estimation” 
(id., ib.) 
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directly inspired by the durkheimian theory of social control. Indeed, all differences 
considered (and in spite of methodological problems that were, besides, clearly recognized 
by the authors), Rockeach and colleagues’ findings suggest that group’s tolerance for 
deviation and tendency toprescribe their members’ behavior is a reverse direct function of 
the internal or external menaces to their existence. 
The Puritan Community of New England 
As a case in point, Erikson (1966), an author who is widely recognized as an 
adherent to the durkheimian tradition, contended that groups define themselves in terms of 
the norms they prescribe to their members (i.e. their moral boundaries), which distinguish 
themselves from other communities. Moral boundaries would thus define the identity of 
those that belong to the community, by prescribing their permissible actions and, hence, 
also those actions that are not to be tolerated. The normative or deviant quality of actions, 
or individuals would thus depend much less on their intrinsic attributes than on the current 
stand of the group regarding the threshold of tolerance for differences in its sphere: 
“Deviance is not a property inherent in any particular kind of behavior; it is 
a property conferred upon that behavior by the people who come into direct 
or indirect contact with it. The only way an observer can tell whether or not 
a given style of behavior is deviant, then, is to learn something about the 
standards of the audience which responds to it.” (Erikson, 1966, p. 6) 
The group would be led to narrowing or enlarging its tolerance for non-conformity, 
depending on whether or not it is at risk to loose its moral identity (Erikson, 1966). 
Conditions that would require narrowing moral boundaries would be, for example, the 
realignment of power, the maintenance of the status quo, or the increase of internal 
cohesiveness in the presence of an external threat. 
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Based on the above ideas, Erikson (1966) analyzed three cases that took place 
between 1630 and 1690 in the Puritan community of New England. The first case, known 
as the Antinomian controversy, dealt with Mrs. Anne Hutchinson’s campaign advocating 
the uselessness of the clergy as the mediator between God and the individual, in light of 
the Calvinist principle of the equality of all individuals in the eyes of God. Mrs. 
Hutchinson’s position was consistent with the Puritan emphasis on the private nature of the 
relationship between God and the individual, but as the Puritan community established 
itself as an autonomous colony, “the New England theorists [had begun] to argue that God 
had entered into a covenant with the people of the colony as a corporate group and was 
only ready to deal with them through the agencies they had built to govern themselves” 
(Erikson, 1966, p. 73). Mrs. Hutchinson’s position thus ran counter the new theology that 
forced the relationship of the individual with God to be mediated, and hence screened by 
the colony’s administration. Describing the long series of events that lead Mrs. Hutchinson 
and her husband to trial, and banishment from the colony, and their followers to be 
punished would be too space consuming and fall beyond our scope. But the way Erikson 
(1966) summarizes what was at stake in the whole process seems elucidative: 
“Although it is convenient to place Mrs. Hutchinson in the center of the 
Antinomian controversy, […] it is far more important to understand the 
shifts of mood that made the settlers responsive to her arguments[…] In 
1636 the townsfolk of Boston decided to join her […] and, in doing so 
placed her in the midst of a crucial historical crossroads. […] Massachusetts 
Bay was a community […] fashioned in the belief that each person was 
primarily responsible to the promptings of his new conscience […]. The 
verdict against her was a public statement of the new boundaries of 
Puritanism in Massachusetts Bay, for in passing sentence on Mrs. 
Hutchinson the magistrates were declaring […] that the historical stage she 
had come to represent was now past.” (pp. 106-107). 
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The second case analyzed by Erikson (1966) was the so-called “Quaker invasion” 
between 1656 and 1665, and the conflict between the progressive tendency of the Quaker 
movement (namely the refusal to defer to the religious and political authority) and the 
conservative Puritan position. The Quaker movement was composed by individuals 
recently arrived in New England who defended simplicity of life at all costs and who 
challenged authority in such ordinary acts as the refusal to display signs of respect to 
superiors or to the church itself. In doing so, 
“…the Quakers had ignored a fundamental responsibility by failing to share 
[…] that sense of firm ideological commitment, that willingness to 
participate fully in the rhythms of group life, the feeling of common heritage 
and common destiny which gives every society its underlying cohesion.” 
(Erikson, 1966, p. 130). 
Such failure resulted in institutional outbursts of punishment. Besides ordering 
burning of any Quaker literature, the Puritan officials punished Quaker offences with fines, 
public beatings, banishment, imprisonment, and stigmatization such as cutting off the 
offenders’ ears or nose, or iron marking them in the forehead, and these punishments were 
often supported by the crowds. 
The third case analyzed by Erikson (1966), known as the case of the witches of 
Salem, occurred in 1692, when, following the establishment of the Reformation as a 
relevant party in the international arena, and the new attitude of England towards the 
Puritan movement, 
“[the settlers] were no longer […] members of that special revolutionary 
elite who were destined to bend the course of history according to God’s 
own word. They were only themselves, living alone in a remote corner of 
the world, and this seemed a modest end for a crusade which had begun 
with such light expectations […]” (p. 155). 
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Following an insignificant turn of events, a group of teenage girls began to 
convince people that they had seen witches and evil spirits. The issue acquired a 
disproportionate dimension, because the alleged sightings were reported almost 
everywhere in the village and directed to every person. Eventually, many people whose 
religious beliefs and allegiance to the community’s ways of life had never been questioned 
before were imprisoned. Some of these people suffered capital punishment. 
According to Erikson (1966), the episode of the witches of Salem was, as were the 
former two cases, elicited by a threat to the founding beliefs and internal cohesiveness of 
the Puritan colony either from the inside or from outside the community. The laypeople’s 
insurgence against the increasing power of the clergy, and the spread of a progressive 
religious doctrine, found in the Antinomian controversy and the Quaker invasion, were 
paralleled, in the episode of the witches of Salem, by the political quarrels due to the war 
against the Indians, and the increasing administrative disorder. 
All three cases suggest that, by devoting increased attention to certain issues and/or 
individuals, and by decreasing tolerance towards particular aspects of these issues and 
individuals, the group increases the opportunities for normative individuals to be 
confronted with deviance, and to directly or vicariously participate in punitive action that 
will strengthen their solidarity with, or commitment to, the group. 
The Lynching Mobs in Nineteenth Century Louisiana 
Inverarity (1976) describes a case with similar consonance, about the significant 
increase of lynching mobs in Louisiana between 1889 and 1896, after the American Civil 
War. Black and white small land owners and workers rallied together in the People’s Party, 
against the large industrial entrepreneurs, merchants and land owners of the southern 
states. The blurring of racial frontiers by the new focus on the conflict between the poor 
and the rich land owners, industrials and merchants, was a major breakdown in the 
  
24
 
solidarity of white southerners that had been previously sustained by the threats posed to 
the Southern spirit by the occupation of Louisiana by the Union army, and by the newly 
established access of blacks to full citizenship. 
According to Inverarity (1976), the community found a response to this new threat 
by increasing the number of informal ritual punishments, the lynching mob. Between 1889 
and 1896, 80 blacks and 14 whites were summarily executed at the hands of mobs, with the 
tacit support of public opinion. Interestingly, these phenomena were more strongly 
correlated with events such as the proximity of elections, opposing the People’s party to 
the ruling Democratic party, or to the relationship between the punished act and the 
political struggle involving the two factions, than to any demographic factor, inclusing 
increases in the population (Inverarity, 1976). 
The Great Red Scare and the Stalinist Purge 
Other authors, for example Gibson (1988) or Sullivan and colleagues (Sullivan, 
Piereson, & Marcus, 1979) describe how the House of Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAAC), controlled by the senator Joseph McCarthy at the time of the Great Red Scare 
of the 1940-1950’s in the United States of America, thousands of individuals suffered 
disqualification from public job careers, were denied the right to be run in any political 
election or from serving public duties even if elected for the position. In 22 of the 50 
North-American states, 13 million workers – corresponding to about 20% of the country’s 
work force – were directly or indirectly affected by control measures by the HUACC. 
These measures resulted in the firing of eleven thousand workers, 100 convictions of anti-
americanism, and 135 citations for contempt. Interestingly enough, McCarthyism emerged 
as an intragroup normative process exactly at the beginning of the Cold War, in which the 
United States faced, for the first time in history a potential dangerous enemy. 
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A similar process is suggested by the so-called “Stalinist Purge” in the years of 
1936-1938. Conquest (1968) and Connor (1972) estimate that about four million lives were 
lost and seven million sent to prison. Whereas in the McCarthyism period the victims 
proceeded from all social status - from working class persons to scholars or movie 
directors – in the Stalinist purge, the victims were mainly members of the elite: high 
officials of the party, people with relationships with foreign countries, industrial engineers 
or even agents of the NKVD that were considered incompetent in their investigation. 
However, in both cases, their persecution served the purpose to reaffirm the principles 
according to which the group (in this case, the large social category) could remain 
positively differentiated from competing groups. 
The War of “Canudos” 
We may find yet another example in the “war of Canudos”, that occurred in 1896-
1897 in the Brazilian state of Bahia (Levine, 1988). The village of Canudos, was a rural 
community founded in the late XIXth century by a religious leader known among his 
followers by the name of António Conselheiro. This leader is nowadays celebrated as 
“Santo Antônio da Bahia” (Saint Anthony of Bahia). The community of Canudos 
advocated an alternative way of life, independent from the central government, and from 
the power of the called “colonels”, a class of land owners that dominated the rural states of 
Brazil. The Canudos community upheld values such as free property and the religious 
independence from the dominant clergy laws. For these reasons, the community was 
increasingly considered as a threat, both to the Catholic Church, and to the newly 
proclaimed Brazilian Republic (1889), which could hardly subsist without the colonels’ 
support. The land that the community proclaimed as their own was mostly infertile and 
abandoned by others, and the influence of the “Canudos” life style over neighbouring 
communities was objectively irrelevant (Levine, 1988). Nevertheless, the central 
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government ordered four consecutive of military charges that lead to the killing of more 
than 20 thousand civilians and 5 thousand soldiers. After approximately one year of war, 
the community and its leaders were defeated and the “moral and religious righteousness” 
as well as the authority of the new republic were reinsured. 
Case studies like the ones reviewed above are, obviously, susceptible to 
methodological and external validity criticism. Indeed, the documental studies about the 
structuring role of deviance in specific communities allow, at best, for correlational 
reasoning (cf. Gibbs & Erikson, 1975), or, as Inverarity (1980) contended, 
“Although Erikson successfully translates Durkheim’s argument into 
researchable problems, he fails to consider the problem of scope. In 
particular, Erikson offers no explicit criteria for his choice of Puritan 
Massachusetts as a research site. Consequently, we are left uncertain about 
the external validity of his conclusion. Do boundary crises produce crime 
waves only in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, in theocracies in general 
or in all social systems?” (p. 197). 
Indeed, Erikson’s case is supported by other relevant studies about social 
phenomena whose structural properties are quite different from those present in the cases 
analyzed by Erikson. Nevertheless, as Inverarity (1980) claims, after an analysis of capital 
punishment in the U.S.A., McCarthyism, and the Stalinist Soviet Purges, Inverarity (1980) 
concludes that: 
“Other cases could be cited, but the above three should be sufficient to 
demonstrate the necessity of qualifying Durkheim’s theory, of 
distinguishing in general terms those kinds of social systems to which it is 
applicable from those to which it is not” (p. 198). 
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An Experimental Study on Group’s Boundaries Definition  
This qualification certainly applies to the remainder of the above reviewed case 
studies. However, as far as we are concerned, we believe that the kind of process 
uncovered by these studies can be relevantly traced to individuals’ sense of membership to 
their social group and the consequent motivation to uphold a positive identity as group 
members. A step towards this goal can be found in a study conducted by Lauderdale 
(1976). In that study, a partial replication of Schachter’s (1951; cf. above) classical 
experiment, participants were asked to join a discussion group whose task was to 
recommend correctional treatment to juvenile delinquents. After reading the case of a 
Johnny Martin, participants were faced with a confederate who behaved in a way similar to 
the “deviant” confederate in Schachter’s (1951) study. The discussion group was  observed 
by an alleged “criminal justice officer” who, depending on conditions, either blatantly 
stated to the Experimenter that the group had few chances to succeed in the task (Threat 
Condition), or, instead, made an irrelevant comment (Non-Threat Condition). Participants 
were then informed that it would be necessary to reduce the number of members in the 
group, and were asked to rank each other in terms of their preferences for those to remain 
in the group as well as to evaluate those members to whom they assigned the highest and 
the lowest preference ranking. Not surprisingly, Lauderdale (1976) found that, in general, 
participants gave the confederate the lowest ranking. However, this ranking was 
significantly lower in the Threat than in the Non-Threat condition. A similar result 
emerged from evaluations. Although the confederate was systematically evaluated in a less 
favorable manner than every other member, this evaluation was the least favorable in the 
Threat condition. These results are consistent with the assumption that deviants are more 
strongly rejected, and more negatively evaluated when the group is subject to an outside 
threat than when no threat is present. These results were replicated in a similar set of 
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experiments by Lauderdale, Smith-Cunnien and Inverarity (1984). Experiments 4 and 5 in 
this work (see chapters 3 and 4) deal with a very similar question from an intergroup 
perspective. 
The Medieval Witch Hunting Crusades 
A final illustration of the social function of deviance in reinforcing the moral 
boundaries of groups comes from Ben-Yehuda’s (1980, 1985; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 
1995) study of the witch-hunting moral panics that pervaded Europe in the end of the 
medieval period. Until the fourteenth century, the Catholic Church’s official position 
regarding magic and witchcraft was that it was an illusion. At that time, witchcraft was not 
part of  the Church’s agenda, which was far more concerned with the struggle against the 
Cathari, Albigensian, and Waldense heresies. By the mid of the thirteenth century, the 
Roman Catholic Church was resolving the internal turmoil of its first centuries of life, and 
the outside threat that had been posed by the heresies came to an end with the defeat of the 
Cathari movement, in 1243 (cf. Ben-Yehuda, 1980). From that moment on, the Church 
started a process that ended with the burning of an estimated two-hundred to five-hundred 
thousand persons, charged of having consorted with the devil, with the support and 
applause of the general population (Delumeau, 1978). 
In 1326, Pope John XXII issued a bull (Super illius specula) in which magicians 
and sorcerers were, for the first time, accused of consorting with the devil. Between 1428 
and 1447, 110 people were executed in the Dauphiné, an event that was concomitant with 
the emergence of the first documented mass panic related to witches in the Swiss Valais. In 
1484, Pope Innocent III elaborated on the art of sorcery (Summis desiderantis), and 
instigated the application of severe punishment measures against sorcerers in the Rhine 
Valley. Three years later, Dominicans Jacob Sprenger and Heinrich Kramer wrote the 
well-known Malleus maleficarum (“The sorcerers’ mallet”), in which they added to the 
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long list of heretics that had been draw by their precursor Nicholas Eymerich (“Handbook 
of the Inquisitors” – ca. 1376), the new category of sorcerers and witches. 
In our view, Ben-Yehuda’s (1980) conclusion deserves to be read, because it 
clearly establishes the social antecedents, of the public participation in the medieval witch 
panic, as well as the social psychological functions of such participation: 
“In the medieval tradition, the moral boundaries of society were clearly 
defined. There was Christendom, ruled spiritually by Rome and structured 
in a uniformly conceived feudal order, firmly embedded in a finite cosmic 
order ruled by God […]. In this sense, the witch craze could be called a 
‘collective search for identity’[…] Witches were the only deviants who 
could be construed as attacking the very core of the social system, through 
antireligion. […] What could better explain the strain felt by the individual 
than the idea that he was part of a cataclysmic, cosmic struggle between the 
‘sons of light’ and the ‘sons of darkness’? His personal acceptance of this 
particular explanation was further guaranteed by the fact that he could assist 
the ‘sons of light’ in helping to trap the ‘sons of darkness’ – the despised 
witches – and thus play a real role in ending the cosmic struggle in a way 
that would bring salvation nearer” (Ben-Yehuda, 1980, pp. 13-16) 
Implications for the Study of Deviance in Social Psychology 
How does the above reviewed theoretical field relates to research on deviance 
conducted in the realm of social psychology? One important feature of the above reviewed 
evidence is that it suggests that punishment of deviants emerges mainly when there is a 
need to reinforce individuals’ sense of cohesion and commitment to society’s norms. In 
this vein, this evidence is consistent with, and very clearly illustrates Durkheim’s (1893, 
1998) ideas about mechanical solidarity. Specifically, it illustrates the processes according 
to which social groups increase the uniformity of their members’ behavior and beliefs, and 
their attachment to the group. Perhaps the citation below, issued from work by another 
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sociologist (Simmel, 1858/1918), helps one to find an answer to the question with which 
we initiated this paragraph. As Simmel put it in discussing the phenomenology of group 
life, every group includes members who generate 
“a kind of (...) hostility whose intensification is grounded in a feeling of 
belonging together, of unity, which by no means always means similarity 
(…). This hatred is directed against the member of the group, not for 
personal motives, but because the member represents a danger to the 
preservation of the group” (Simmel, 1858/1918, pp. 48-49). 
In our opinion, this idea subsumes the phenomenology of deviance in face to face 
groups, the traditional domain of study of this process by classical social psychology. 
However, the notion of mechanical solidarity and its supporting evidence also suggests that 
such phenomenology allows groups to maintain internal uniformity and cohesiveness, by 
reinforcing both the inter-individual ties among their members, and each individual’s ties 
with the group as a whole. 
Uniformity and Deviance in Small Groups 
Typically, social psychology has pictured small, or face to face groups, as social 
units in which individuals directly interact with one another and are associated to each 
other by common goals and mutual attraction (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & 
Moreland, 1994, 1998; Levine & Thompson, 1996; Shaw, 1976). For example, Shaw 
(1976, p.10) defined a group as “two or more persons who are interacting with one another 
in such a manner that each person influences and is influenced by each other person” 
(p.10). In a similar vein, Jones and Gerard (1967) proposed that a group is “an aggregation 
of persons [in which] all see their actions as interrelated and their fates to some extent 
interdependent. The members of a group usually expect that their continued affiliation will 
provide a means of obtaining desired goals” (p. 713). 
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The small group approach traditionally stresses the role of group members’ reciprocal 
influence in the various aspects of group life (e.g. Allport, 1924; Brown, 1988; cf. also 
Hogg, 1992, 1996; Wilder & Simon, 1998). In fact, two basic assumptions underlie the 
small group approach. First, social affiliation is moderated by the individuals’ 
interpersonal similarity and reciprocal attraction (cf. Hogg, 1992, for an extensive review), 
and/or by their interdependence regarding goal achievement. Second, social affiliation 
allows for the social validation of individual opinions through the construction and 
maintenance of group consensus, and helps individuals achieving shared, or 
complementary, goals (e.g. Backman, 1992; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950; Jones & 
Gerard, 1967; Newcomb, 1961). 
Social Reality and Group Locomotion 
Interdependence among group members importantly refers to the construction and 
maintenance of the group’s social reality (Festinger, 1950). To Festinger (1950), 
individuals position themselves in the social world according to a subjective assessment of 
the validity of their beliefs. However, because most beliefs cannot be validated in 
psychophysical ways, individuals will search for consensus as an alternative source of 
validation. The group would provide the context in which individuals validate their beliefs, 
not only about the outside world, but also about themselves, in terms of abilities, 
competencies, by providing them with a relevant context for social comparison. (e.g. 
Festinger, 1954; Hyman, 1942), and reciprocal social approval (Kelley, 1952; Lott & Lott, 
1965). 
A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to the achievement of group goals (e.g. 
Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Jones & DeCharms, 1957). Indeed, Festinger (1950) proposed 
that individuals also affiliate and attempt to ensure unity within the group because, in 
acting together, they can more easily achieve shared or complementary goals. That is, 
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groups would have a locomotion function. Similarity of beliefs and the commitment of 
group members to implicitly or explicitly defined courses of action, would enable them to 
progress towards these goals (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; 
Newcomb, 1961; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956; Zander, 1968). 
Clearly, an existing state of interdependence for the validation of the self as well as 
of other less, yet still, relevant aspects of social reality, would turn any dissent emerging in 
the group into a more or less dramatic threat to group members, either regarding their 
worth as individuals, or regarding the accuracy of their views of the world. Dissent would 
thus generate an unpleasant state of uncertainty (Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 1992). To 
overcome this state of uncertainty, group members would first attempt to persuade the 
deviants to join the group’s mainstream, show hostility towards deviants who consistently 
resist these persuasive efforts, and, ultimately, cast them out of psychological existence by 
expelling them from the group (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Israel, 1956, cited by 
Levine & Thompson, 1996; Levine, 1980). 
In brief, social reality and group locomotion would cause groups to devote 
significant attention at reinforcing consensus and preventing intragroup deviance 
(Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950). Each member would be motivated to accept group 
influence, to endorse group beliefs, and to enforce others to comply with such beliefs 
(Boyanowsky & Allen, 1973; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1975). Interpersonal interdependence 
within the group would translate itself in terms of individuals’ reciprocal commitment and 
consensus as regards fulfillment of such psychological goals and collective achievements. 
By the same token, interpersonal interdependence would prompt reactions against any 
forces with a potential to jeopardize the fulfillment of such goals, emerging within the 
group (see also Cota, Evans, Dion, Kilik & Stewart-Longman, 1995). 
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Groups would thus develop controlling mechanisms to insure uniformity and the 
maintenance of reciprocal commitment among group members (Levine & Moreland, 
1994). Among these mechanisms, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished between 
informational influence and normative influence. Informational influence refers to the private 
acceptance of other people’s beliefs as a proof of reality. It would fulfill individuals’ 
motivation to hold a correct view of relevant aspects of the world. Normative influence 
refers to the public, but not private, acceptance of other people’s beliefs as a means to obtain 
social approval from these individuals. Its efficacy would thus depend on the anticipation of 
the negative reactions of other people to one’s dissent, and their consequences, such as status 
loss, marginalization, or eviction from the group (cf. Cartwright, 1968; Hare, 1962; Janis, 
1982; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Levine, 1980; Shaw, 1976). 
Informational and Normative Influences 
Informational influence would correspond to the internalization of standards that 
are created or assimilated in the course of group life, whereas normative influence would 
correspond to external constraints that compel individuals to conform to other people’s 
expectations as a means to avoid the negative effects of deviance (cf. Forsyth, 1990; Kelley 
& Volkart, 1962; Levine & Thompson, 1996). These two forms of influence would be 
associated with individuals’ motivations to hold an accurate view of the world, and to obtain 
social approval from others (cf. Forsyth, 1990; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Moscovici, 1985). 
Internalized standards thus correspond to the private, and, to a large extent, 
“automatic”, endorsement of beliefs that provide individuals with criteria that guide their 
perception, judgment, and behavior (Jones & Gerard, 1967). As Forsyth (1990) put it, these 
standards make group members “feel duty bound to adhere to the norms of the group since, 
as loyal members, they accept the legitimacy of the established norms and recognize the 
importance of supporting these norms” (p. 163). The private acceptance of norms is thus 
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related with their subjective validity, that is, the “confidence that some idea, judgment, or 
action is right (correct, proper, etc.)” (Turner, 1995, p. 562). 
In turn, normative influence stands exclusively for the overt compliance with the 
expectations of other group members. As Marques (in preparation) pointed out, an 
interesting aspect of normative influence is that it is often cognitively mediated. That is, 
individuals do not necessarily conform because others directly enforce their compliance. 
Rather, they conform because they anticipate other members’ negative reactions, and the 
associated fear of loss in status, rejection, ostracism, etc. (cf. also Archer, 1985; Emler & 
Reicher, 1994; Levine & Thompson, 1996). Individuals expect fellow group members to 
conform to relevant group norms, and lack of conformity on the part of these members 
produces discomfort due to a decrease in the subjective validity of their beliefs. 
Concomitantly, individuals expect “deprecatory” reactions from other members when they 
deviate from the group’s standards themselves. 
Reactions to Deviance in Small Groups 
The above ideas are sustained by a vast body of evidence, from which we shall give 
but a few representative examples (for an extensive reviews, see, for example, Levine, 
1980, and Marques & Páez, 1994).For example, Berkowitz and Howard (1959) had groups 
of four or five participants appraise an organizational conflict. According to conditions, 
participants would be rewarded for their work, either on the basis of collective 
performance, or on the basis of individual performances. In the course of the group 
discussion, participants learned that one member disagreed with the majority. Results 
showed that participants rejected this member more as a prospective co-worker, in the 
collective than in the individual reward condition. In a similar study, Jones and DeCharms 
(1957) had participants perform a task in groups of five or six, among whom there was a 
confederate instructed to systematically fail. Again, participants would be rewarded for 
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their success, either on the basis of the group performance, or on the basis of individual 
performances. When, after completing the task, participants evaluated each other, they 
judged the confederate more negatively in the collective than in the individual condition. 
However, this only occurred when participants attributed the confederate’s failure to lack 
of effort rather than lack of ability. Together, these studies indicate that deviants elicit 
more negative reactions from other members, in contexts in which the deviants hinder the 
positive rewards expected from group performance. This is not the case when rewards are 
based on individualistic criteria. 
As we noticed above, there is a parallel between the material implications of 
deviance for group achievement, and its implications for the subjective validity of group 
members’ beliefs. In his well-known “Johnny Rocco” experiment, Schachter (1951) had 
university students to participate in discussion clubs. Three confederates in the group were 
instructed, respectively to fully and consistently agree (“modal”), or disagree (“deviant”), 
or to initially disagree and then increasingly agree (“slider”), with the majority. After the 
discussion, group members evaluated themselves reciprocally, and appointed each other to 
functions of varying prestige within the group. Among other things, Schachter observed 
that, as it became evident that the deviant confederate would not alter his position, 
participants stopped to communicate with him, rejected him in terms of sociometric 
choices, and appointed him to the less prestigious position in the group. These results 
increased as a function of the direct relevance of the discussion topic and of participants 
involvement with the issue (Schachter, 1951). 
In another representative study, Sampson and Brandon (1964) had white 
participants, who had previously reported themselves to be against racial discrimination, 
working together in order to reach a solution for a case of delinquency involving a black 
youth. At the beginning of the group discussion, a confederate disclosed either a prejudiced 
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or an unprejudiced attitude. In the course of the discussion, the confederate deviated from 
the majority opinion about the solution to the case. Among other results, participants 
exerted stronger uniformity pressures and derogated more the unprejudiced than the 
prejudiced confederate. We may assume that the prejudiced-unprejudiced dimension stood 
either for a categorical distinction (and hence participants considered the unprejudiced 
confederate as an ingroup member), or for a dimension of interpersonal similarity (and 
hence participants considered the confederate as a similar other). In any case, the results 
suggest that individuals derogate more those deviants with whom they share common 
characteristics than deviants with whom they have less in common. 
In a more recent study, Earle (1986) had groups of four participants discussing 
whether psychology undergraduates should participate as research subjects at the 
university. According to conditions, participants were informed either that the discussion 
was aimed to help each person to form a personal opinion (individual goal) or to help the 
group reach a consensual conclusion (group goal). A deviant confederate was instructed to 
systematically give an opinion divergent from that of the majority. Participants then 
anonymously indicated the extent to which they wished each other to remain in the group 
in an upcoming discussion. The confederate was more strongly rejected in the group goal 
than in the individual goal condition. 
This result suggests that when individual goals are salient, individuals would reject 
deviants less, because deviants yield potential informational gain from dialogue. However, 
when group goals are salient, deviant opinions obstruct consensus, and this is particularly 
menacing when a relevant value (as opposed to information-seeking) is in order (Earle, 
1986; cf. also Goethals & Nelson, 1973; Wiggins, Dill & Schwartz, 1965). 
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Implications for the Study of Deviance in Contexts in which Social Identity is Relevant 
The above reviewed ideas and evidence have important implications to our work. 
Indeed, the parallel between the exertion of influence in small groups and the societal 
processes that we outlined in the preceding section seems easy to establish. In spite of the 
different tasks performed by participants and the different issues involved in experimental 
settings, the above summarized experiments seem to involve a similar mechanism. This 
mechanisms stands for the emergence of a punitive attitude towards those individuals who 
fail to contribute to the group’s reality and/or success. By behaving this way, such 
individuals disrupt the group’s certainty about relevant aspects of its reality, or show 
insufficient commitment to the group and the other members. In such conditions, the group 
reciprocates. This may involve a decrease in commitment to the deviant individuals, the 
downgrading of these individuals, or even, their eviction from the group (cf. Levine & 
Moreland, 1994, 1998). In other words, implicit in the reviewed evidence is the idea that 
punishing reactions by normative members are directed, in the long run, at ascertaining the 
validity of the group’s relevant beliefs and at reassuring the fulfillment of relevant group 
goals. 
Nevertheless, if we limited ourselves to draw this straightforward analogy between 
interpersonal processes occurring in small groups and collective processes occurring in the 
large society, we would run the risk of make what Doise (1986) designated as a 
reductionism, i.e., explaining a phenomenon that occurs at a higher level (the society), in 
terms of a process that occurs at a lower level (the small group) of explanation (cf. 
Marques, in preparation). Our central purpose in the present work is to account for the way 
derogation of deviants relates to individuals’ social identity concerns. By definition, this 
purpose does not differentiate between the two levels of “groupness”. Indeed, as Turner 
(1975) pointed out, 
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“Any individual defines himself as well as others in terms of his location 
within a system of social categories - specifically social group memberships 
- and social identity may be understood as his definition of his own position 
within such a system.” (Turner, 1975, p.7). 
Or, as Tajfel (1982) claimed, 
“Social identity is defined as that part of the individuals’ self-concept which 
derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that 
membership.” (Tajfel, 1982, p.12). 
Therefore, as long as membership to the group is psychologically defined by social 
identification, the psychological significance of deviance would be the crucial mediator 
between individuals’ identification with a social group and their reactions to other 
individuals who disrespect relevant standards, irrespective of whether this group is a large 
social category (e.g. defined in terms of race or gender, etc.) or a social unit in which a 
limited number of individuals actually interact with one another. 
The above theoretical position is the central tenet of the subjective group dynamics 
model (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). As this model suggests, 
in groups whose membership is psychologically defined by a shared, common identity, this 
identity would be a major aspect of the group’s social reality. Social identification entails 
the assimilation of the self to the ingroup’s representation. As a result, it would directly 
generate the perception of interdependence between ingroup members, in order to establish 
a positive social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). In this psychological context, 
individuals should expect other ingroup members to contribute to a positive social identity. 
Social identity would function as a unique (perhaps, the single relevant) aspect of social 
reality. Positive social identity would thus be a major (perhaps, the ultimate) group goal 
(cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). 
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The above assumptions are central to the subjective group dynamics model. This 
model is deeply rooted in the principles of the social identification approach.8. Therefore, it 
is important to review such principles in order to better understand that model.9 
The Social Identification Approach 
Social Categorization, Social Identity, and Intergroup Behavior 
The social identification approach was developed as an account for the conditions 
in which individuals represent themselves and others as members of social categories and 
for the consequence of this process in terms of social identity and social comparison 
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1975). It deals with the way individuals 
construe social situations so that their behavior is structured by their sense of membership 
to a social category, rather than by their personal, idiosyncratic characteristics. 
Intergroup Behavior and Self-Stereotyping 
According to Tajfel (1978), social behavior ranges along a continuum from 
interpersonal to intergroup behavior. Interpersonal behavior would correspond to “any 
social encounter between two or more people [that] is determined by the personal 
relationships between the individuals and by their respective individual characteristics”. 
Conversely, intergroup behavior would be “determined by [individuals’] membership in 
different social groups or categories” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 41). 
Interestingly, the conception of social behavior to be found in the small group 
approach is closer to Tajfel’s definition of interpersonal than of intergroup behavior. This 
is not so much because, in most instances of research in small groups, the outgroup is 
                                                 
8 Although, as we shall see in the “Subjective Group Dynamics” section, below, it also presents important 
departures from that approach. 
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objectively absent from the picture, but rather because, as we mentioned earlier in this 
work, this research considers that the main antecedents of social affiliation are the personal 
characteristics or motives of individuals that lead them to affiliate themselves to the group. 
Turner (1984) elaborated on the continuum proposed by Tajfel (1978), with the 
notion of self-stereotyping, which he defined as the 
“cognitive re-definition of the self - from unique attributes and individual 
differences to shared social category memberships and associated 
stereotypes - that mediates group behaviours." (p.528). 
The individuals’ notion of their group membership thus depends on the specification 
of a set of characteristics common to all group members that, in a context of social 
comparison, allow differentiating them from relevant contrasting outgroups (Turner et al, 
1987). 
Social Comparison, Ingroup Favoritism, and Ingroup Bias 
One important consequence of self-stereotyping is that it converts a positive 
orientation towards the self into a positive orientation towards the ingroup, that is, into 
ingroup favoritism. Turner (1981) defined ingroup favoritism as 
“any tendency to favour ingroup over outgroup members on perceptual, 
attitudinal or behavioural dimensions. It includes partisan intergroup 
attitudes, sociometric preferences for the ingroup, discriminatory intergroup 
behaviour and more favourable evaluations of the products and 
performances of the ingroup than the outgroup.” (Turner, 1981, p.66). 
Ingroup favoritism characteristically emerges from situations that involve a direct 
comparison between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup, or between their respective 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 The social identification approach is a major topic in contemporary social psychology. In the same way we 
did with respect to the durkheimian and the small group approaches, we will focus exclusively on those 
aspects that bear direct implications to our subject matter. 
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members. The most representative of such kind of situations in social identity research is 
the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). Typically, 
participants are put in a situation in which the only relationship they have with each other 
is their membership to the same or to opposite groups in which they have been 
(unknowingly to them) arbitrarily included, on the basis of some (purportedly relevant) 
criterion of categorization (e.g. artistic preferences, answers to a bogus test, etc.). 
Following the categorization, participants are usually asked to perform some task (e.g. 
assigning money rewards, or points to, or judging the favorability of, ingroup and outgroup 
stimuli, in terms of performances, attitudes, personality traits, etc.) that has no direct 
relationship to the categorization. Also typically, the outcome of this task has no personal 
implications to the participants, so that every potential intervening variable other than the 
participants’ and the targets’ group membership, is controlled for, or eliminated. The 
minimal group paradigm thus creates the conditions required to observe how intergroup 
comparison works to generate pure intergroup judgments. The consistent pattern of results 
observed in experiments that employ the minimal group paradigm is that participants 
generate the greatest possible positive differentiation between the ingroup and the 
outgroup, or their respective members. This pattern of responses is generally known as 
ingroup bias (Tajfel, 1978; cf. also Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Cramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982; 
Turner, 1981, for reviews). Ingroup bias indicates that, in contexts of social comparison, 
group members strive to maximize the positive difference between the value they assign to 
the ingroup and the value that they assign to the outgroup. 
In short, intergroup comparison settings generally lead individuals to assimilate the 
self to the ingroup category, to develop ingroup favoring attitudes, and to attempt to 
maximize the positive difference between ingroup and outgroup (cf. Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al, 1987; see, also, e.g. Hinkle & 
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Brown, 1990 for a discussion of exceptions). However, it seems logical to suppose that the 
cognitive construction of the social categories that prompt the emergence of the above mentioned 
processes takes precedence over these processes. This justifies the significant attention devoted 
by self-categorization theory to the metacontrast principle (Turner et al, 1987). 
Self-Categorization Theory 
Self-categorization theory ensued from social identity theory with the specific 
purpose of establishing the interplay between the social context in which intergroup relations 
take place and the cognitive processes that sustain such relations (e.g. Oakes, Haslam & 
Turner, 1994). Its core assumption is that the basic motivation underlying social 
categorization is the construction of cognitive clarity in social stimulus settings (e.g. Oakes, 
Haslam & Turner, 1994). The important notions associated with this theory are comparative 
fit, the metacontrast principle, and normative fit. 
Comparative Fit, the Metacontrast Principle, and Normative Fit 
Self-categorization theory strongly focused itself on social identity theory’s 
assumption that individuals are motivated to achieve a clear-cut representation of their social 
identity, by exaggerating intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (e.g. Tajfel, 1969, 
1978). This idea first emerged in terms of the well-known perceptual accentuation process 
(Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), an inductive judgmental process according to which stimulus arrays 
that emerge in association with opposite category-labels are perceived as more different from 
each other than if no such association existed. Perceptual accentuation allows individuals to 
construe continuous stimulus properties in terms of discrete categories, and is at the basis of 
categorization (Bruner, 1957; Tajfel, 1969). 
Self-categorization theorists (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner et al, 1987) 
developed the above idea with the notion of comparative fit. Comparative fit corresponds to 
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the match between the properties of the stimuli present in a context of judgment and the 
category-labels that, being accessible to the individual, better contribute to construe the 
situation in terms of an opposition between categories (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). 
Thus, in a given social setting, individuals will begin by appraising whether the 
characteristics of the people involved match a cognitively accessible categorical opposition 
that is susceptible to provide a clear cut definition of these people in terms of their 
memberships to the opposite categories. 
The above process corresponds to what Turner and colleagues (1987; cf. also Hogg, 
1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990) designated as the metacontrast process. Assuming that the 
salient attributes (e.g. skin color, attitudinal positions, etc.) of relevant individuals in a 
judgmental setting fit into an accessible categorical opposition (e.g. “black people vs. white 
people”, “pro-abortionists vs. anti-abortionists”, etc.), the metacontrast process would led 
perceivers to ascertain whether, on the basis of these salient attributes, inter-category 
differences would be, on the average, higher than intra-category differences (cf. also 
Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). If this were the case, such categorical opposition would 
become informative, in that it would allow to construe the situation in terms of clear-cut 
differences between two groups of people (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1995). In this case, the 
situation would also allow defining, for each group, the attribute values (e.g., perceived 
intensities of skin pigmentation, or intensities of pro- and anti-abortion attitudes) that better 
summarized, in the whole, the similarities between members of the same group and, at the 
same time, the differences between the two groups. Group members who held these attribute 
values would be in position to represent their respective groups, i.e., to define the most clear-
cut possible contrast between the two groups. Their positions would correspond to the 
group’s prototypes (Turner et al, 1987). 
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The metacontrast principle thus appears highly functional, in that it allows 
condensing the wide array of individual differences into a simple distinction between 
opposing category prototypes. From this moment on, perceivers will appraise the degree of 
correspondence between group members and the attribute values that represent their 
respective categories. In other words, perceivers will expect a normative fit between the 
attributes of group members and the prototypical specifications of their respective 
categories. Where normative fit existed, perceiver would continue to focus on the 
established intergroup contrast, In contrast, low normative fit should decrease the cognitive 
clarity of intergroup differences. In this case, perceivers would switch to alternative 
categorizations that better account for the stimulus setting (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 
1994). 
Comparative fit and normative fit are thus two crucial components of social 
interaction, both in terms of the way individuals conceive of social reality in specific social 
settings, and in terms of their behavior in such setiings. As Oakes, Haslam and Turner 
(1994; cf. also Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1998) pointed out,  
“Since the internal structure of a social category, the relative 
representativeness of members, naturally varies with the comparative 
context, these aspects of its […] content will vary likewise. As [...] different 
dimensions of social comparison become relevant, redefining the basis of 
relative prototypicality, the judgment of the category as a whole will 
change. [...] Comparative and normative fit are therefore interactive and 
inseparable.” (p. 123). 
The Metacontrast Principle and Referent Information Influence 
The metacontrast principle would not be limited to this cognitive simplification 
process, though. It also fulfils a self-regulatory function (cf. Hogg & Abrams, 1988, 1993). 
By assimilating themselves to their group’s prototype, individuals would commit 
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themselves to the ingroup-typical criteria of judgment and behavior (cf. also Turner & 
Hogg, 1987). This would explain how the salience of social identity generates a feeling of 
interdependence and similarity between ingroup members and increases the uniformity of 
their behavior (Turner, 1991). Social behavior would therefore ensue from this shared 
feeling of identification to a group, rather than from interpersonal similarity, opinion 
convergence, or coincidence of personal goals. It follows that the crucial role assigned by 
classic small group theory and research to informational and normative influence in 
creation of uniformity within the group would be replaced by the impact of individuals’ 
assimilation to the ingroup prototype on their behavior as group members (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1991; Turner, Wetherell & Hogg, 1989). As they assimilate to the 
prototype, individuals would incorporate the ingroup norms that distinguish the ingroup 
from the outgroup, and therefore, would behave in line with the ingroup’s prototype. This 
would correspond to an influence process which directly ensues from the ingroup as a 
reference for behavior. Such behavior would be primarily directed at ensuring the 
persisting and clear-cut differentiation from the outgroup rather than at simply holding an 
accurate view of reality or obtaining approval from others (cf. Abrams, Wetherell, 
Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990, for a set of studies illustrative of this process). This is 
why Turner (1991; Hogg & Turner, 1987) designated it as referent information influence, 
as opposed to the dichotomy between informational and normative influence that had been 
widely accepted by small group theory and research. 
Implications for the Interplay between Self-Categorization and Deviance 
In brief, comparative fit should provide individuals with the judgmental and 
behavioral criteria that allow for the most effective and clear-cut description of social 
settings in terms of contrasting categories. In addition, normative fit should define the 
extent to which any existing intragroup differences and intergroup similarities allow for a 
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given categorization to remain effective or, alternatively, to be replaced by another who 
better accounts for the stimuli present in a social situation. 
Importantly to our concerns, comparative fit would define the extent to which 
group members may deviate from their groups’ prototype while still being perceived as 
members in those groups. For example, if individuals who had been first categorized as 
members of one category (e.g. “anti-abortionists”) started to display characteristics that 
drove them enough away from their category’s prototypes (e.g. distributing pro-abortion 
leaflets), they would be included in the other category, rather than being viewed as “anti-
abortionist deviants”. This would stand for a phenomenon close to defection (cf. Levine, 
Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). Concomitantly, normative fit would define the extent to 
which deviance, as a form of intragroup differentiation, would be conceivable from the 
standpoint of self-categorization theory. Assuming that lack of fit to the prototypical 
specifications of the group would lead perceivers to switch to an alternative intergroup 
dimension, deviance, as an intragroup event leading to punishment reactions, or negative 
appraisals of ingroup members would hardly be conceivable from a straightforward 
reading of self-categorization theory. Indeed, if both pro-abortionists and anti-abortionists 
started to distribute anti-abortion and pro-abortion leaflets indiscriminately, the pro- vs. 
anti-abortionist categorization would cease to fulfill its function of providing perceivers 
with a clear-cut representation of social reality (cf. Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994), and 
the distribution of leaflets would no longer be viewed in line of the specifications attached 
to that categorization. As Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, (1994) put it, from self-
categorization theory’s standpoint,  
“the only instances (...) where intergroup attraction may be negative are: (1) 
where a specific ingroup member is highly non-prototypical; this is 
relatively rare, since categorisation of individuals as ingroup members 
accentuates their prototypicality, and highly non-prototypical ‘members’ are 
  
47
 
likely to be categorised as outgroupers or non-ingroupers; (2) where the 
ingroup prototype is perceived to be highly negative” (p. 123). 
However, there are many situations in social life in which individuals are faced with 
members of their group whose actions clearly deviate from tolerable limits, and yet they 
cannot be re-categorized as outgroup members, or in which the situation cannot be 
reconstructed according to an alternative dimension of categorization.  In such 
circumstances, ingroup deviants may attract negative evaluations while encouraging attempts 
of normative members to reinforce the subjective validity of their social identity. Research 
on the black sheep effect (e.g. Marques, 1990; Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt & 
Leyens, 1988) supports this idea which, we believe, is consistent with the durkheimian 
perspective that we presented above. 
Subjective Group Dynamics 
As we stated above, the model of subjective group dynamics was inspired by an 
attempt to solve a number of apparent inconsistencies between evidence on the black sheep 
effect and assumptions of self-categorization theory. Specifically, the black sheep effect 
shows that individuals can strongly differentiate between normative and deviant ingroup 
members while, simultaneously, differentiating between ingroup and outgroup as a whole. 
This fact is problematic in light of self-categorization theory’s principles. As we saw 
above, the theory clearly states that the operation of comparative and normative fit 
necessarily generate a functional antagonism between levels of categorization (Oakes, 
Haslam & Turner, 1984), so that individuals cannot apply to a superordinate level of 
categorization (e.g. “pro-abortionists” vs. “anti-abortionists”) simultaneously with an 
internal differentiation within the categories existing at that level (e.g. “male and female 
pro-abortionists” vs. “male and female anti-abortionists”). 
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The Black Sheep Effect 
The term black sheep effect was coined by Marques (1986, Marques, Yzerbyt & 
Leyens, 1988) to describe how people upgrade likable ingroup members and downgrade 
unlikable ingroup members, relative to comparable outgroup members. According to 
Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988), likable ingroup members contribute positively to the 
overall positive image of the ingroup, and thus their evaluation relative to outgroup 
members reflects an ingroup bias. In turn, unlikable ingroup members contribute 
negatively to the overall image of the ingroup. This would be reflected in the derogation of 
ingroup deviants relative to comparable outgroup members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This idea was supported in a series of studies conducted by Marques and 
colleagues. In one illustrative study, Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens (1988, Experiment 1) 
had Belgian students evaluate “Belgian students”, “North African students”, “Likable 
Likable 
Unqualified 
Figure 2.1. Attractiveness of Likable, Unlikable and Unqualified targets as a function 
of Group Membership (Adapted from Marques et al, 1988: Experiment 1). 
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Belgian students”, “Likable North African students”, “Unlikable Belgian students”, and 
“Unlikable North African students”. Participants’ evaluations of ingroup and outgroup 
targets did not differ significantly when their “quality” as group members was unspecified 
(i.e. Belgian Students and North African Students). However, participants judged Likable 
Belgian Students more favorably than Likable North African Students, whereas Unlikable 
Belgian Students were judged more unfavorably than Unlikable North African Students 
(see Figure 2.1.) 
In their next study, Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988, Experiment 2) had 
Belgian students evaluate ingroup or outgroup members on one of two dimensions of 
behavior relevant to student life on the university campus. One dimension applied equally 
to ingroup and outgroup: “Belgian (vs. Moroccan) students who always lend their course 
notes to fellow students”, or, “Belgian (vs. Moroccan) students who never lend their course 
notes to fellow students” (Superordinate Norm condition). The other dimension applied 
only to the ingroup: “Belgian (vs. Moroccan) students who preferred to participate in 
parties at university clubs, instead of staying at home to work”, or, “Belgian/Moroccan 
students who preferred to stay at home to work, instead of participating in parties at 
university clubs” (Ingroup-Specific Norm condition). The results revealed that participants 
in the superordinate norm condition judged likable ingroup and outgroup members equally 
favorably, and judged unlikable ingroup and outgroup members equally unfavorably. In 
other words, the targets’ Belgian or Moroccan group membership did not seem to matter to 
participants, who exclusively focused on whether these targets’ behavior was consistent or 
inconsistent with the superordinate, student, norm. In the ingroup-specific norm condition, 
participants judged likable and unlikable ingroup members as favorably and as unfavorably 
as in the superordinate norm condition. However, judgments of likable and unlikable 
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outgroup members were significantly less extremely differentiated (see also Marques & 
Páez, 1994). 
In a second set of experiments, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) had Law students 
listening to two tape-recorded speeches and rating the speakers and their "discursive 
ability" Whereas in one study (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988, Experiment 1) the speaker’s 
group (Law vs Philosophy student) was a within-subject factor, and the performance of the 
speaker (Good vs Poor) was a between-subjects factor, in the other study (Marques & 
Yzerbyt, 1988, Experiment 2), speakers’ group membership was a between-subjects factor 
and speech performance was a within-subject factor. Regardless of whether the 
experimental situation evoked an intergroup comparison (Experiment 1) or an intragroup 
comparison (Experiment 2), participants upgraded the good ingroup speaker relative to the 
good outgroup speaker, and derogated the bad ingroup speaker relative to the bad outgroup 
speaker. However, when at the end of each experiment, participants were asked to evaluate 
ingroup’s and outgroup’s average speech ability, in both experiments, they considered the 
ingroup to be significantly better than the outgroup on this dimension. 
In another study, Marques (1990) had students of a military school rank a set of 
norms issued from the code of military students from most to least important. Participants 
then evaluated a fellow student who consistently complied with, and another, who 
consistently failed to comply with either the four most relevant, or the four most irrelevant 
norms. Half of the participants were instructed to evaluate students of their own school 
(Ingroup condition) whereas the other half were instructed to evaluate students of another 
military school (Outgroup condition). Marques (1990) predicted and found that, when the 
norms were relevant, participants would evaluate normative ingroup members and counter-
normative ingroup members respectively more favorably and more unfavorably than their 
outgroup counterparts. This result was not significant when the norms were irrelevant. 
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Implications of the Black Sheep Effect for the Process of Intergroup Differentiation 
The studies reviewed above have three interesting implications. First, they suggest 
a correlation between positive ingroup differentiation, as shown by Marques and Yzerbyt’s 
(1988) finding that participants upgraded likable ingroup members and derogated unlikable 
ingroup members as compared to similar outgroup members while, at the same time, 
judging the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup as a whole. This relationship was 
replicated by Marques, Robalo and Rocha (1992, Experiment 2). In that experiment, 
participants evaluated ingroup and outgroup as whole, and likable and unlikable ingroup or 
outgroup members on the same set of judgmental dimensions. The results showed that 
upgrading of likable ingroup members and derogation of unlikable ingroup members 
relative to outgroup members, and more positive evaluations of the ingroup than the 
outgroup occurred on exactly the same judgmental dimensions. Branscombe, Wann and 
Noel (1994) found similar results and showed that participants who identified with the 
ingroup, judged a “loyal” or a “disloyal” ingroup member, respectively, more favourably 
and more unfavourably than a loyal or a disloyal outgroup member, respectively. This did 
not happen for participants whose ingroup identification was weak. 
The second implication, is that derogation of ingroup deviants occurs mainly on 
those dimensions that are, in the eyes of participants, relevant criteria of positive ingroup 
differentiation (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988, Experiment 2; Marques, 1990), a result 
that reminds one of Durkheim’s claim that punishment of deviants occurs mainly when 
deviance offends the “strong states of the collective mind” (cf. above). This result supports 
the idea that individuals expect fellow group members to conform to relevant group norms, 
and lack of conformity on the part of these members produces discomfort due to a decrease 
in the subjective validity of their beliefs on positive ingroup differentiation. In derogating 
ingroup deviants, normative members would subjectively enforcing normative solidarity 
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for the purpose of enhancing and protecting a positive social identity. In more 
inconsequential situations, for instance when the deviants are outgroup members, or when 
ingroup members’ deviance emerges on dimensions unimportant to social identity, 
individuals’ reactions to these members would be less extreme. 
The third implication of evidence on the black sheep effect bears with the basic 
principles of self-categorization theory. This evidence shows that individuals are less 
attracted to unlikable ingroup members than to outgroup members, likable or unlikable, 
while showing more favourable attitudes towards likable ingroup than outgroup members. 
This general pattern can hardly be assigned only to the operation of comparative and 
normative fit. In some of the above reviewed studies, there was strong intergroup rivalry ( 
e.g. Branscombe, Wann & Noel, 1994; Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992) or prejudice (e.g. 
Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). It is likely that, in these studies unlikable outgroup 
members present strong normative fit. However, unlikable ingroup members would 
present, to say the least, weak normative fit. 
As a result, based on the operation of normative fit, one could expect that 
participants showed a more favourable attitude to likable and unlikable ingroup members 
than to likable and unlikable outgroup members, respectively. In this case, the intergroup 
dimension would have been more salient than the likability dimension., and fit applied to 
the former dimension. Alternatively, if fit applied to the likability dimension more than to 
the intergroup dimension, participants would have shown more favourable attitudes to 
likable members than unlikable members, irrespective of their group membership. In this 
case, target characteristics did not normatively fit the intergroup dimension, and perceivers 
would have switched from this dimension to the likability dimension. 
Clearly, the above reasoning does not match results obtained in the black sheep 
effect studies. Indeed, the black sheep effect suggests that perceivers do not restrain 
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themselves to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup prototypes. This idea is 
reinforced by two facts. On the one hand, individuals differentiate ingroup and outgroup as 
a whole, while internally differentiating their likable and unlikable members. To account 
for this result in terms of the single operation of the metacontrast principle, one would have 
to suppose that participants switched back and forth between levels of categorisation, from 
judgments of group members, to intergroup differentiation judgments. On the other hand, 
individuals can upgrade likable ingroup members and derogate unlikable ingroup members 
as compared to their outgroup correlatives, both in intergroup settings and in intragroup 
settings (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Intragroup settings, by definition, endow the 
likability dimension with strong comparative fit, particularly if judgments are made within 
the ingroup (cf. Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). If comparative 
fit alone explained participants’ judgments, then, participants should differentiate equally 
strongly between likable and unlikable ingroup members as they did between likable and 
unlikable outgroup members.10 
The Subjective Group Dynamics Model 
From the above reasoning, it follows that the black sheep effect and self-
categorization theory’s metacontrast principle need to be theoretically articulated. On the 
one hand, the black sheep effect’s basic assumption is that derogation of ingroup deviants 
ensues from individuals’ strong identification with their group, and consequent motivation 
to uphold a positive ingroup differentiation. In this aspect, the black sheep effect is 
consistent with self-categorization theory’s central tenets. On the other hand, the pattern of 
judgments that corresponds to the black sheep effect appears inconsistent with the core 
                                                 
10 In partial support of this idea, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) found that judgments of likable and unlikable 
members of the same group were more differentiated than were judgments of similar members, in intergroup 
comparison settings. However, this difference still allowed for the black sheep effect to significantly emerge 
from both kinds of comparison settings (cf. Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988, Experiments 1-2). 
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predictions of self-categorization theory, according to which individuals strive to increase 
intergroup differentiation while decreasing intragroup differences. The notion of subjective 
group dynamics was largely encouraged by an attempt at solving this apparent 
inconsistency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Subjective group dynamics. In Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg (2001, p. 
414). 
The notion of subjective group dynamics is founded on three core ideas. First, 
deviance may help legitimating the positive social identity of normative ingroup members. 
Second, these members’ reactions to intragroup deviance must be understood in the more 
general context of intergroup relations. Third, these reactions are the expression of the 
individual’s cognitive representation of the social order. We hope that the theoretical roots 
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of these ideas can now be easily traced back to the theoretical contexts that we reviewed 
until now. 
The model proposes that individuals’ reactions toward ingroup deviance involve 
two distinct, but interrelated processes. In relevant social contexts, individuals will, firstly, 
attempt to establish a clear-cut difference between ingroup and outgroup (the metacontrast 
process), and will assimilate themselves to the representation of the ingroup (self-
stereotyping). As proposed by social identity theory, this cognitive construction of the 
situation as an intergroup context will motivate individuals to achieve and to maintain a 
positive ingroup representation. Individuals will thus focus exclusively on intergroup 
differences in search for positive differentiation of the ingroup as a whole by comparison 
with the contrasting outgroup (Tajfel, 1978). This intergroup differentiation process would 
be satisfactorily concluded if positive ingroup distinctiveness was achieved with no 
emergence of any relevant intragroup differentiation in the judgmental context. In this 
case, individuals would achieve a sense of legitimated positive social identity. (Marques, 
Abrams & Páez, 1998), as illustrated in the upper part of the model of Figure 2.2. 
However, there can be situations in which ingroup deviance by ingroup members 
may become salient. For example, certain ingroup members may display characteristics or 
behavior that contradict ingroup standards (crooked politicians who are prominent 
members of one’s own party, traitors to one’s cause, or otherwise socially undesirable 
ingroup members would be illustrative) and therefore be perceived as a menace against the 
legitimacy of the ingroup’s superior position. Self-stereotyping generates a subjective full 
interdependence with the ingroup, which transforms self and ingroup into interchangeable, 
completely equivalent psychological objects. As a result, the deviants will be perceived as 
a menace to the self, and will trigger responses intended to restore the threatened 
subjective validity of the standards that legitimate the positive value assigned to the 
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ingroup. Obviously, the most direct way to restore such subjective validity would be by 
showing disagreement with, and rejection of, those who oppose them. Roughly, this 
corresponds to the lower part of the model displayed in Figure 2.2. 
In support of this idea, Marques et al (1998, Experiment 4) categorized participants 
in two groups (X and Y), supposedly according to their reasoning about a murder case. 
Participants were asked them to rank-order six characters involved in that case, from most 
to least responsible by the murder. They were informed that a norm existed, according to 
which people who belonged to their category should rank the characters in a given order 
(which was always the order each participant had chosen), whereas people who belonged 
to the outgroup category should choose the opposite ranking order. Participants were then 
asked to evaluate ingroup or outgroup members who had, supposedly, follow their 
respective groups’ ranking norm and another ingroup or outgroup member who deviated 
from the prescribed ranking order. Importantly, participants were to report their 
identification with ingroup and outgroup categories, both immediately after they were 
categorized (pre-identification) and after they evaluated the normative and deviant ingroup 
or outgroup members (post-identification). Not surprisingly, participants reported higher 
ingroup than outgroup identification both before and after they judged the target group 
members. In addition, they evaluated normative ingroup members more favorably than the 
ingroup deviant, and, the outgroup deviant member more favorably than outgroup 
normative members. But, the most interesting result is that derogation of deviant ingroup 
members significantly mediated between the two measures of ingroup identification. The 
more participants identified with the ingroup as compared to the outgroup immediately 
after the categorization, the more they derogated members who deviated from ingroup 
norms as compared to ingroup normative members, and the more they derogated these 
members, the more they reinforced their identification with the ingroup. This result clearly 
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supports the idea that derogation of ingroup deviants reinforces individuals’ solidarity with 
their group. 
Descriptive and Prescriptive Norms 
Marques, Páez and Abrams (1998) proposed that intergroup differentiation and 
intragroup differentiation stem from different normative processes, which entail, 
respectively, a denotative and a prescriptive focus on the part of perceivers. According to 
these authors, descriptive norms allow individuals to differentiate between groups, in that 
they provide the criteria for category inclusion (race, gender, nationality, for example). 
Descriptive norms are denotative tools individuals use in order to recognize the features 
that allow them to impose labels on targets of judgment by reference to these targets’ 
membership categories (e.g. a “white person”, a “woman”, a “Portuguese person”). In turn, 
prescriptive norms are endowed with a moral character. They do not allow to establish the 
category membership of the persons to whom they apply, because, by definition they 
“ought” to apply to everyone. but they allow to judge whether these persons are “good” or 
“bad” (cf. Cialdini, Kallgreen & Reno, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Forsyth, 1990). As 
Marques, Abrams and Serôdio (2001) suggested, 
“one ought to wear the kippah at the Shabbat whether one is Jewish or not, 
and one should not wear shoes in a Mosque whether one is Muslim or not. 
These norms thus do not function as criterion attributes for defining group 
membership, as in the case of other norms. They correspond more to societal 
norms because they involve generic values and standards of conduct.” (p. 
437). 
A good example of a prescriptive norm is the norm of loyalty to the group (cf. 
Cooley, 1902; Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). To perceivers, the fact that an 
individual is loyal or disloyal to their group is not diagnostic of the individual’s group 
membership. However, it is highly diagnostic of the individual’s “moral character”.  
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In other words, descriptive norms would help defining relevant contrasts between 
social categories (cf. Turner et al., 1987). In turn, prescriptive norms, with their injunctive, 
moral, character, would function as generic evaluation criteria. As Durkheim (1912) would 
put it, descriptive norms would be utilitarian devices that provide individuals with frames 
of reference that allow them to guide their behavior and adapt to their objective 
environments. They would to a large extent correspond to what Miller and Prentice (1996) 
designated as “local standards”, i.e., judgmental and behavioral anchors that help 
individuals to extract meaning from initially ambiguous situations. In turn, prescriptive 
norms would carry intrinsic social value. Therefore, prescriptive norms would reflect the 
operation of social control mechanisms at the psychological level (Marques, in 
preparation). To a large extent, then, subjective group dynamics would be, itself, the 
outcome of the interiorization of social control by the individual (Mead, 1918, 1925, 1934; 
Vigotsky, 1977, 1997 ; cf. Marques, in preparation).  
Marques et al (1998) analyzed the interplay between the descriptive and 
prescriptive norms in the subjective group dynamics process in a series of experiments. In 
one of those experiments, Marques et al (1998, Experiment 3) had participants examining a 
murder case, purportedly as part of a research on jury decision-making. Participants were 
informed that two opposite decision-making patterns (X and Y) existed, and, purportedly as 
a means to determine to which pattern they belonged, they were asked to write a short 
account of the way they appraised the case. Participants then ranked the six characters 
involved in the case, in terms of their responsibility for victim’s death. In a second session, 
one week later, participants were informed that, according to the contents of their written 
account (but not according to their ranking), they belonged to one pattern. They were 
reminded of their own rankings and presented with the rankings made by five other ingroup 
or outgroup members. Participants were then divided in two conditions. In one condition 
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(norm condition), participants were informed that a norm existed according to which those 
who belonged to their pattern should rank the characters in a defined order (which was 
always similar to the participant’s ranking), and that members of the opposed pattern should 
show the reverse ranking, and, importantly, it was made clear that rankings were not a 
criterion for defining membership to a pattern. In another condition (no norm condition), 
intragroup norms were not mentioned. Participants were then presented with the responses of 
five ingroup or five outgroup members. Ingroup members’ rankings were constructed such 
that four ingroup members (normative members) displayed exactly the same response, and 
one ingroup member (deviant member) displayed a response similar but not identical to the 
outgroup. In the outgroup condition, this pattern of information was reversed. Finally, 
participants judged the normative and deviant group members as well as their group as a 
whole. 
Marques and colleagues (1998) predicted and found that participants judged the 
ingroup more favorably than the outgroup as a whole, irrespective of the experimental 
conditions. In addition, when no mention to norms had been made, normative and deviant 
ingroup members were always judged more favorably than outgroup members. However, 
when participants were made aware of prescriptive ingroup or outgroup norms they judged 
ingroup or outgroup members who attuned to the prescriptive ingroup norm more 
favorably than those who opposed it.  
In a similar study, Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada (1998, Experiment 2) 
examined another way in which individuals adopt a prescriptive focus. The procedure was 
similar to that of the summarized above study, except that all participants were aware of 
the prescriptive norm. Moreover, half of the participants were informed that their 
evaluations of other members would be, later, scrutinized either by ingroup members or by 
outgroup members. The authors reasoned that accountability to ingroup members should 
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increase participants’ prescriptive focus and that this would be reflected in their judgments 
of normative and deviant members. Consistent with this reasoning, participants derogated 
deviant ingroup members more strongly when they were made accountable to the ingroup 
than the outgroup. In addition, when they were accountable to the ingroup, participants 
differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup as a whole more strongly than when they were 
accountable to the outgroup. Together with the results of the preceding study, evidence 
collected by Marques and colleagues suggests that in the absence of a prescriptive focus, 
individuals are concerned only with generating positive ingroup distinctiveness. However, 
prescriptive focus leads individuals to strongly differentiate between those who support 
and those who do not support the ingroup norm, while simultaneously, positively 
differentiating the ingroup from the outgroup as a whole. 
Marques et al (1998) did not explore this aspect of their data. However, their results 
illustrate a relevant aspect of normative thinking. Participants in the Marques et al’s (1998, 
Experiment 2) study showed stronger ingroup bias and derogated ingroup deviants more 
when they knew that their judgments would be scrutinized by other individuals. This result 
might be viewed as a case for normative influence (cf. above). However, such an 
interpretation seems to be inadequate for two reasons. First, participants did not act in the 
same way when they knew that the scrutinizers were outgroup members. Second, even 
when the scrutinizers were ingroup members, normative influence would hardly be 
effective, because participants were entirely aware of the anonymity of their judgments, 
and they did not expect any interaction with these ingroup members. In brief, these results 
suggest that participants acted not only on the basis of their expectancies about the 
desirable behaviour of target ingroup members, thus upgrading normative individuals and 
derogating the deviants, but also that they acted on the basis of what they though were the 
expectancies of other members regarding their judgments. Although we recognize the 
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speculative character of this reasoning, if it nevertheless applied, then the process 
uncovered by Marques et al (1998) in this experiment would present a strong parallel with 
Durkheim’s contention that normative individuals define themselves by their solidarity 
with the collective mind. To put it in the words of Cooley, the participants seem to have 
experienced a sense of 
“the pains and inconveniences of non-conformity […] the source of the pain 
appearing to be a vague sense of deprecatory curiosity which one imagines 
that he will excite. His social self-feeling is hurt by an unfavourable view of 
himself that he attributes to others.” (Cooley, 1902/1992, pp. 293-294). 
Furthermore, results reported by Marques, Abrams, Páez and Taboada (1998) 
suggest that denotative and prescriptive norms simultaneously operate in judgments of 
groups and their members. As was the case with evidence on the black sheep effect, these 
results cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the operation of the metacontrast 
principle. As we suggested above, a salient intergroup dimension would lead participants 
to assimilate ingroup and outgroup members to their respective prototypes. In turn, 
salience of prescriptive intragroup norms, should decrease the salience of intergroup 
differentiation, and this should be mirrored by participants’ judgments of ingroup and 
outgroup as a whole. This was not the case. For example, reinforcement of prescriptive 
intragroup focus reinforced intergroup differentiation, as shown in Marques and 
colleagues’ (1998) Experiment 4. This result in particular suggests that when prescriptive 
norms are salient, individuals simultaneously value intergroup distinctiveness and ingroup 
normativity. This idea is also consistent with Durkheim’s (1912, 1982) view that, in setting 
off punitive reactions, deviance ultimately contributes to the reinforcement of the group’s 
normative system. 
Another study that supports the idea that derogation of ingroup deviants ensues 
from individuals’ attempts to reinforce the group’s normative system was reported by 
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Marques, Abrams & Serôdio (2001, Experiment 2). In that study participants answered to a 
bogus test purportedly aimed at detecting to which of two opposed types of imagination 
they belonged (Intragroup condition) or, instead, supposedly aimed to know their personal 
imagination characteristics (Interpersonal condition). All participants were asked to report 
their position along a continuum of attitudes of increasing social desirability. One week 
latter, in a second session, all participants received feedback about the first session. 
Participant in the intragroup condition false feedback about the position of ingroup or 
outgroup members along the continuum of attitudes. Participants in the interpersonal 
condition received feedback about the responses of individuals that were simply presented 
as interpersonally similar to, or different from, them in terms of their imagination 
characteristics. From the five targets participants were presented with, four adopted 
socially desirable positions on the continuum (normative targets) and one target adopted a 
socially undesirable position (deviant target). The normative targets were either highly 
consensual in their attitudes (High Uniformity condition) or somewhat dispersed, although 
their attitudes still espoused the socially desirable half of the continuum (Low Uniformity 
condition). Among other tasks, participants evaluated one normative and the deviant target. 
The positions of the normative and deviant targets were constant across conditions.  
Figure 2.3 shows the mean evaluations of these targets as a function of their group 
membership or interpersonal similarity with the participants, and the uniformity of 
normative targets’ positions. As can been seen in that figure participants evaluated the 
socially desirable target more favorably and the socially undesirable target more 
unfavorably when they were presented as ingroup members than when they were presented 
as outgroup members, or simply as individuals. More importantly, Figure 2.3 clearly shows 
that this result was stronger when the ingroup lacked normative uniformity, than in every 
other condition.  
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Figure 2.3. Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets as a function of Interpersonal 
or Intragroup Context, High or Low Uniformity and Stimulus Set (Ingroup vs. Outgroup 
or Similar vs. Different Set of Targets). Adapted from Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 
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These results indicate that evaluations of norm validating (socially desirable) and 
norm undermining (socially undesirable) targets are a function of their group membership. 
This result is, obviously, consistent with the black sheep effect (cf. above). It demonstrates 
that any influence of interpersonal similarity between participants and targets on 
derogation of ingroup deviants can only be considered in the broader context of their 
common group membership. That is, participants derogated in-group deviants precisely 
because they were in-group members. More importantly, this derogation occured mainly 
when other in-group members showed but questionable support of the normative attitude 
position. Although no data were collected regarding the effects of derogation of the 
ingroup deviant on the reinforcement of the subjective validity of this position, the present 
results are consistent with the idea that judgments of ingroup members who deviate from 
prescriptive norms ensue from individuals’ motivation to reinforce the subjective validity 
of the standards that sustain the ingroup’s positive image, and that this is achieved by 
generating internal conformity to valued in-group standards. 
Concluding Remarks: Guidelines for the Reported Research 
To conclude this theoretical outline, we must stress that our aim is not to dispute the 
theoretical ideas of the well-established work we refer to. Rather, we attempted to explore 
these ideas in order to organize the framework that underlies the studies reported in the 
following chapters. 
Deviance and Social Control 
The durkheimian perspective, stresses the fact that deviance is not to be viewed as a 
social dysfunction, but rather, as an intrinsic property of groups, that allows them to 
reinvigorate their normative systems and, by doing so, to resist the constraints and 
vicissitudes that impinge on them in particular contexts. Therefore, deviance is not a built-
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in property of behavior. To take an example given by Durkheim (1893), the act of killing a 
fellow human is not punished because of the harm done to the victim. Indeed, it may even 
be praised as an heroic act, for example, in times of war. 
By the same token, deviance is not an indissociable characteristic of deviant 
individuals. Rather, it is a burden that those who happen to be “in the bad place at the 
wrong time”, will have to endure at a particular moment of the group’s life. This was the 
case of sorcerers in the final years of the European Middle Ages (e.g. Ben-Yehuda, 1985), 
of the Antinomian advocates in Puritan New England (Erikson, 1966), or of Black and 
White persons who advocated miscegenation in late nineteenth-century Louisiana 
(Inverarity, 1976). 
Specifically, deviance is a collective construction aimed to generate reactions from 
normative group members, whom by associating themselves to the punishment process, 
learn the group’s norms and commit themselves to these norms, so that the group ends up 
with an increased internal normative solidarity (Marques & Serôdio, 2000). This normative 
solidarity helps the group to differentiate from other groups, possibly, in terms of a shared 
representation by its members of their moral superiority (Erikson, 1966). 
Deviance in Face to Face Groups 
The above idea matches, to some extent, the individuals’ behavior observed in 
small group research. This research shows that group members expect other members to 
conform to valued opinions (the social reality function) and to settle for commonly agreed 
courses of action (the group locomotion function). This is due to the fact that group 
members are interdependent for the reciprocal validation of their opinions and the 
achievement of their goals. Group members who fail to meet these requirements are 
subject to pressures to conform, and when these pressures fail, they face consequences that, 
all differences considered, are equivalent to those suffered by deviants in large 
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communities. However, research in small group processes considers that the main 
determinant of group members’ negative reactions to deviance is their interpersonal 
indeterdependence (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine & 
Thompson, 1996). This fact may hinder a full understanding of deviance processes in 
large-scale social categories, where group behavior of a common group identity (e.g., 
Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
Deviance and Social Identity 
The social identification framework, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of 
individuals’ representation of the group and the impact of such representation on the way 
they define themselves and others. In the context of this framework, interdependence 
would be a consequence of a shared group identity, rather than the cause of individuals’ 
commitment to the group (Hogg, 1992; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
Whereas the small group perspective frames deviance as a failure in meeting the 
expectancies derived from such interdependence, a view of deviance inspired by the social 
identification framework would see deviance as a departure from the criteria that define the 
ingroup’s shared identity. Therefore, solidarity among group members would be the 
outcome of their common attraction to the ingroup’s representation (Hogg, 1992; Hogg, 
Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & Hains, 1996; Hogg, Hardie & Reynolds, 1995). 
In a nutshell, the social identification framework offers a theoretically sound 
account of the process according to which individuals may conceive themselves as 
members of large-scale social categories and uniformly behave according to that self-
conception. However, this framework is directly concerned about the way in which 
individuals cognitively maximize intergroup differences and minimize intragroup 
differences. By contrast, deviance corresponds to an emphasis on intragroup 
differentiation, as shown by the black sheep effect studies. At face value, then, the general 
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principles of the social identification framework would lead one to expect that the 
emergence of intragroup deviance in a given intergroup distinction would lead individuals 
to cognitively abandon this distinction, because it no longer allowed them to construct the 
situation in terms of a clear-cut categorical contrast. 
Deviance and Subjective Group Dynamics 
The subjective group dynamics model, to which the present work subscribes, 
attempts to deal with this inconsistency. This model is based on the idea that social order 
largely depends on social categorization. In line with the social identification framework, it 
assumes that a salient social identity motivates individuals to ascertain the overall 
positiveness of their group. As a result, when social identity is salient, normative and 
deviant ingroup members are viewed as social objects that, respectively, enhance, or 
jeopardize, positive ingroup differentiation. Individuals will therefore react to these 
members according to the valence of their contribution to social identity and, in doing so, 
they engage in the equivalent of social control actions aimed to reinforce the positive 
meaning of their membership category. 
The subjective group dynamics model inspires itself from durkheimian theory, in 
that it suggests that the above outlined process emerges when, following a denotative 
intergroup differentiation (or, social categorization), individuals adopt a prescriptive focus 
in their appraisals of other group members. In addition, also in accordance with the 
durkheimian theory, the model assumes, at least implicitly, that this prescriptive focus 
should be more in order when ingroup members construe the intergroup situation as 
menacing the perceived legitimacy of positive ingroup differentiation. 
Overview of Hypotheses 
The following chapters are devoted to the presentation of our studies. Based on the 
above outlined ideas, we conducted seven experiments. These experiments were aimed to 
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test three general ideas. The first idea is that reactions of normative individuals to ingroup 
deviance depend on the intragroup and intergroup characteristics of the situation in which 
that deviance occurs. This idea thus deals with predictions directly issued from the 
durkheimian theory. Specifically, as regards the impact of the social situation, we may 
expect that (1) lack of support of a valued norm by salient ingroup members, (2) a 
threatened ingroup status relative to the outgroup, and (3) the lack of validation of an 
ingroup norm by the society at large, will increase individuals’ prescriptive focus and, 
hence, their derogation of ingroup deviants (and upgrading of ingroup normative 
members), but that these factors have no impact on evaluations of outgroup members 
whom, by definition, are less relevant to individuals’ social identity. 
The second idea is that these reactions depend on the implications of that deviance 
to the ingroup, considering the denotative characteristics of the deviants. This idea more 
directly deals with the implications of self-categorization theory’s assumptions about the 
role of prototypical group members in the definition of the group, and its relationship with 
the subjective group dynamic model’s distinction between descriptive and prescriptive 
norms. Specifically, as regards the prescriptive implications of deviance to the ingroup, we 
may expect that individuals who are, denotatively, the best ingroup representatives will 
have the strongest prescriptive impact on the subjective validation of ingroup standards 
that legitimate beliefs in a positive social identity. Indeed, as we discussed in a previous 
section, typical ingroup members, by definition represent the group’s essence. As a result, 
the value of their behavior or characteristics should directly and totally revert to the image 
of the group as whole. In turn, behavior of less typical members, who are, by definition, 
less representative of the group, should have a lower perceived contribution to the group’s 
value. As a result, the former members’ behavior or characteristics should have an 
increased impact on individuals’ judgments. These members should be more negatively 
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judged than less typical ingroup members or outgroup members whom, by definition 
matter less to the overall ingroup’s value. 
The third idea also draws from durkheimian theory and is generally consistent with 
social identity theory’s contention that social categorization involves cognitive, evaluative 
and emotional processes. We reasoned that in the same way a comparatively negative 
social identity generates negative feelings in the individuals, also should ingroup deviants 
generate such feelings. To be consistent with the previous hypotheses, this process should 
emerge more strongly in situations that induce prescriptive focus. Therefore, we expected 
that negative emotional reactions should mediate between individuals’ attachment to the 
ingroup (in the forms of social identification or commitment to ingroup norms) and their 
judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members, especially in situations in which 
ingroup norms are not supported by societal consensus, or when ingroup prescriptive 
deviants are, descriptively, strong ingroup representatives.11 
                                                 
11 Indeed according to Tajfel (1978), following social categorization individuals comparatively appraise the 
ingroup’s value relative to the outgroup on relevant social value-laden dimensions. This evaluative process 
has emotional implications. When the social comparison yields relative ingroup superiority individuals’ 
social identity will be satisfactory. Otherwise individuals will be unsatisfied with their group membership. 
This is a major issue in the realm of social identity theory (cf. Tajfel, 1978), with important implications to 
the kinds of social behavior (social mobility, social creativity, or social change) individuals may engage in. 
However this issue falls beyond the scope of the present work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EFFECTS OF INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THREATS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF 
INGROUP STANDARDS12 
As we noted in Chapter 2, deviance within a group, may it be a small group, a large 
community or society in the broader sense, represents a challenge to the collective within 
which it emerges (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Durkheim, 1893; Simmel, 1955). 
However, the menacing potential of deviant ingroup members to the image of the ingroup 
as a whole is emphasized in contexts in which ingroup’s normative positioning as a whole 
is not clearly established. This idea was illustrated, for example, by Erikson’s (1966) 
studies (cf. Chapter 2). We may suppose that, as part of the same process, those ingroup 
members who support the norm – the normative members – should meet individuals’ 
expectations about ingroup members in general. That is, these members should be 
perceived as instrumental to the subjective validation of the norm, hence contributing to 
the perceived legitimacy of the group’s positive differentiation. They should thus be 
judged in a favorable manner. Clearly, in contexts in which individuals perceive their 
positive identity to be well established, deviants pose a much less important threat. As a 
consequence, individuals’ reactions towards these deviants should be more lenient in the 
latter than in the former case. 
Hypotheses 
In Experiment 1, we analyze whether the relative dispersion of ingroup members 
around a prescriptive normative position increases the extremity of participants’ positive or 
negative reactions, respectively to normative and deviant ingroup members. The basic idea 
                                                 
12 Experiments 1 and 2 in the present chapter were previously published in Marques, J. M., Abrams, D. & 
Serôdio, R. G. (2001). Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of ingroup 
deviants when generic norms are undermined. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 3, 436-44 
(Experiments 1 and 3, respectively). In the present work we present extended versions of those experiments. 
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in this experiment is that the perceived legitimacy of the positive value assigned to the 
ingroup should be undermined when, while remaining within an acceptable latitude, 
ingroup members’ positions are relatively scattered. When this is the case, any position 
that clearly opposed the norm (a deviant position) emerging within the ingroup should be 
perceived as potentially more threatening than if the former members cohesively adopted 
the normative position. As a consequence, ingroup deviants should be derogated more 
strongly, and submitted to stronger pressures to conform in the former than in the latter 
situation. 
In experiments 2 and 3, we addressed ourselves to a different sort of moderator of 
judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members which, nevertheless should have 
implications similar to the preceding one. This moderator is the status of the ingroup 
relatively to the outgroup as a whole. In these experiments, we tested the assumption that 
uncertainty about social identity, resulting from a non-decisive intergroup comparison, 
should elicit more favorable and more unfavorable judgments of normative and deviant 
ingroup members, respectively, than of similar outgroup members. By contrast, when the 
ingroup’s positive status is clearly established, there should be no such need to reinforce 
the subjective validity of ingroup standards. As a result, judgments of outgroup members 
should be less extreme. Because outgroup members, normative or deviant, are irrelevant to 
the participants’ identity, their judgments should always be less extreme and not affected 
by the ingroup validating or undermining context. 
In Experiment 4, we pursued an idea akin to that of Experiment 1. Specifically, 
we checked for whether a prescriptive focus can be induced, not only when the norm is 
undermined from inside the ingroup, as we found in Experiment 1, but also when the norm 
is challenged from outside, by the lack of “societal” support to it. We reasoned that group 
members should feel more secure about the perceived legitimacy of the norms that sustain 
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a positive social differentiation when there is general recognition, outside the group, of the 
interest and value of such norm. In turn, if they are aware that the norm does not attract 
sympathy from the society at large, group members should respond to this threat by 
reinforcing their prescriptive focus. This would emerge in the form of upgrading of 
ingroup members who endorse the norm and derogation of those who challenge it. 
Experiment 1 
To test our assumption that individuals should be more sensitive to deviant behavior 
within the ingroup when the group as a whole seems to fail at exhibiting clear support to a 
prescriptive norm, we run an experiment with Psychology and Law students. At the time of 
the experiment the two groups shared the same building, and had, to say the least, a “tense” 
relationship. However, regardless of inter-faculty rivalries or conflict, there is widespread 
consensus among university students about the value of ragging practices passed on first-
year students as a means of integration into the student life. These practices evoke great 
amounts of activity by students’ associations, are tacitly sanctioned by university’s 
authorities, and are a relevant part of the student culture. Support to such practices and, 
specifically, to first-year students’ ragging, may thus be viewed as a highly important student 
norm. We asked participants issuing from the two faculties to examine information regarding 
the answers that had been purportedly given by a sample of 50 other Psychology or Law 
students to a previous survey on “freshmen ragging practices”. Depending on Group Opinion 
conditions, the distribution of responses of the 50 target students was asymptotic, either in 
the direction of support to these practices (Norm-Validating condition) or in the opposite 
direction (Norm-Undermining condition). Participants also had to indicate, on a pro-ragging 
– anti-ragging continuum (1) the position they most agreed with, (2) the position they most 
disagreed with, and (3) the position from which on they would disagree with. Participants 
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then evaluated group members issuing either from the ingroup or the outgroup faculty who 
adopted each of these positions. Finally, participants indicated to which extent they 
considered these targets to convey a bad or a good image of the faculty they belonged to. 
In line with our rationale, we expected participants to express stronger prescriptive 
focus in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition than in all other conditions. First, we 
expected a lower threshold of rejection in this condition than in all others. That is, 
participants in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, should express disagreement with 
positions that are objectively more normative (i.e., more pro-ragging) than in the remaining 
conditions (Boundary Narrowing hypothesis). Secondly, we expected participants in the 
Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition to derogate ingroup deviants relative to outgroup 
deviants and to upgrade normative ingroup members as compared to normative outgroup 
members more than participants in all other conditions (Black Sheep hypothesis). 
Finally, we predicted that, in the Norm-Undermining condition, participants would 
consider that the deviant ingroup members conveyed a more negative image of the ingroup 
than would deviant outgroup members convey of the outgroup. We expected the reverse, 
regarding the image of the group conveyed by the normative members (Group’s Image 
hypothesis). 
Pilot Study 
Prior to the main experiment, we tested whether the continuum of statements we 
devised for this experiment accounted for the normative standings of the participants. With 
this purpose, we presented a continuum of 7 statements about first-year student ragging in 
the university to a convenience sample of 13 Law (6 male and 7 female) and 13 Psychology 
(6 male and 7 female) students, aged between 18 and 23 years old (Mean age = 19.27; SD = 
  
74
 
1.76). These students were asked to indicate which of the 7 statements best represented their 
personal opinion on the issue. These 26 students did not participate in the main experiment. 
The seven statements were listed in the continuum were as follows: “Ragging is…: 
Statement 1. “unnecessary, I definitely disagree with it, and it should be forbidden”; 
Statement 2. “very useless, I disagree with it, and it should be discouraged”; Statement 3. 
“useless, I tend to disagree with, and one should be critical about it”; Statement 4. “neither 
useful nor useless, and I neither agree nor disagree with it”; Statement 5. “useful, I tend to 
agree with it, and I think it should be regarded favorably”; Statement 6. “very useful, I agree 
with it, and I think it should be encouraged”; and Statement 7. “necessary, I strongly agree 
with it, and I think it should be mandatory”» (cf. Appendix 1). Not surprisingly, 24 
participants endorsed Statement 6, and two participants (one male Psychology student and 
one female Law student) endorsed Statement 5, indicating a strong norm in favor of ragging 
practices. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty female and 18 male (N = 58) Law and Psychology undergraduates (n = 38 and 
n = 20 respectively), ranging from 19 to 23 years old (Mean age = 20.64; SD = 1.07), 
volunteered to participate in the main experiment. Gender, χ2 (3, N = 58) = 4.24, ns, Age, 
F(1, 54) = 1.87, ns, Faculty, χ2(3, N = 58) < 1, and Year of Studies, F(1, 54) < 1, were 
similarly distributed across conditions.  
The design of the experiment was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Group 
Opinion: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). 
Group and Group Opinion are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject 
  
75
 
factor. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions (12 to 16 participants per 
condition). 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted by questionnaire (cf. Appendix 2). An interviewer 
approached lone participants in public places in the Faculty building and asked them whether 
they agreed to answer to a questionnaire about “student ragging practices”. Upon agreement, 
the interviewer handed the questionnaire to the participant. 
On Page 1, participants read the following information about the purported goal of 
the experiment: “As you know, student’s ragging practices have recently caused some 
debate, and are, at the same time, one of the most important aspects of student life, inside and 
outside the University. As one part of a series of studies in which we inquire students of the 
several faculties about different aspects of their life at the university, we are now conducting 
a survey regarding student ragging practices. In the first phase of this study, we asked a 
sample of 50 Psychology (vs. Law) students to indicate, which of the 7 sentences written on 
the next page, they agreed the most. […]”. In this same page, following the text setting the 
“scenario” for the experiment, participants answered a few identification questions (such as 
faculty they study at, age, sex, etc) and then the questions measuring participants´ 
Endorsement of student ragging. 
On top of Page 2, participants read an instruction which introduced both the Group 
and the Group Opinion manipulations: “You may see bellow the same sentences which we 
have previously presented to those 50 students of the Psychology Faculty (vs. Law Faculty)”. 
Depending on the Group manipulation, participants were shown a distribution of responses 
given by members either from the ingroup or from the outgroup. According to the Group 
Opinion conditions, that distribution of responses either validated (Norm-Validating 
condition), or undermined (Norm-Undermining condition) the prescriptive norm. 
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Specifically, in the Norm-Validating condition, the number of ingroup or outgroup members 
who chose each of the 7 statements was, 2, 3, 4, 6, 17, 16, and 2, respectively for statement 1 
to statement 7. This distribution was reversed in the Norm-Undermining condition. 
Participants were fully debriefed on the deceptions involved in the experimental procedure 
after completing the questionnaire. 
Dependent Measures 
Endorsement of student ragging practices. Prior to the manipulation of Group 
Opinion, participants indicated their opinion about student ragging using the following four 
questions: questions 1 and 2 began with the phrasing “In you opinion, student ragging is …”, 
followed by 7-point bipolar scales ranging from very negative, very useless, to very positive, 
very useful; (3) “In you opinion, student ragging…”, 1 = should be forbidden, 7 = should be 
mandatory; (4) “In general, as regards student ragging, you …”, 1 = fully disagree, 7 = fully 
agree. We averaged these four scales to create a Norm Endorsement Score (Cronbach’s α = 
0.80).  
Participants were also asked to estimate the consensus about student ragging by 
writing down the percentage of target faculty students that were pro-ragging and anti-
ragging. We named this measure Perceived Consensus Estimates. 
Personal opinion and rejection threshold. In page 2, participants were asked to 
indicate with a plus sign (+) which of the 7 statements best represented their opinion about 
student ragging. This measure was named Personal Opinion. Participants also had to 
indicate with a minus sign (-) the statement on the continuum from which on they would 
disagree with. For example, if the participant indicated Statement 4, this meant that he or 
she disagreed not only with this statement but also statements 3, 2 and 1. We labeled this 
measure the Rejection Threshold.  
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Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. In the last page of the 
questionnaire, participants were asked to evaluate ingroup or outgroup members whose 
personal opinion was the same as their own or whose personal opinion fell within their 
rejection threshold. With this procedure we obtained participants’ judgments of group 
members that were subjectively normative and deviant, respectively. Participants had to 
evaluate each target in turn and in response to the following statement: “Your opinion 
about the students of the [Psychology vs. Law] Faculty who adopted this position is …”. 
The bipolar scales ranged from 1 to 7 and were as follows: very favorable - very 
unfavorable, bad classmates - good classmates, lack a lot of solidarity - show a lot of 
solidarity, and contribute nothing to student cohesion - contribute very much to student 
cohesion. We averaged these measures to create a Normative Member Attractiveness Score 
and a Deviant Member Attractiveness Score (Cronbach’s α = 0.84, and 0.78, respectively). 
Image conveyed by normative and deviant members. Finally, participants were 
asked whether they considered that the normative and the deviant members conveyed a 
good image of the ingroup or of the outgroup: “In your opinion the image conveyed by the 
students of the [Psychology vs. Law] Faculty who adopted your personal opinion [rejection 
threshold] position about their Faculty in general is …”. The response scale ranged from 
very bad (= 1) to very good (= 7). 
Results and Discussion 
We found no significant effects involving Participants’ Faculty (Law vs. 
Psychology) as covariate in any of the dependent measures (highest F1, 53 = 2.45, ns)13. 
Apart from the change in their respective magnitude, the analyses involving the factors in 
                                                 
13 The effects involving Participants’ Faculty as covariate in the analyses reported in the results section were 
the following: on Endorsement of Student Raging Practices, F (1, 53) = 2.45, ns, and on Perceived 
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the design of the experiment were similar to those reported bellow. We thus disregarded 
Participants’ Faculty in the subsequent analyses and employed the 2 x 2 x 2 design 
described earlier.  
Endorsement of Student Ragging Practices 
Norm endorsement. To check for the consensual endorsement of student ragging, 
we ran a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. Norm-
Undermining) ANOVA on the Norm Endorsement Score. This analysis yielded no 
significant effects (all Fs1, 54 < 1). All participants were significantly in favor of student 
ragging (Overall Mean = 5.49, SD = 0.70), as shown by the significant difference between 
this score and the scale midpoint (4), t (57) = 16.21, p < .001. 
Perceived consensus estimates. A Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion 
(Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) ANOVA with perceived consensus estimates 
(pro-ragging vs. anti-ragging) as a within-subject factor, indicated that participants 
considered that a higher percentage of students would endorse a pro-ragging position, M = 
64.98%, SD = 21.17, than an anti-ragging position, M = 26.48%, SD = 19.14, F (1, 54) = 
62.40, p < .001, η2 = .54. All remaining effects were non significant (all Fs < 1.60, ns). In 
addition, both the pro-ragging and the anti-ragging percentage were significantly different 
from 50%, respectively t (57) = 5.39, p < .001 and t (57) = 9.36, p < .001.  
In the whole, these results validate the choice of student ragging as a relevant 
normative dimension to test our hypotheses. Participants agreed with, and expected more 
others to agree than to disagree with student ragging. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Consensus Estimates, all Fs (1, 53) < 1; on Personal Opinion, F (1, 53) < 1 and on Rejection Threshold, F (1, 
53) < 1; on the Black Sheep Effect,  all Fs (1, 53) = 2.33, ns. 
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Personal Opinion and Rejection Threshold 
Personal opinion. As expected, the position with which participants agreed the most 
did not vary across conditions (all Fs1, 54 < 1). Also, in line with the pilot study, there was 
strong agreement with ragging (Overall Mean = 5.71, SD = 0.73).  
Table 3.1 
Rejection Threshold as a Function of Group Opinion and Membership (Experiment 1) 
 Group Opinion 
 Norm-Validating Norm-Undermining 
 Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
M 
(SD) 
1.44 
(1.50) 
1.86 
(2.18) 
4.00 
(3.13) 
2.38 
(2.42) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (most anti-ragging) to 7 (most pro-ragging). 
 
  
Rejection threshold. More importantly, our Boundary Narrowing hypothesis states 
that participants’ rejection threshold score should be higher in the Ingroup/Norm-
Undermining condition than in all other conditions. To test this hypothesis, we ran a contrast 
analysis on the rejection threshold scores, by assigning the values –1, +3, –1, and –1, 
respectively to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, Outgroup/Norm-
Validating, and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions. This analysis supported the 
hypothesis, t (54) = 2.80, p = .007.14 The results presented in Table 3.1 show that the 
rejection thresholds were significantly more pro-ragging in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining 
                                                 
14 To examine the possibility that there were significant differences among the three conditions made equal in 
our contrasts, we first checked for differences among the two outgroup conditions, by assigning the values 0, 
0, +1, and –1, to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, 
and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions, respectively. This analysis revealed no significant difference, t 
(54) < 1. We also compared the Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition with the Outgroup condition as a whole, 
M = 2.13, by assigning the values –1, 0, and +1, to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-
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condition than in the remaining three conditions. That is, in this condition participants 
expressed, on the average, their disagreement with all statements of the continuum that were 
below Statement 4 (“Ragging is neither useful nor useless, and I neither agree nor disagree 
with it”). In support of our Boundary Narrowing hypothesis, this indicates that, in this 
condition, participants were less tolerant to deviations from the norm than in all other 
conditions, and even that they were intolerant to positions that, objectively, were not against 
first-year student ragging. 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
With the Black Sheep hypothesis, we predicted that participants would upgrade 
normative ingroup members and derogate deviant ingroup members as compared to their 
outgroup counterparts, more strongly in the Norm-Undermining than in the Norm-Validating 
condition. To test this hypothesis, we examined judgments of ingroup or outgroup members 
who adopted participants’ personal opinion and of ingroup or outgroup members who 
adopted an opinion that was within the participants’ threshold of tolerance respectively. We 
submitted these judgments to a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-
Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x Member (Normative vs. Deviant) repeated measures 
ANOVA, with Member as a within-subject factor. To control for possible effects of Personal 
Opinion and Rejection Threshold, we entered these scores as covariates in the analysis. 
We found significant effects of Member, F (1, 53) = 30.51, p < .001, η2 = .37, Group 
x Member, F (1, 53) = 5.11, p < .03, η2 = .09, and Group x Group Opinion x Member, F (1, 
53) = 7.62, p = .008, η2 = .13 (remaining Fs1, 53 < 1.81, ns). The effect of Member indicates 
that, overall, participants judged normative members more favorably, M = 5.37, SD = 0.96, 
than deviant members, M = 3.24, SD = 1.08. The Group x Member interaction indicates that, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Undermining, and the Outgroup condition as a whole, respectively. Again, the analysis revealed no 
significant difference, t (55) < 1. 
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independently of Group Opinion factor, participants upgraded the normative ingroup 
members, M = 5.69, SD = 0.85, relative to the normative outgroup members, M = 5.07, SD = 
0.97, F (1, 55) = 6.46, p = .01. However, participants did not differentiate between deviant 
ingroup, M = 3.17, SD = 1.19, or outgroup members, M = 3.31, SD = 0.97, F (1, 55) < 1. 
Table 3.2 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Opinion and 
Group Membership (Experiment 1) 
  Group Opinion 
  Norm-Validating Norm-Undermining 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Members      
M 
(SD) 
 5.77 
(0.83) 
5.40 
(0.74) 
5.58 
(0.89) 
4.77 
(1.07) 
Deviant Members      
M 
(SD) 
 3.50 
(1.12) 
3.02 
(0.71) 
2.72 
(1.20) 
3.56 
(1.11) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 7 (attractive). 
More important to our predictions is the significant Group x Group Opinion x 
Member effect. By decomposing this interaction we found that in the Norm-Validating 
condition the Group x Member effect was not significant, F (1, 54) < 1 (remaining F1, 54 = 
3.23, p = .0815). However, in the Norm-Undermining condition, the Group x Member effect 
was significant, F (1, 54) = 12.52, p = .001 (remaining F1, 54 < 1). As presented in Table 
3.2, and in line with our predictions, in this condition, participants upgraded normative 
                                                 
15 Although the effect of Group is irrelevant to our predictions and even with no relevant sense, the fact that it 
is marginally significant may require its interpretation. This effect indicates that in the Norm-Validating 
condition participants tend to judge the ingroup members more favorably, M = 4.64, SD = 0.66, than the 
outgroup members, M = 4.21, SD = 0.34, irrespective of their normative or deviant prescriptive status. 
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ingroup members relative to normative outgroup members, F (1, 54) = 6.83, p = .012 and, in 
contrast, they derogated deviant ingroup members relative to deviant outgroup members, F 
(1, 54) = 4.87, p = .03.16 
Derogation of Deviants and Rejection Threshold  
We also tested the idea that deviant members would be more strongly derogated in 
the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition than in the remaining conditions. To do so we 
performed a contrast analysis entering the contrast values of 1, 1, -3 and 1, respectively for 
the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, the Outgroup/Norm-Validating, the Ingroup/Norm-
Undermining, and the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions.  
We found support to our idea. Consistent with the predicted pattern, t (54) = 1.88, p < 
.05, one-tailed, deviants were more strongly derogated in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining 
condition than in the remaining conditions, in which the deviants were similarly evaluated 
(see Figure 3.1).17 
In the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, the judged deviant members were 
objectively less deviant than the deviants in all other conditions. In fact, in this condition 
participants were judging deviant members who, in average, adopted Statement 4 or lower, 
whereas, in the remaining conditions, participants were judging deviant members who 
adopted Statement 2, or lower. Nevertheless, the former objectively less deviant members 
                                                 
16 To further explore the results on group members’ attractiveness, we computed an Intragroup 
Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score from the Normative Member Score. Thus, 
higher intragroup differentiation values indicate stronger upgrading of normative members and derogation of 
deviant members. We submitted the scores of the four conditions to a contrast analysis with the values -1, -1, 
3, and -1, assigned respectively to the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, the Outgroup/Norm-Validating, the 
Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, and the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions. Although marginally 
significant, t (54) = 1.91, p = .06, results indicate that participants differentiate more strongly 
between the normative and the deviant member in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, M = 2.86, SD = 
1.23, than in the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, M = 1.21, SD = 1.75, in the Ingroup/Norm-
Validating condition, M = 2.27, SD = 1.47, or in the Outgroup/Norm-Validating condition, M = 2.38, SD = 
1.28.16 
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were more strongly derogated than the latter. This result thus suggests that individuals tend 
to adopt a stronger prescriptive focus when faced with a context that poses a meaningful 
threat to the ingroup’s standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members 
We ran a Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x Group Opinion (Norm-Validating vs. 
Norm-Undermining) x Image repeated measures ANOVA, with image conveyed by the 
normative and the deviant members as a within-subject factor, and personal opinion and 
rejection threshold as covariates. We found significant effects of Image, F (1, 53) = 15.48, p 
< .001, η2 = .23, Group x Image, F (1, 53) = 7.65, p = .008, η2 = .13, and Group x Group 
                                                                                                                                                    
17 To discard the possibility that evaluations of deviants differed among the three conditions to which we 
gave the same contrast value, we performed a contrast analysis entering the values 1, -2, 0 and 1. The result 
was not significant, t (54) = 1.51, ns. 
Normative Member 
Deviant Member 
Figure 3.1. Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a function of 
Context and Group Membership (Experiment 1). 
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Opinion x Image, F (1, 53) = 10.25, p = .002, η2 = .16 (highest remaining F1, 53 = 1.31, ns). 
The effect of Member indicates that, overall, participants considered that normative members 
convey a better image of the group they belong to, M = 5.43, SD = 1.13, than do the deviants, 
M = 3.55, SD = 1.32. The Group x Image interaction indicates that, irrespective of whether 
the context validates or undermines the norm, participants tend to consider that the normative 
ingroup members convey a better image of the ingroup, M = 5.71, SD = 0.98, than the 
normative outgroup members do of the outgroup, M = 5.17, SD = 1.21, F (1, 55) = 3.34, p = 
.07. However, the image that ingroup deviants, M = 3.32, SD = 1.47, or outgroup deviants, M 
= 3.77, SD = 1.66, convey of their respective groups did not differ significantly, F (1, 55) = 
1.52, ns. 
Table 3.3 
Image Conveyed of Own Group by Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of 
Group Opinion and Group Membership (Experiment 1) 
  Group Opinion 
  Norm-Validating Norm-Undermining 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
5.69 
(1.01) 
5.71 
(0.83) 
5.75 
(0.97) 
4.69 
(1.30) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
3.69 
(1.40) 
3.64 
(1.45) 
2.83 
(1.47) 
3.88 
(0.89) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (bad image) to 7 (good image). 
More important to our predictions is the fact that by decomposing the second-order 
interaction we found results consistent with those of the black sheep effect: whereas in the 
  
85
 
Norm-Validating condition, we found no significant effects of Group or of Group x Member 
(all Fs1, 54 < 1), on the contrary, in the Norm-Undermining condition, the Group x Member 
effect was highly significant, F (1, 54) = 16.95, p < .001 (remaining F1, 54 < 1). As shown 
by Table 3.3, consistent with our predictions, in this later condition participants considered 
that the normative ingroup members conveyed a better image of the ingroup than did the 
normative outgroup members of the outgroup, F (1, 54) = 9.30, p < .01. In contrast, when 
judging the image that ingroup and outgroup deviants convey of their respective groups, 
participants considered that the ingroup deviants conveyed a worse image than did the 
equivalent outgroup members, F (1, 54) = 3.69, p = .06. As expected, judgments of the 
extent to which the normative and the deviant members contribute to the good image of their 
respective groups paralleled participants’ judgments of these members’ attractiveness. In 
both cases, participants’ judgments were moderated both by the targets’ group membership 
and by the supporting or undermining context in which these judgments occurred. 
In our view, the most important results of this experiment may be summarized as 
follows: contexts that undermine the perceived legitimacy of positive ingroup differentiation 
lead individuals to narrow their tolerance to deviations from the group’s standards. This 
process magnifies the deviant character of ingroup members who stand off track. They are 
perceived as a stronger threat to the ingroup’s overall image than they would be in more 
securing contexts, and, possibly as a consequence, they evoke evaluations that are more 
negative than they would be if judgments occurred in the latter contexts. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we tested the idea that individuals may derogate deviant ingroup 
members as a response to intragroup constraints that pose a menace to the perceived 
legitimacy of the ingroup’s value. With the present experiment, we examined the idea that 
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similar reactions would emerge when factors external to the ingroup undermine its value of 
as compared to a relevant outgroup. In addition, we examined whether the derogation of 
ingroup deviants is concomitant with motivation to exert normative pressure upon these 
members. 
To examine the above ideas, we created an intergroup situation using artificial 
groups. In a first session of the experiment, we asked participants to respond to two 
ostensibly unrelated bogus tasks: an “imagination test” and a “Condensed Ethical-Value 
Survey”. In a second session, participants were given false feedback about their own 
performance and the performance of other target individuals in the imagination test and the 
survey. We also provided participants with information about the ingroup and the outgroup 
as wholes, in terms of their respective ethical levels. This information allowed us to 
manipulate the validity of the ingroup’s position relative to the outgroup. In the Secure 
Identity condition, participants learned that ingroup’s ethical level was superior to that of the 
outgroup. In the Insecure Identity condition, they were informed that there was no certainty 
about which group had the higher ethical level. Participants then indicated the extent to 
which they believed that target normative and deviant members contributed to their 
respective group’s image, and evaluated these target members in a series of items similar to 
those used in the previous experiment. Finally, participants reported their willingness to 
persuade the target members to change their opinion. 
In line with subjective group dynamics model, and consistent with the results of the 
preceding experiment, we expected participants to show a stronger prescriptive focus in the 
Insecure Identity condition than in the Secure Identity condition. The Insecure Identity 
condition provides a context that challenges the subjective validity of participants’ social 
identity. Such threat would thus reflect in participants’ attitude towards others within this 
context. Therefore, we expected participants in this condition to upgrade normative, and to 
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derogate deviant ingroup members relative to equivalent outgroup members, to consider 
normative and deviant ingroup members to convey, respectively, a better and a worse image 
of their group than normative and deviant outgroup members, and to be more willing to 
convince the deviant ingroup member to change his or her opinion, than in the Secure 
Identity condition. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-eight female second year Psychology students, aged 18 to 34 years old (Mean 
age = 20.11, SD = 2.50; age was equivalent across conditions, F3, 54 = 1.21, ns) 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. These students had no prior courses in social 
psychology.  
The design of the experiment was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Context: 
Secure Identity vs. Insecure Identity) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and 
Context are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject factor. Participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions and ranged between 14 and 15 per condition. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in two sessions. In the first session, the 
experimenter informed participants that the goal of the study was to “examine the 
relationship between the psychological profile of people in terms of their imagination 
characteristics and their ethical values”. The experimenter then handed each participant a 
bogus “Creative Imagination Test” (see Appendix 3) consisting of a series of questions that 
were ostensibly aimed to evaluate people’s imagination characteristics. After completing 
the imagination test, participants received the “Condensed Ethical-Value Survey”. The 
experimenter made it clear to participants that this survey was unrelated to the imagination 
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test. For realism’s sake, the “survey” was composed by five “social topics” about which 
participants had to state their personal opinion: abortion, aids, homosexuality, attitudes 
towards fellow students, and “the wallet dilemma” (see Appendix 3). Each “topic” of the 
Ethical-Value survey consisted of a list of 7 statements that our previous work (Serôdio, 
1999) had established to represent equal interval steps on a liberal-conservative 
continuum. Within each “topic”, the statements were organized in a manner similar to that 
of the student ragging continuum used in Experiment 1, and ranged from the most counter-
normative to the most normative positions. However, to add realism to the manipulation of 
secure versus insecure social identity, the experimenter emphasized the fact that each 
individual would receive an “Ethical Level” score resulting from their responses across the 
five “topics”. Based on our pilot work and previous studies (Marques et al., 2001, 
Experiment 2; Serôdio, 1999; Serôdio, Marques and Abrams, in preparation) we decided to 
use the “homosexuality” continuum to manipulate normative and deviant targets. In this 
continuum, we expected that almost all participants would adopt a normative position, 
specifically that “Homosexual people, like everyone else, are entitled to choose their own 
sexual life” (position 6). The “homosexuality” continuum was as follows: Statement 1. 
“Homosexuals should be exiled to appropriate facilities so that they could not endanger 
normal people”; Statement 2. “Homosexuals should receive the appropriate treatment for 
their illness”; Statement 3. “Homosexuals should try to hide their sexual tendencies”; 
Statement 4. “Although they are normal people, homosexuals should be helped finding a 
better course in life”; Statement 5. “Despite their sexual choice, homosexuals, as everyone 
else, are entitled to choose their own sexual life”; Statement 6. “It makes no sense to make 
any kind of discrimination against homosexual people”; Statement 7. “Homosexuality is a 
reality in the modern society, therefore homosexuals should be appointed to Government 
positions”. At the end of the session, participants enclosed their response-sheets in a folder, 
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on which they had to write a “personal-code”. While ensuring participants’ anonymity, this 
code would allow us to give them personal feedback results in the a session that would take 
place one week later.  
In the second session, that was named the “validation session”, the experimenter 
handed back the folder from the previous session to each participant. This folder contained 
the participant’s responses to the imagination test, as well as information about their 
imagination characteristics, and about responses to the Ethical-Value survey. 
Firstly, participants were instructed to carefully read the feedback about their 
personal results in the “Creative Imagination Test”. This information was written in a 
“Coding Sheet” and allowed us to categorize participants in groups: “You belong to the 
Abstract-Pictorial Type. Abstract-Pictorials’ imagination ensues from their grasp of the 
external world, their values and expectations. These features distinguish between Abstract-
Pictorial and Picto-Experiential persons. For Picto-Experientials, the external factors 
articulate with the self-concept to convey a general view of the world.” 
All participants received the same feedback, i.e. they were all categorized as 
belonging to the Abstract-Pictorial Type of Imagination. After reading this information, 
participants were given a booklet in which they answered a series of questions tapping 
group attraction and the manipulation check. While ostensibly disclosing the experiment’s 
goal to participants, the experimenter then informed them that, in fact the study had been 
designed to reveal which of the two types of imagination is superior to the other in terms of 
ethical values”. In the Secure Identity condition, the experimenter proceeded to inform 
participants that the results in Session 1 were entirely clear and had left no doubt about the 
ethical superiority of the Abstract-Pictorial type of imagination over the Picto-Experiential 
type. The purpose of Session 2, the experimenter added, was simply to confirm that result. 
In the Insecure Identity condition, the experimenter explained that the results in Session 1 
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were totally ambiguous and had not allowed to decide which of the two types of 
imagination is superior to the other. He added that the purpose of Session 2 was to clarify 
the data he had obtained so far. In both conditions, the experimenter showed an obscure 
data listing to participants, as a justification for this claim. 
Participants were then provided with a second booklet that included photocopies of 
the responses to the liberal-conservative continuum about homosexuals that had purportedly 
been given by two target individuals who had participated in the first session. These targets 
were described, by means of a photocopy of their alleged “Coding-Sheet”, as being either 
ingroup or outgroup members. One target (normative member) adopted a norm validating 
position (Statement 6, which was the one endorsed by almost all participants). The other 
target (deviant member) adopted a norm undermining position (Statement 2). Participants 
were fully debriefed in the end of the experiment. 
Dependent Measures 
Manipulation checks. Immediately after being categorized as Pictorials, participants 
answered the following question: “To what extent do you think the Creative Imagination 
Test is correct about your imagination type?” (1 = probably is wrong, 7 = probably is 
correct). After all dependent measures were collected in Booklet 2, participants were 
instructed to answer to a third booklet, supposedly in order to “improve the presentation of 
future studies as well as to help preparing the presentation of the results of the present 
study”. In this booklet they were asked to remember: (1) their own type of imagination, (2) 
the type of imagination of the two target persons they had to judge, (3) which statement of 
the continuum each of the targets chose as personal opinion, and (4) what did the results of 
Session 1 indicate about the Ethical Level of the two types of imagination. Finally, to 
check for suspicion, participants were invited to write down in their own words which 
were the goals the experiment. 
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Group attraction. After being informed that they belonged to the Pictorial type and 
prior to any manipulation, participants answered to four questions tapping group attraction. 
These questions were answered on a scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= very much) 
and were the following: (1) “How much do you like belonging to the Abstract-Pictorial 
type of imagination”; (2) “How much do you feel that you belong to the Abstract-Pictorial 
type of imagination?”; (3) “How much do you identify with your Imagination Type?”; (4) 
“How much do you like your Imagination Type?”. We averaged these responses to create a 
Group Attraction Score (Cronbach’s α = .88). 
Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. After answering to the Group 
Attraction questions, and after the Group and Context manipulations, participants judged 
the normative and the deviant members on five bipolar dimensions aimed to tap member 
attractiveness: (1) “What is your opinion about this person?” (1 = negative; 7 = positive); 
(2) “In your opinion, this person is...” (1 = unlikable; 7 = likable); (3) “In your opinion, 
this is a...” (1 = bad person; 7 = good person); (4) “In your opinion, this person is a...” (1 = 
bad colleague; 7 = good colleague); (5) “In your opinion, this person is...” (1 = insensitive; 
7 = sensitive). We pooled these judgments for each target to create a Normative Member 
Score and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .75, and .86, respectively). 
Image conveyed by normative and deviant members and willingness to influence 
the deviant member. Participants were then asked: “In your opinion, the image this person 
conveys about their Imagination Type is...” (1 = very bad; 7 = very good), and reported 
their willingness to influence the deviant member to adopt a more norm-validating 
position: “In the third session, we will ask you to discuss ethical values with this person. 
How willing would you be to attempt to convince this person to change his or her 
opinion?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). 
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
The manipulation check for the categorization of participants in artificial groups 
was collected before any other manipulation. Nonetheless, we submitted participants’ 
answers to a Group x Context ANOVA. The analysis revealed no significant effects 
(Highest F1, 54 = 2.62, ns). Also as required, the Overall Mean = 5.71, SD = 0.96 was 
significantly different from the scale’s midpoint (4 = neither correct nor incorrect), t (57) 
= 13.61, p < .001. This result indicates that participants considered that the imagination test 
was indeed correct in depicting their type of imagination and that this result did not vary 
across experimental conditions. 
The post-experimental questionnaire (booklet 3) revealed that all participants 
correctly remembered their own type of imagination as well as that of the normative and 
the deviant targets. Participants also correctly indicated the personal opinion of these 
targets along the homosexuality continuum. In accordance with Context manipulation, all 
participants in the Secure Identity condition correctly recalled that the alleged results of 
Session 1 indicated that the Pictorials showed a superior Ethical Level, whereas those in 
the Insecure Identity condition recalled that the results had not been conclusive. 
Group Attraction 
Group attraction measures were collected before the Group and Context 
manipulations. However, in order to be sure of the equivalence of participants across 
conditions, we submitted the group attraction score to an ANOVA with these two factors. 
This ANOVA showed no significant effects, highest F (1, 54) = 2.30, ns. When we 
compared the mean of this score with the midpoint (4) of the scale, we found a is highly 
significant difference, M = 5.35, SD = 0.88; t (57) = 11.75, p < .001. These results show 
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that participants’ strong attraction to the ingroup was equivalent across conditions, 
confirming that group membership manipulation was successful and meaningful to 
participants. 
 
Table 3.4 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 2) 
  Context 
  Secure Identity Insecure Identity 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
5.97 
(0.57) 
5.73 
(0.83) 
6.56 
(0.42) 
5.97 
(0.59) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
2.72 
(0.95) 
2.45 
(0.79) 
2.29 
(0.51) 
2.96 
(0.87) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 7 (attractive). 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
A Context x Group x Member ANOVA on normative and deviant member scores, 
yielded significant effects of Member, Context, and Group x Member, respectively, F (1, 
54) = 520.11, p < .001, η2 = .91, F (1, 54) = 3.96, p = .05, η2 = .07, and F (1, 54) = 4.12, p 
= .05, η2 = .07. More importantly, and in support of our predictions, there was a significant 
effect of Context x Group x Member, F(1, 54) = 4.49, p = .04, η2 = .08; highest remaining 
Fs(1, 54) = 1.75, ns. In the Secure Identity condition, the Group x Member interaction was 
not significant, F (1, 55) < 1. However, in the Insecure Identity condition the same 
interaction was significant, F (1, 55) = 8.24, p = .006. In line with the Black Sheep 
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hypothesis, in this condition, participants judged the normative ingroup member more 
favorably than the normative outgroup member, F (1, 55) = 5.65, p = .02, while derogating 
the deviant ingroup member as compared to the deviant outgroup member, F (1, 55) = 
5.02, p = .03 (see Table 3.4).18 
Image Conveyed by the Normative and the Deviant Members 
A Context x Group x Member ANOVA yielded significant effects of Group, 
Member, and Group x Member, respectively F (1, 54) = 5.09, p < .05, η2 = .09, F (1, 54) = 
313.43, p < .001, η2 = .85, and F (1, 54) = 4.99, p = .05, η2 = .08. These effects were 
qualified by a significant Context x Group x Member effect, F (1, 54) = 10.13, p = .002, η2 
= .16. 
As shown in Table 3.5, the results are parallel to those obtained in Experiment 1. 
Also, these results are consistent with results for target attractiveness. In the Secure 
Identity condition, we found no significant Group x Member effect, F (1, 55) < 1. 
However, in the Insecure Identity condition, the Group x Member effect was highly 
significant, F (1, 55) = 13.79, p < .001. In support of our hypothesis, in this condition, 
participants considered that the normative ingroup member conveyed a better image of the 
ingroup than did the normative outgroup member of the outgroup, F (1, 55) = 14.53, p < 
.001. Conversely, participants considered that the deviant ingroup member conveyed a 
worse image of the ingroup than did the deviant outgroup member convey of the outgroup, 
F (1, 55) = 4.53, p = .04. 
                                                 
18 As in Experiment 1, we computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member 
Score to the Normative Member Score: higher values of the intragroup differentiation represent stronger 
upgrading of the normative and stronger derogation of the deviant member. We performed a contrast analysis 
on the scores of intragroup differentiation entering the values -1, -1, 3, and -1, respectively for the 
Ingroup/Secure Identity, Outgroup/Secure Identity, Ingroup/Insecure Identity, and Outgroup/Insecure 
Identity conditions. In line with our reasoning, results revealed that participants differentiated more strongly 
between the normative and the deviant member in the Ingroup/Insecure Identity condition, M = 4.27, SD = 
0.78, than in the Outgroup/Insecure Identity, M = 3.01, SD = 1.13, in the Ingroup/Secure Identity, M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.27, and in the Outgroup/Secure Identity conditions, M = 3.28, SD = 1.33, t (54) = 3.08, p = .003. 
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Table 3.5 
Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 2) 
  Context 
  Secure Identity Insecure Identity 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
5.87 
(0.74) 
5.60 
(1.45) 
6.71 
(0.47) 
5.29 
(0.99) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
2.67 
(1.45) 
2.33 
(1.21) 
1.50 
(0.52) 
2.36 
(1.15) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (bad image) 7 (good image). 
Willingness to Influence the Deviant Member 
A Context x Group ANOVA revealed a significant two–way interaction, F (1, 54) = 
6.66, p = .01, η2 = .11 (highest remaining F1, 54 = 1.84, ns). In the Secure Identity 
condition, participants were equally willing to exert influence on the deviant ingroup 
member, M = 5.60, SD = 1.77, as on the deviant outgroup member, M = 6.00, SD = 1.13, F 
(1, 55) < 1. However, in the Insecure Identity condition, participants were significantly 
more willing to influence the deviant ingroup member, M = 6.79, SD = 0.58, than the 
deviant outgroup member, and M = 5.50, SD = 1.16, F (1, 55) = 7.47, p = .008. This result 
thus supports our hypothesis. 
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Experiment 3 
In our third experiment, we examined the same idea as in Experiment 2, namely, that 
a potentially inferior status relative to an outgroup (specifically, an outgroup with which the 
ingroup has a history of competition), should trigger stronger derogation of ingroup deviants, 
and, concomitantly, upgrading of normative ingroup members, than a secure superior 
ingroup status. The difference between this experiment and Experiment 2 is that, this time, 
we used natural social categories instead of artificial groups. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
In this experiment, 40 female and 16 male Psychology (n = 32) and Dentistry (n = 
24) students in a private school, aged 18 to 35 years old (Mean age = 20.52, SD = 2.33) 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. Gender, χ2 (3, N = 56) = 1.06, ns, age, F (3, 
52) < 1, and faculty, χ2 (3, N = 56) = 6.54, ns, were similarly distributed across conditions. 
The design of the experiment was a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Context: 
Secure Identity vs. Insecure Identity) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and 
Context are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject factor. Participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions and ranged between 13 and 15 per condition. 
Procedure 
The procedure was inspired by that of Experiment 2 with some adjustments 
required by the use of natural social categories. The experiment was also conducted in two 
sessions, but, this time, the goal of the study was described in a slightly different manner 
than in the previous experiment. In the first session, the experimenter informed participants 
that the study was part of a larger research program aimed to, “learn about the social values 
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that people use in their daily life, and whether there is any relation between such values 
and the different university courses that people choose”. “Individuals who had previously 
participate in the research program” the experimenter continued, “had answered to a Value 
Inventory that was in the process of adaptation to the Portuguese population”. Participants 
were also informed that previous research had, allegedly, proved that this inventory 
“established with a high degree of precision the level of moral development of each 
individual”. Once participants gave their consent to participate in the research, the 
experimenter handed them a “Value Inventory – Short Version” (cf. Appendix 4). This 
inventory was composed by five questions addressing the same social topics as described 
in Experiment 2 (abortion, aids, homosexuality, attitudes towards fellow students, and “the 
wallet dilemma”). 
Once the value inventory had been answered, the experimenter informed that, from 
te participants’ university, only the students from the Psychology and the Dentistry 
departments were chosen to participate in the research. At this point the experimenter 
explained that the adaptation of any “measurement instrument” required that the sample 
used in the research should be thoroughly described, in terms of a large set of indicators. 
Therefore, participants “would have to answer a series of question in a separate booklet”. 
In this booklet, amongst other questions, participants could find a series of questions 
measuring their attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup. Because their responses were 
anonymous and confidential, they would have to identify themselves by means of a 
personal-code known only to them. As in Experiment 2, this code would allow them to 
receive feedback regarding their answers to the value inventory, while conserving their 
anonymity. In the second booklet, participants could find a written presentation of the 
study in which all verbal instructions were restated (see Appendix 4). Once they finished 
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answering all the questions, participants were asked to insert the two booklets in a folder, 
on which they wrote their “personal-code”. 
The second session of the experiment was conducted one week latter. At the 
beginning of the session, the experimenter informed the participants that they would not be 
provided with the feedback concerning their personal level of moral development because, 
due to the pattern of results obtained in the first session, some additional data were 
required. At this point, the experimenter presented one of the results obtained in the first 
session that, “in light of previous data, request further inquiry”. This was intended to 
manipulate Context. As in Experiment 2, in the Secure Identity condition participants 
learned that “the results from the first session conclusively showed that the level of moral 
development was superior amongst the Psychology [vs. Dentistry] students than among 
Dentistry [vs. Psychology] students”. In the Insecure Identity condition participants were 
told that “the results from the first session were not at all conclusive about the superiority 
of any of the two groups of students”. All participants were then told that, these results had 
led the research team “to prepare a series of additional questions aimed to explore further 
the data gathered thus far”. This second phase of the study was identified in a new booklet 
entitled “Complementary Phase”. Finally, the experimenter informed participants that “the 
results of this second session will also allow the research team to devise a third phase of 
study in which the social issues listed in the value inventory would be discussed by some 
of the people who participated in the second phase of the study”, and, “those who 
volunteer to continue will be asked to pick their envelope from the first session and to start 
filling Booklet 1”. This booklet was similar to the corresponding one in our Experiment 2.  
In the first page of Booklet 1, participants found written instructions about how they 
should carefully analyze the photocopies of the responses given by two students (A and B) to 
the liberal-conservative continuum about homosexuals. Depending on conditions, “student 
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A” and “student B” were presented either as Ingroup or Outgroup students who participated 
in the first session. Similarly to Experiment 2, the photocopies showed that one of these 
students adopted a normative position in the continuum (Statement 6) whereas the other 
adopted a deviant position (Statement 2).  
Dependent Measures 
Manipulation checks. At the end of the experiment, participants were instructed to 
fill a third booklet that was similar to the one employed in Experiment 2. In this booklet, 
participants were asked to remember: (1) which of the two courses showed a superior level 
of moral development (“Psychology”, “Dentistry”, “it wasn’t possible to determine”), (2) 
to which course students A and B belonged, and (3) which statement of the continuum had 
been chosen by each target. A final open-ended question invited participants to describe 
the study in their own words.  
Attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup. In the first session, participants 
answered six question measuring their attraction to their own course and to the opposite 
course: (1) “I like to be a student of the [ingroup] course” vs. “Sometimes I feel I would 
rather be in another course, for instance that of [outgroup]”(both questions, 1 = totally 
disagree, 9 = totally agree); (2) “To what extent are you pleased to belong to the [ingroup] 
course” vs. “To what extent would you feel more pleased if you belonged to the [outgroup] 
course” (both questions, 1 = not at all, 9 = very much); (3) “To what extent do you identify 
with the [ingroup] course?” vs. “To what extent do you identify with the [outgroup] 
course?” (both questions, 1 = I don’t identify much, 9 = I identify very much). We averaged 
these items to an Attraction to the Ingroup Score (Cronbach’s α = .95) and an Attraction to 
the Outgroup Score (Cronbach’s α = .81). 
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Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. Participants judged students A 
and B, each, on ten bipolar items: (1) “What is your opinion about this student?” (1 = 
negative; 9 = positive); (2 through 10) “In your opinion, student A [B] is a...” (1 – 9: bad 
person – good person, dishonest – honest, selfish – altruistic, insincere – sincere, envious – 
generous, insensitive – sensitive, bad colleague – good colleague, unsolidary – solidary, 
disloyal – loyal). The judgments across the ten items were averaged to create a Normative 
Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .88) and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
Normative and deviant members’ perceived impact on the group. We asked 
participants to what extent the normative and the deviant target might affect their 
respective group in a positive or negative way: “To what extent do you consider that, 
during the third session of the study, this student will affect what others think about 
[Psychology vs. Dentistry] students in general?” (1 = very positively; 9 = very negatively). 
Image conveyed by the normative and the deviant members. Participants were also 
asked whether students A and B portrayed a good or bad image of their course: “In your 
opinion, what image does this student convey of Psychology [vs. Dentistry] course as a 
whole?” (1 = very bad image; 9 = very good image).  
Willingness to influence the deviant member. Finally, participants were asked how 
willing they were to attempt to make the deviant member adopt a different opinion on the 
issue: “If you participated in the third session along with this student, to what extent are 
you willing to convince this person to change their opinion?” (1 = not at all; 9 = very 
much). 
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Results and Discussion 
Participants’ course (Psychology vs. Dentistry) revealed no significant effects as a 
covariate throughout the dependent measures (highest F1, 51 = 3.39, ns), and the effects 
involving the factors in our experimental design were similar to those we present bellow.19 
Therefore, we collapsed participants in a Context x Group between-subjects design, while 
disregarding participants’ course. 
Manipulation Check 
The post-experimental questionnaire (Booklet 3) revealed that participants in the 
Secure and Insecure Identity conditions remembered correctly the respective manipulation 
of the alleged results of Session 1. In addition, all participants correctly reported the 
personal opinions of normative and deviant targets, as well as the targets’ group 
membership. 
Attraction to Ingroup and to the Outgroup 
The measures of attraction to the two rival courses were collected in the first 
session. Nevertheless, to be sure of the equivalence of participants across experimental 
condition in these measures, we submitted the two attraction scores (Attraction within-
subject factor) to an ANOVA, entering Group and Context as between subjects factors. 
The analysis revealed only an effect of Attraction, F (1, 52) = 480.92, p < .001, η2 = .90 
(highest remaining F1, 52 = 2.87, ns). Not surprisingly, participants reported stronger 
                                                 
19 All analyses reported in this experiment were first conducted by including participants’ course as a 
covariate. The effects of the covariate in these analyses are the following: Attraction to the ingroup and to the 
outgroup, all Fs (1, 51) < 1; attractiveness of normative and deviant targets, F (1, 51) = 1.27, ns; normative 
and deviant targets’ impact on the group, all Fs (1, 51) < 1; image conveyed by the normative and deviant 
targets, all Fs (1, 51) < 1;and willingness to influence the deviant Member, F (1, 51) = 3.39, ns. This shows 
that participants’ course had no impact on the relevant dependent measures. 
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attraction to the ingroup, M = 8.08, SD = 1.23, than to the outgroup, M = 2.02, SD = 1.16. 
No differences were found across conditions. 
Table 3.6 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 3) 
  Context 
  Secure Identity Insecure Identity 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
7.16 
(0.84) 
6.78 
(0.82) 
7.59 
(0.90) 
6.69 
(0.73) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
4.16 
(0.78) 
4.25 
(0.93) 
3.48 
(0.80) 
4.04 
(0.94) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 9 (attractive). 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
The results reported in Table 3.6 are consistent with those of Experiment 2, and in 
line with the black sheep effect hypothesis. The Context x Group x Member ANOVA 
computed on the normative and deviant member attractiveness scores, revealed significant 
effects of Member, F (1, 52) = 336.16, p < .001, η2 = .87, Group x Member, respectively, 
F (1, 52) = 14.45, p < .001, η2 = .22, and Context x Group x Member, F (1, 52) = 5.39, p = 
.02, η2 = .09 (highest remaining F1, 52 = 1.16, ns). The three-way interaction shows that, 
consistent with our predictions, in the Insecure Identity condition, the Group x Member 
effect is significant, F (1, 53) = 19.17, p < .001, whereas in the Secure Identity condition it 
is not, F(1, 53) = 1.11, ns. The interaction within the Insecure condition indicates that 
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participants judge the normative ingroup member more favorably than the corresponding 
outgroup member, F (1, 53) = 8.49, p = .005, and, on the contrary, the deviant is more 
strongly derogated than that of outgroup, F (1, 53) = 12.37, p = .001.20 
Table 3.7 
Perceived Impact of Normative and Deviant Members on the Group as a Function of 
Context and Group Membership (Experiment 3) 
  Context 
  Secure Identity Insecure Identity 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
3.08 
(2.63) 
2.36 
(1.45) 
1.93 
(1.39) 
2.53 
(1.30) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
6.46 
(2.15) 
6.50 
(1.95) 
7.79 
(1.93) 
6.53 
(2.30) 
Note: Higher values indicate the perception of a more negative impact on the group. 
Normative and Deviant Members’ Impact on the Group 
Table 3.7 shows the means and standard deviations of participants’ judgments 
about the perceived impact of normative and deviant members on their respective group. 
As we can see, the general pattern is consistent with the idea that the judgment of whether 
the targets have a positive or negative impact on their respective group matches 
participants’ evaluations of the normative and deviant members’ attractiveness. The 
                                                 
20 We submitted the intragroup differentiation scores to a contrast analysis with the values -1, -1, 3, and -1, 
respectively for the Ingroup/Secure Identity, Outgroup/Secure Identity, Ingroup/Insecure Identity, and 
Outgroup/Insecure Identity conditions. Consistent with our predictions and with the results of the previous 
experiment, the analysis revealed a stronger differentiation between the normative and the deviant members 
in the Ingroup/Insecure Identity condition, M = 4.10, SD = 0.37, than in the remaining conditions, t (52) = 
4.16, p < .001 (Outgroup/Insecure Identity, M = 2.14, SD = 0.98; Ingroup/Secure Identity, M = 3.01, SD = 
1.47; Outgroup/Secure Identity conditions, M = 2.54, SD = 0.91. 
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highest negative impact is that of the ingroup deviant member in the insecure identity 
condition, and the highest positive impact is that of the normative ingroup member, in that 
same condition.  
Unfortunately, although the ANOVA revealed an effect of Member, F (1, 52) = 
336.16, p < .001, η2 = .73, the predicted Context x Group x Member effect was but 
marginally significant, F (1, 52) = 3.13, p = .08, η2 = .06 (highest remaining F1, 52 = 2.48, 
ns). In decomposing this interaction, we found that the Group x Member effect was only 
marginally significant in the Insecure Identity condition, F (1, 53) = 3.06, p = .09, and non-
significant in the Secure Identity condition, F (1, 53) < 1. In addition, these results did not 
indicate that in the Insecure Identity condition the judgments of normatives, F (1, 53) < 1, 
and deviants, F (1, 53) = 2.49, ns, differed depending on their group membership. 
In short, although they are but marginally consistent with our hypothesis, these 
results encourage the idea that the context in which normative and deviant ingroup 
individuals are judged may affect the extent to which they are perceived, respectively, as a 
threatening or as shielding the group’s social identity. In support of this idea, we found that 
decomposing the two-way interaction as a function of Group and not of Context, the 
Context x Member interaction is significant when judging ingroup members, F (1, 53) = 
5.55, p = .02, but not outgroup members, F (1, 53) < 1. This interaction indicates that 
participants tended to perceive the normative ingroup member’s more positive impact on 
when the group’s status is insecure, M = 1.93, DP = 1.39, than when it is secure, M = 3.08, 
DP = 2.63, F (1, 53) = 5.55, p = .09. Conversely, participants considered that the deviant 
has a more strongly negative impact on the ingroup when the group’s status is threatened, 
M = 7.79, DP = 1.93, than when it is secured, M = 6.46, DP = 2.15, F (1, 53) = 2.80, p = 
.10. 
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Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members 
The ANOVA conducted on the scores relative to perceptions of the image 
conveyed by the normative and deviant members revealed significant effects of Member, F 
(1, 52) = 352.83, p < .001, η2 = .87, and Group x Member, F (1, 54) = 6.08, p = .02, η2 = 
.10 (highest remaining F1, 52 = 2.14, ns). The Group x Member interaction indicates that, 
regardless of context, participants considered that ingroup deviants, M = 2.37, DP = 1.28, 
convey a worse image of the ingroup than outgroup deviants convey of the outgroup, M = 
3.10, DP = 1.18, F (1, 54) = 5.01, p = .03. In turn, participants tend to perceive that 
normative ingroup members promote a better image of the ingroup, M = 7.81, DP = 1.18, 
than do the their outgroup equivalents of their respective group, M = 7.28, DP = 0.99, F (1, 
54) = 3.43, p = .07 (see Table 3.8). 
 
Table 3.8 
Image Conveyed by Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 3) 
  Context 
  Secure Identity Insecure Identity 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
7.85 
(1.21) 
7.21 
(0.95) 
7.79 
(1.18) 
7.33 
(1.05) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
2.85 
(1.28) 
3.14 
(1.23) 
1.93 
(1.14) 
3.07 
(1.16) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (very bad image) to 9 (very good image). 
  
106
 
Willingness to Influence the Deviant Member 
Finally, in the same way as we did in Experiment 2, we checked for the idea that 
participants would be more willing to attempt to influence the deviant member to change 
their opinion about homosexuals, when the deviant belonged to the ingroup member and 
the context is insecure. However, the present results do not support this prediction (see 
Table 3.9). Indeed, the Context x Group ANOVA on the participants’ responses to this 
question revealed no significant effects, all Fs (1, 52) < 1. At odds with our hypothesis and 
with the results of Experiment 2, participants reported to be similarly willing to exert 
influence on the deviant across conditions. 
Table 3.9 
Willingness to Influence the Deviant Member as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 3) 
  Context 
  Secure Identity Insecure Identity 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
M 
(SD) 
 
7.46 
(1.61) 
7.21 
(1.58) 
7.93 
(2.24) 
7.27 
(1.62) 
Note: Higher values indicate stronger willingness to influence the deviant member. 
Experiment 4 
In this experiment we asked Sciences and Arts students to participate in a survey 
about student ragging practices in the university. Allegedly the survey had already been 
answered by people that were not students of the University of Porto and we wanted them 
give their opinion regarding the results gathered so far. Depending on the Context 
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manipulation, participants found out either that the majority of Porto’s inhabitants were in 
favor of ragging rites in the university (Norm-Validating condition) or that the majority 
was against these rites (Norm-Undermining condition). Subsequently, participants were 
invited to state their reaction to this alleged result. With a similar procedure to the one 
described for Experiment 1 participants then indicated their personal opinion along the pro-
ragging – anti-ragging continuum, as well as the position in the continuum they disagreed 
the most with. Finally, participants judged the attractiveness of group members that had 
adopted each one of these two positions. 
We expected participants to express a more negative emotional reaction in the 
Norm-Undermining condition than in the Norm-Validating condition. As a consequence of 
the stronger prescriptive focus elicited in that context, we expected stronger derogation of 
deviant ingroup members (and upgrading of normative ingroup members) in the Norm-
Undermining condition than in the Norm-Validating condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 44 female and 14 male Arts (n = 26) and Sciences (n = 32) 
students, from 18 to 26 years-old (Mean age = 21.12; SD = 1.97) who volunteered to 
participate in an alleged survey about student ragging. Gender, χ2 (3, N = 58) = 1.73, ns, 
age, F (1, 54) = 1.20, ns, faculty, χ2 (3, N = 58) < 1, and year of studies, F (1, 54) = 1.55, 
ns, were similarly distributed across conditions.  
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Procedure and Design 
The study was conducted by means of a questionnaire. An interviewer asked Arts 
and Sciences students to participate in a survey “aiming to know the opinions of the 
student population and the public in general about students’ ragging in the university”. In 
the first page of the questionnaire, participants read information about the study’s alleged 
objective: “As you know, student ragging at the university has recently become an issue of 
debate, not only among students, but also in the general public. […] This questionnaire is 
part of a two-phase survey about this issue. In the first phase, a representative sample of 
the students of the Arts faculty and the Sciences faculty, as well as of the inhabitants of 
Porto has stated their opinions regarding student ragging […]. In this second phase our 
purpose is to validate the results obtained in the first phase […]”.  
In that same page, participants were presented with a series of questions about 
which faculty they belonged to, for how many years they studied in that faculty, and their 
age and gender. The interviewer insured that participants completed each page of the 
questionnaire before going forward and that they did not go back to correct any answer in 
previous pages. 
In the second page of the questionnaire, participants were presented with questions 
aiming to measure their attraction to their own school. In the third page, participants were 
given information about the alleged results of the first phase of the study that, purportedly, 
had already been concluded. This information was used to manipulate Context. In the 
Norm-Validating condition participants learned that the data collected thus far indicated 
that “the large majority of the public in general clearly supports student ragging”. 
Conversely, in the Norm-Undermining condition participants read that “the large majority 
of the public in general clearly is against student ragging”. Subsequent to this information, 
participants answered to questions aiming to assess their emotional reaction to the results 
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they had just learned about (Emotional Reaction to Threat). In the same page, they were 
asked to indicate, in the same continuum of opinions about student ragging as the one 
employed in Experiment 1, the statement with which they agreed the most and the 
statement with which they disagreed the most. As we did in Experiment 1, we used these 
positions to manipulate Normative and Deviant target members (see Appendix 5). 
Finally, in the last page of the questionnaire, participants were asked to judge 
students issuing either from their faculty (Ingroup condition) or from the opposed faculty 
(Outgroup condition) who had chosen the normative, or the deviant position. Once the 
questionnaire was complete, participants were fully debriefed.21  
The design was a 2 (Context: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-Undermining) x 2 
(Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant) mixed-design, in 
which Context and Group are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject 
factor. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and their numbers were 14 or 15 
by condition. 
Dependent Measures 
Attraction to the ingroup. Before any manipulation, participants answered to four 
questions aimed to measure attraction to their own faculty: (1) “I like being a student of my 
faculty”; (2) “I have strong bonds with my faculty and my colleagues”; (3) “I identify with 
my faculty”; (4) “I see myself as a member of my faculty”. All response scales ranged 
from 1 (= I completely disagree) to 9 (= I completely agree).  We averaged these questions 
to an Attraction to the Ingroup score (Cronbach’s α = .80).22  
                                                 
21 Eleven participants were not considered for data analysis either because they said to be suspicious while 
answering to the questionnaire (two participants), for not answering all the questions (seven participants) or 
did not complied with the experiment instructions on how to answer the questionnaire (two participants). 
22 We did not include measures of attraction to the outgroup based on the fact that, in a brief test to the 
questionnaire, more than one person pointed out that the presence of such questions made them suspect about 
the real purpose of the study. 
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  Emotional reaction to threat. After reading the information stating that the public 
in general was either clearly supportive of, or clearly opposed to, student ragging (Norm-
Validating condition vs. Norm-Undermining condition), participants were asked about how 
they felt after having learnt about this result, in 3 bipolar scales: “Now that you know this 
result you feel …” (1 = very happy, very pleased, in a very good mood; 9 = very unhappy, 
very annoyed,  in a very bad mood). Although the Cronbach’s Alpha was somewhat low 
(Cronbach’s α = .61), we averaged the three items to create an Emotional Reaction to 
Threat score. 
Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. After having chosen the 
statement with which they agreed the most (normative position) and the statement with 
which they most disagreed (deviant position), participants were asked to judge students 
who had chosen these positions.23 These judgments were made in five bipolar items (1 = 
very unfavorable opinion, bad schoolmate, very disloyal, lack a lot of solidarity, 
contributes to disharmony among students; 9 = very favorable opinion, good schoolmate, 
very loyal, show a lot of solidarity, contributes to cohesion among students). We averaged 
the scores of the five items to create a Normative Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .89) and 
a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .84). 
Results and Discussion 
For all the dependent measures, we ran the analyses reported below, by entering 
Participant’s Faculty (Arts vs. Sciences) as a covariant. These analyses revealed no 
significant effects involving Participant’s Faculty, in any of the dependent measures: on 
Attraction to the Ingroup, F (1, 53) < 1; on Emotional Reaction to Threat, F (1, 53) < 1; on 
                                                 
23 The Normative and the Deviant positions chosen by participants were equivalent across conditions. The 
Context x Group ANOVA revealed, as required, no significant effects in the Normative position chosen by 
the participants, highest F (1, 54) = 2.73, ns (positions ranged from 5 to 7 in the continuum), or in the 
Deviant position, highest F (1, 54) = 3.11, ns (positions ranged from 1 to 3 in the continuum). 
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the normative position chosen by participants, F (1, 53) = 2.23, ns; on the deviant position 
chosen by participants, F (1, 53) < 1; on the atrractiveness to normative and deviant 
members, F (1, 53) = 2.33, ns. Given these results we disregarded Participant’s Faculty 
from the following analyses. 
Attraction to the Ingroup 
Although we measured attraction to the ingroup before any manipulation, we 
nonetheless computed a full factorial ANOVA on the Attraction to the Ingroup score that 
revealed no significant effects (highest F1, 54 = 2.91, ns). Participants reported to be 
equally attracted to their own school across conditions, Overall Mean = 6.60, SD = 1.37. In 
addition, the difference between this score and the scale midpoint (5), shows that 
participants were without any doubt attracted to the ingroup, t (57) = 8.89, p < .001,. 
Emotional Reaction to Threat 
In this experiment, we wanted to test the idea that the negative emotional reaction 
associated with the sense of threat that results from the undermining of ingroup standards 
would trigger strong derogatory attitudes towards ingroup deviants and appreciation 
towards normative members. To test this prediction we must ensure that the Context 
manipulation is effective in generating a more negative emotional reaction in the Norm-
Undermining than in the Norm-Validating condition. 
Although participants’ emotional reaction was measured before the manipulation of 
Group, we submitted the Emotional Reaction to Threat score to a full factorial ANOVA. 
The results showed that participants reported a more negative emotional reaction in the 
Norm-Undermining condition, M = 5.60, SD = 1.96, than in the Norm-Validating 
condition, M = 3.88, SD = 0.98, F (1, 54) = 36.15, p = .001, η2 = .40 (remaining Fs < 2.79, 
ns). In addition, when compared with the midpoint (5) of the scale, these values indicate 
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that whereas in the norm-validating condition participants had a positive emotional 
reaction, t (27) = 6.06, p < .001, on the contrary in the norm-undermining condition the 
participants had a negative emotional reaction, t (29) = 2.74, p = .01.  
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
The fact that participants’ emotional reaction was more negative in the Norm-
Undermining than in the Norm-Validating condition, allows us to examine the idea that 
participants will more strongly differentiate between normative and deviant ingroup 
members in the former than in the latter condition.24 
Table 3.10 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 4) 
  Context 
  Norm-Validating Norm-Undermining 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
6.51 
(1.48) 
6.69 
(1.13) 
7.07 
(0.99) 
6.00 
(1.59) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 4.47 
(1.24) 
4.73 
(1.17) 
3.49 
(1.19) 
4.76 
(0.88) 
Notes: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 9 (attractive). 
Table 3.10 shows the means and standard deviations of judgments of normative and 
deviant members across conditions. A Context x Group x Member ANOVA revealed 
                                                 
24 We decided to enter the normative and the deviant positions chosen by participants as covariates in the 
analyses reported in this section. The results were similar to those reported, with no significant effects 
involving the covariates, highest F (1, 52) = 1.71, ns. 
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significant effects of Member, F (1, 54) = 76.53, p < .001, η2 = .59, of Group x Member, F 
(1, 54) = 5.77, p = .02, η2 = .10, and, more important to our predictions, of Context x 
Group x Member, F (1, 54) = 4.98, p = .03, η2 = .08 (remaining Fs1, 54 < 1.79, ns). 
The main effect of Member indicates that the normative member was judged more 
favorably than the deviant member, M = 6.57, SD = 1.34 and M = 4.36, SD = 1.22, 
respectively. The Group x Member interaction indicates that, whereas judgments of the 
normative member were not affected by the Group factor, F (1, 56) = 1.79, ns, participants 
judged the deviant ingroup member more negatively, M = 3.97, SD = 1.29, than the deviant 
outgroup member, M = 4.74, SD = 1.01, F (1, 56) = 6.53, p = .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We decomposed the Context x Group x Member interaction. The analysis revealed 
that, whereas no significant effects emerged in the Norm-Validating condition (all Fs1, 55 
< 1), On the contrary, a significant Group x Member interaction, F (1, 55) = 11.18, p = 
Figure 3.2. Attractiveness of normative and deviant members as a function of context 
and group membership (Experiment 4) 
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.001 emerged in the Norm-Undermining condition (remaining F1, 55 < 1). As shown in 
Figure 3.2, in the Norm-Validating condition participants upgraded normative members 
and derogated deviant members, irrespective of their group membership. However, as 
predicted, in the Norm-Undermining condition, participants upgraded normative ingroup 
member, F (1, 55) = 4.98, p = .03, and, simultaneously, derogated deviant ingroup 
members, F (1, 55) = 9.21, p = .004, as compared to their outgroup counterparts.25 
Table 3.11 
Correlations between Emotional Reaction and Intragroup Differentiation in each 
Condition (Experiment 4). 
Ingroup/Norm-
Validating 
Outgroup/Norm-
Validating 
Ingroup/Norm-
Undermining 
Outgroup/Norm-
Undermining 
r = -.49† r = -.27 r = .45† r = -.01 
(n = 14) (n = 14) (n = 15) (n = 15) 
Note: † p < .10 
 
   
Emotional Reaction to Threat and Intragroup Differentiation 
We may expect that upgrading of normative and derogation of deviant ingroup 
members in the norm-undermining context should be negatively correlated with the 
emotional reaction score, especially in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition. In order 
                                                 
25 We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the 
Normative Member Score so that a higher value indicates stronger intragroup differentiation. The scores of 
the four conditions were submitted to a contrast analysis with the values -1, -1, +3, and -1, respectively for 
the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-Undermining, and Outgroup/ 
Norm-Undermining conditions. The analysis revealed that, as expected, participants differentiated more 
strongly between the normative and the deviant member in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, M = 
3.57, SD = 1.90, than in the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining, M = 1.24, SD = 2.14, in the Ingroup/Norm-
Validating, M = 2.04, SD = 1.84, and in the Outgroup/Norm-Validating conditions, M = 1.96, SD = 1.75, t 
(54) = 3.18, p = .002. Since the mean observed in the Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, M = 1.24, is 
apparently lower than that of the other two condition to which we attributed the same contrast value we 
decided to perform a second contrast analysis with the values +1, +1, 0 and -2. We thus compare only the 
three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation scores. The analysis revealed a non-significant result, t 
(54) = 1.24, ns. 
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to explore this idea, we correlated the two scores within each condition, even though the 
number of participants per condition may hinder the power of such an analysis. 
As we may see in Table 3.11, although they were only marginally significant, the 
product-moment correlations between the two measures indicate that, when judging 
normative and deviant ingroup members in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, the 
more negative were participants’ emotional reactions, the more strongly they differentiated 
between the normative member and the deviant ingroup members, r = .45, p = .09. The 
reverse pattern emerges in the Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, in which the more 
negative were participants’ emotional reactions, the less they differentiated between the 
two targets, r = -.49, p = .07. In the outgroup conditions, correlations are negligible, 
respectively, r = -.01, and r = -.27, ns. We return to this issue in more detail in Experiment 
5. For the time being, it seems enough to notice that this result suggests that perceived 
threat to a prescriptive ingroup norm elicits negative emotional reactions from individuals. 
As a result, they may display stronger derogatory attitudes towards t ingroup deviants 
while upgrading normative ingroup members. 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
Altogether, the results of the four experiments reported in this chapter support our 
hypotheses. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the extent to which a relevant norm is 
supported or challenged by ingroup or outgroup members. We found that, when salient 
ingroup members undermined the subjective validity of the norm, and therefore, the group’s 
perceived legitimacy for a comparatively positive stand with respect to the outgroup, 
participants decreased their level of tolerance for deviant positions. Interestingly, the 
deviants judged in the ingroup norm undermining condition were objectively more close to 
the normative standard than were the deviants judged in the three remaining conditions. In 
spite of this fact, participants derogated deviants more negatively in the former than in the 
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latter conditions. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated the extent to which participants 
could feel secure or insecure regarding the comparative position of the ingroup relative to the 
outgroup as a whole. In both studies, we found that participants derogated ingroup deviant 
members more and upgraded normative ingroup members more when the ingroup’s position 
as a whole was insecure. In Experiment 4, we manipulated the existing agreement outside 
the group with a valued norm. We found, in consonance with Experiment 1, that when such 
agreement did not exist, participants became significantly more prescriptive in their 
appraisals of ingroup normative and deviant members than when such agreement helped 
validating the norm’s legitimacy. We also found that, when no agreement existed, emotional 
reactions were more negative than when agreement existed. In addition, we found a 
correlation of differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup members with the 
emotional reaction evoked by whether there existed or not an outside agreement with the 
norm. When no such agreement existed, differentiation between normative and deviant 
ingroup members emerged in association with negative emotional reaction. 
To conclude, results of the four reported experiments appear to be consistent. 
Derogation of ingroup deviants and upgrading of ingroup normative members seem to be 
associated  to internal (Experiment 1), or to external conditions (experiments 2, 3, and 4), 
that are endowed with the potential of jeopardizing the ingroup’s stand relative to an 
outgroup. We also found, in all experiments, that outgroup normative members and outgroup 
deviant members elicited, respectively, favorable and unfavorable evaluations. However, not 
only were these evaluations much less strong than evaluations of their ingroup correlatives, 
but they were also impervious to contextual changes. This is not surprising, and, in fact, is 
fully consistent with the principles of the subjective group dynamics model. Indeed, 
outgroup members are irrelevant because intergroup boundaries prevent them from having 
significant impact on the subjective legitimacy of a positive social identity. Interestingly, this 
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finding is in line with the idea that derogation of deviants by other ingroup members 
involves more of an inclusive rather than an exclusive attitude towards them (cf. Levine, 
1980; Levine & Thompson, 1996, for discussions). In further support of this idea, and 
consistently with research reported elsewhere (Marques et al., 2001, Experiment 2; cf. 
Chapter 2),we found that individuals are motivated to exert influence upon deviant ingroup 
members by willing to attempt to persuade them to change their normative stand. 
The above result replicates well-established findings in the realm of small group 
research. Notice however, that it clearly emerges from our results that this motivation is not 
directed at simply generating consensus about an issue of dissent. Participants’ are 
particularly concerned with establishing consensus with dissenting ingroup members, and 
not so much with dissenting outgroup members. This result thus appears to support the 
notion of referent information influence (Turner, 1991; cf. also Abrams et al, 1990; Chapter 
2) in that, for participants, the relevant source of validation lies more in the ingroup than 
outside of it, even though, general consensus, rather than ingroup consensus exclusively, 
might, in principle offer stronger social validation. Finally, we found that this process is 
correlated with the actual perception of ingroup deviants as a threat (as indicated by negative 
emotional reaction), in such identity jeopardizing conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTS OF THREAT TO PRESCRIPTIVE NORMS, NORM ENDORSEMENT AND 
EMOTIONAL REACTION TO THREAT ON JUDGMENT OF INGROUP AND 
OUTGROUP MEMBERS 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, the subjective group dynamics model posits that 
social situations in which salient ingroup members violate relevant criteria that support 
positive ingroup differentiation makes individuals switch from a descriptive focus to a 
prescriptive focus (e.g. Marque et al, 2001; Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998). Descriptive 
focus refers to the fact that individuals concentrate their attention on those characteristics 
that differentiate between ingroup and outgroup as a whole, and operates at the intergroup 
stage of the subjective group dynamics model (cf. Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998; Figure 
2.2). In line with self-categorization theory, descriptive focus would depend on the 
operation of the metacontrast process, according to which individuals establish the criteria 
which better account for perceived intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. In 
adopting a descriptive focus, individuals will equally attempt to fulfill their motivation to 
uphold a positive social identity, by attempting to generate positive differentiation between 
the ingroup and the outgroup as a whole. However, according to the subjective group 
dynamics model, while adopting a descriptive focus, individuals may be faced with 
undesirable behavior of ingroup members. Evidence shows that prescriptive focus is 
heightened by the violation of group norms (e.g. Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Therefore, when 
such behavior is not correlated with the criteria that specify group membership, and thus 
cannot be reconstructed as outgroup behavior, individuals will adopt a prescriptive focus. 
In this case, individuals will focus 
“on norms that legitimate [their] beliefs about positive in-group 
distinctiveness. These norms anchor judgments of what individuals believe 
  
119
 
ought to be consistent with in-group membership […].Often, in such 
situations, individuals cannot or do not wish to recategorize deviants as 
members of another group (e.g. when groups are defined by race, ethnicity, 
or gender, or when group solidarity is a highly valued group norm)” 
(Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001, pp. 445). 
To summarize, descriptive norms and prescriptive norms would have different 
psychological properties and functions. On the one hand, descriptive norms would help to 
inductively establish group prototypes and to deductively establish intergroup positions 
from these prototypes. On the other hand, prescriptive norms would “provide standards on 
which individuals base their judgments about the legitimacy of positive ingroup 
distinctiveness” (Marques et al., 2001, p. 419; cf. also Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). 
Therefore, when, we refer to individuals’ hostile reactions to deviants, we are referring to 
the emotional consequence of salient violations of such injunctive, “oughtness-based” 
criteria that are not definitional properties of group membership but are definitional of the 
moral value of those who attune to, or who violate them. 
Compelling as it may be, the idea that there is an interplay between group 
prototypes and prescriptive norms has never been directly addressed by research on 
subjective group dynamics.26 This is the central point of the present chapter. However, 
before comparing between the two types of norms, descriptive norms, or prototypical 
specifications of group membership on the one hand, and prescriptive norms, or moral 
injunctions susceptible to generate punitive reactions from individuals, we need to 
demonstrate the emotional properties of the reactions evoked by prescriptive norms. This is 
the goal of Experiment 5. We may then progress in our attempt to establish the relationship 
                                                 
26 As a case in point, Marques et al (1998) have shown that participants simultaneously applied to an 
intergroup and an intragroup level of judgment, when the prescriptive focus was directly induced in the 
context of judgments. However, these authors did not directly deal with the impact of prototypicality as a 
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between these emotional reactions and the, descriptive, prototypical, characteristics of 
normative and deviant members towards whom individuals direct such reactions. This is 
the general goal of experiments 6 and 7. 
Experiments 6 and 7 were partly inspired by the above reasoning. Participants were 
categorized in artificial groups using a similar procedure to that of Experiment 2 (cf. 
Chapter 3). The alleged goal of the experiments was to examine the relationship between 
people’s perceptual profile” and their ethical values. Participants were categorized in one 
of two opposite perception types and were asked to state their ethical positions on an issue. 
They were asked to judge ingroup or outgroup members who were depicted either as 
typical or atypical of their perceptual type. In addition, these target members could be 
either normative or deviant in terms of their ethical positions. Following the reasoning we 
outlined above, we expected participants to show a stronger prescriptive focus when 
judging typical ingroup group members than atypical ingroup members, or outgroup 
members. Therefore, we predicted that participants would upgrade descriptively typical/ 
prescriptively normative ingroup members compared to equivalent outgroup members, 
and, conversely, that they would more strongly derogate descriptively 
typical/prescriptively deviant ingroup members compared to equivalent deviant outgroup 
members. In other words, we expected a black sheep effect to emerge only from judgments 
of highly typical ingroup members. 
In Experiment 7, we made two additional sets of predictions, one set regarding the 
impact of emotional reactions to targets on their evaluations, and the other, regarding the 
perceived impact of these targets on the group’s overall image. With respect to the first set, 
we made three predictions. First, we predicted that, compared to the remaining conditions, 
                                                                                                                                                    
property of the judgmental targets on the judgments of their prescriptively normative or deviant status (cf. 
also Pinto, 2006). 
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descriptively typical normative and deviant ingroup members would elicit, respectively, 
more positive and more negative emotional reactions than all other members. Second, we 
hypothesized that, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition, the higher is participant’ 
attraction to the ingroup, (1) the more negative will be their emotional reaction to the 
deviant, (2) the more positive will be their emotional reaction to the normative member, 
and (3) the more strongly they will derogate the former and upgrade the later member. 
Third we predicted that participants’ emotional reaction to deviant and normative members 
should mediate the extent to which their attraction to the ingroup predicts judgments of 
deviant and normative ingroup members. 
With respect to the perceived impact of targets on their group’s overall image, we 
predicted that, when judging descriptively typical ingroup members, the more participants 
are attracted to the ingroup, (1) the more they will perceive the deviant member as a threat 
to, and the normative member as protective of, the group’s overall image, and (2) this 
difference would mediate the extent to which attraction to ingroup predicts stronger 
intragroup differentiation. 
Experiment 5 
In Experiment 4, we found a correlation between individuals’ emotional reaction to 
a threat to an ingroup norm and the extent to which they upgraded normative ingroup 
members and derogated deviant ingroup members. We speculated that this result may 
indicate that emotional reaction is a mediator between perceived threat and judgments of 
ingroup members. In the present experiment, we reasoned that the logical next step would 
be to account for participants’ endorsement of the prescriptive norm, in order to show that 
their emotional reaction actually mediates between such endorsement and their judgments 
of ingroup members. 
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In the present experiment, we examine whether, in a context that potentially 
threatens an ingroup prescriptive norm, derogatory reactions to ingroup deviants (and 
favorable reactions towards ingroup normative members) depend on the endorsement of 
such a norm, as mediated by negative emotional reactions that, in turn, instigate 
individuals’ hostile reactions to ingroup deviance. The procedure of this experiment is 
similar to that of Experiment 4. 
To test the above idea, we measured participants’ endorsement of student ragging 
before any manipulation, followed by measures of emotional reaction to threat and, the, by 
judgments of normative and deviant ingroup or outgroup members. This allowed us to 
regress participants’ emotional reaction to threat (mediator) and their judgments of target 
group members (outcome) on their endorsement of the prescriptive norm (predictor). In 
addition, we hypothesized that this process would be significant only in the Ingroup/Norm-
Undermining condition. In this condition, the more strongly participants endorse a norm: 
(1) the more negative will be their emotional reaction; and (2) the more strongly they will 
differentiate between normative and deviant members. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were Arts (n = 35) and Sciences (n = 38) students (42 female and 31 
male; Mean age = 21.00, SD = 2.94) who volunteered to participate in a “survey about 
student ragging”. Gender, χ2 (3, N = 73) = 1.82, ns, age, F (1, 69) < 1, faculty, χ2 (3, N = 
73) < 1, and year of studies, F (1, 69) = 1.01, ns, were similarly distributed across 
conditions. 
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Procedure and Design 
The design of the experiment was a 2 (Context: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-
Undermining) x 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant) in 
which Context and Group are between-subjects factors and Member is a within-subject 
factor. The number of participants randomly assigned across conditions was as follows: 
Ingroup/Norm-Validating, n = 20; Outgroup/Norm-Validating, n = 17; Ingroup/Norm-
Undermining, n = 18; Outgroup/Norm-Undermining, n = 18. 
The procedure was similar to that of the Experiment 4 (cf. Chapter 3). The major 
difference with that experiment is that in the second page of the questionnaire, before all 
manipulations, we measured participants’ level of endorsement of student ragging. 
Dependent Measures 
Attraction to the ingroup. Before any manipulation, participants answered to the 
same four questions as those used in Experiment 4, in order to measure their attraction to 
their own faculty. We averaged the four items to a Group Attraction Score (Cronbach’s α 
= .85). 
Endorsement of student ragging. In the second page of the questionnaire, we asked 
participants to which extent they endorsed student ragging by means of five items: (1)“In 
your opinion, student ragging in your faculty is …”, 1 = worse than in other faculties, 9 = 
better than in other faculties; (2) “In your opinion, student ragging is …” 1 = very 
negative, 9 = very positive; (3) “In your opinion, student ragging is …” 1 = very useless, 9 
= very useful; (4) “In general, as regards student ragging, you …” 1 = fully disagree, 9 = 
fully agree; (5) “In your opinion, as regards the integration of the new students in the 
university, ragging is …” 1 = not at all important, 9 = very important. The five items were 
averaged to a Norm Endorsement Score (Cronbach’s α = .81). 
  
124
 
Emotional reaction to threat. Immediately after reading the information used to 
manipulate Context, participants were asked to answer to the same three items that we used 
in Experiment 4 to create the Emotional Reaction Score (Cronbach’s α = .81). 
Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. Finally, participants had to judge 
the normative and the deviant members in the same items as those employed in Experiment 
4. The five items were averaged to a Normative Member Score and a Deviant Member 
Score (Cronbach’s α = .83 and .81, respectively). 
Results and Discussion27 
Attraction to the Ingroup 
We submitted the Group Attraction Score to a full factorial ANOVA. This ANOVA 
revealed no significant effects (all F1, 69 < 1). Participants’ attraction to their own faculty 
did not vary across conditions, Overall Mean = 6.63, SD = 1.61. The comparison with the 
scale midpoint (5) shows that participants were positively attracted to the ingroup, t (72) = 
8.60, p < .001. 
Endorsement of Student Ragging 
The Norm Endorsement Score was obtained before any manipulation. Nevertheless, 
we submitted this score to a Context x Group ANOVA, to insure its equivalence across 
conditions. The analysis revealed no significant effects (highest F1, 69 = 2.94, ns). 
Participants endorsed the student ragging norm, Overall Mean = 6.96, SD = 1.04, as 
                                                 
27 As we did in the preceding experiments, for all dependent measures we ran the analyses reported below by 
using Participant’s Faculty (Arts vs. Sciences) as a covariate. Again, the analyses revealed no significant 
effects involving Participant’s Faculty, in any of the measures: Group Attraction, highest F (1, 68) = 2.26, ns; 
Emotional Reaction, F (1, 68) < 1; normative position chosen by participants, highest F (1, 68) < 1; deviant 
position chosen by participants, F (1, 68) < 1; attractiveness of normative and deviant members, F (1, 68) < 
1. We thus disregarded this variable and proceeded we the 2 (Context: Norm-Validating vs. Norm-
Undermining) x 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x (Member: Normative vs. Deviant) design described 
above. 
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revealed by the comparison of this score with the midpoint (5) of the scale, t (72) = 16.15, 
p < .001. 
Emotional Reaction to Threat 
The Context x Group ANOVA on the Emotional Reaction to Threat score revealed 
only an effect of Context, F (1, 69) = 57.83, p < .001, η2 = .46 (highest remaining F1, 69 = 
1.58, ns). Participants reported a more negative emotional reaction in the Norm-
Undermining, M = 5.14, SD = 1.10, than in the Norm-Validating condition, M = 3.05, SD = 
1.28. Consistent with Experiment 4, in the Norm-Validating condition, participants showed 
a “positive” emotional reaction, as given by the comparison between their mean scores and 
scale midpoint, t (36) = 9.26, p < .001. However, in the Norm-Undermining condition, the 
score did not significantly differ from the scale midpoint, t (35) < 1. This result indicates 
that participants’ emotional reaction was not as negative as the one we have found in 
Experiment 4. We may only deem their emotional reaction as less positive than the one 
elicited in the Norm-Validating condition. 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
We tested the equivalence of both the Normative and the Deviant positions chosen 
by participants across conditions. The Context x Group ANOVA on these positions 
revealed no significant effects either for the Normative (highest F1, 69 = 1.78, ns, positions 
ranged from 5 to 7 in the continuum), or for the Deviant position (all F1, 69 < 1, positions 
ranged from 1 to 3 on the continuum).28 
                                                 
28 As in Experiment 4 we found no significant effects involving the normative or the deviant positions chosen 
by the participants as covariates in the ANOVA, highest F (1, 67) = 2.51, ns. 
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Table 4.1 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Context and Group 
Membership (Experiment 5) 
  Context 
  Norm-Validating Norm-Undermining 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 6.58 
(1.09) 
6.78 
(0.77) 
7.03 
(1.20) 
5.66 
(0.73) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 4.20 
(0.82) 
4.56 
(1.29) 
3.49 
(1.57) 
4.31 
(0.73) 
Notes: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 9 (attractive). 
The Context x Group x Member ANOVA revealed significant effects of Member, F 
(1, 69) = 119.02, p < .001, η2 = .63, Context, F (1, 69) = 10.65, p = .002, η2 = .13, Context 
x Group, F (1, 69) = 4.97, p = .03, η2 = .07, Group x Member, F (1, 69) = 7.43, p = .008, 
η2 = .10. More important for our predictions, the Context x Group x Member effect was 
also significant, F (1, 69) = 5.46, p = .02, η2 = .07 (remaining Fs < 1). 
By breaking down the Context x Group x Member interaction according to the 
Context factor, we found, as predicted, a significant Group x Member effect within the 
Norm-Undermining condition, F (1, 70) = 12.85, p = .001 (remaining F1, 70 = 2.14, ns). In 
this condition, participants upgraded the normative ingroup member as compared to the 
normative outgroup member, F (1, 70) = 17.59, p < .001, and derogated the deviant 
ingroup member as compared to the deviant outgroup member, F (1, 70) = 4.43, p = .04 
(see Table 4.1). No significant effects emerged within the Norm-Validating condition, all 
Fs1, 70 < 1. 
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In sum, consistent with our findings in all the previous experiments, we found a 
black sheep effect in the condition in which some sort of threat to the group is present. 29  
Mediational Status of Emotional Reaction to Threat 
The results obtained with Norm Endorsement and Emotional Reaction to Threat 
scores allow us to test the assumption that, individuals’ emotional reaction to a threatening 
context mediate their judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members. To test this 
assumption, we used the Intragroup Differentiation Score as criterion variable. As 
described earlier, the higher is this score, the more strongly participants derogate the 
deviant and upgrade the normative member. 
There are four prerequisites to test the mediational status of any given factor (e.g. 
Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998). First, the predictor variable (Norm 
Endorsement) must be correlated with the outcome (Intragroup Differentiation Score). 
Second, the predictor must be correlated with the mediator (Emotional Reaction to Threat). 
Third, the mediator must have an effect over the outcome variable. In our case, this is 
tested by checking for the effect of Emotional Reaction to Threat on the Intragroup 
Differentiation Score while controlling the effect of Norm Endorsement. We analyzed 
these relationships by means of a multiple regression of Intragroup Differentiation Score 
on both the predictor (Norm Endorsement) and the mediator (Emotional Reaction to 
Threat). Fourth, the effect of the predictor over the outcome variable must decrease when 
                                                 
29 We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the 
Normative Member Score so that a higher value indicates stronger intragroup differentiation. We submitted 
these scores to a contrast analysis ascribing the contrast values of -1, -1, +3 and -1, respectively to the 
Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, M = 2.38, SD = 1.63, to the Outgroup/Norm-Validating condition, M = 
2.21, SD = 1.69, to the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition, M = 3.54, SD = 2.57, and to Outgroup/Norm-
Undermining condition, M = 1.34, , SD = 1.29. Consistent with the findings of the previous experiment, 
results show that participants differentiate more strongly between normative and deviant members when 
these targets are ingroup members and when such judgments are made in a context in which a prescriptive 
ingroup norm, and hence the group itself, is threatened, t (69) = 3.11, p = .003.We also ran a contrast analysis 
comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation entering the contrast values +1, +1, 0 
and -2 respectively for the Ingroup/Norm-Validating, Outgroup/Norm-Validating, Ingroup/Norm-
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controlling the effect of the mediator. This means, in the present case, that the effect of 
norm endorsement on intragroup differentiation should decrease when emotional reactions 
to threat are controlled.30  
As predicted, the above mentioned pre-requisites emerged only in the Norm 
Undermining condition.31 The regression analysis conducted in this condition showed, 
firstly, that, in the norm-undermining condition, the more participants endorsed student 
ragging, the more they derogated the deviant, while upgrading the normative ingroup 
member, β = .55 (R2 = .30; F1, 16 = 6.86, p = .02). Concomitantly, the more participants 
endorsed the norm, the more negative was their emotional reaction to the context, β = .58 
(R2 = .34; F1, 16 = 8.20, p = .01). Secondly, when Emotional Reaction was entered in the 
equation, the multiple regression was significant, R = .71 (R2 = .50), F (2, 15) = 7.50, p = 
.006.32 This indicates that, on the one hand, the more negative was participants’ emotional 
reaction, the more they differentiated between deviant and normative ingroup members (β 
= .55, p = .03). Further, as predicted, the effect of norm endorsement on intragroup 
                                                                                                                                                    
Undermining and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining. The analysis revealed a non-significant result, t (69) = 1.79, 
ns. 
30 More formally, the β value from Step 1 must be higher than the β corresponding to the effect of Norm 
Endorsement over Intragroup Differentiation obtained in the regression of Step 3. In sum, our prediction is 
that these requisites will be fully met only for the judgments of normative and deviant members in the 
Ingroup/Norm Undermining condition. 
31 As predicted, the requisites for a mediation emerged only in the Norm Undermining condition. The results 
for the first two steps in the remaining three conditions were as follows, respectively for Ingroup/Norm-
Validating, Outgroup/Norm-Validating and Outgroup/Norm-Undermining conditions: (1) regression of 
Intragroup Differentiation on Norm-Endorsement: β = .32 (R2 = .10; F1, 18 = 2.02, ns); β = -.36 (R2 = .13; 
F1, 15 = 2.18, ns); β = -.05 (R2 = .00; F1, 16 < 1); (2) regression of Emotional Reaction on Norm-
Endorsement: β = -.36 (R2 = .13; F1, 18 = 2.65, ns); β = -.52 (R2 = .27; F1, 15 = 5.51, p = .03); β = .68 (R2 = 
.46; F1, 16 = 13.66, p = .002). Despite the fact that we make no predictions for these conditions and, more 
important, that in none of these conditions the regression analyses fit the mediation requirements, we may 
nonetheless look at the results that revealed to be significant. Only in the second regression, we found other 
significant results. However, these results are simply the reflex of the manipulation of Context. This means 
that it is not surprising that we find positive and negative correlations respectively in the norm-validating and 
in the norm-undermining conditions. Indeed, in the former conditions the more participants endorse the norm 
the more positive is their emotional reaction (β = -.36 and β = -.52, respectively for the Ingroup and Outgroup 
conditions); in the later conditions the pattern is the reverse (β = .58 and β = .68, respectively for the Ingroup 
and Outgroup conditions). 
32 For the remaining three condition the results obtained in the regression of Intragroup Differentiation on 
Norm-Endorsement and Emotional Reaction were the following: Ingroup/Norm-Validating condition, R = 
.37 (R2 = .14, F2, 17 = 1.36, ns), Outgroup/Norm-Validating condition, R = .49 (R2 = .24, F2, 14 = 2.25, ns); 
Outgroup/Norm-Undermining condition, R = .14 (R2 = .02, F2, 15 < 1).  
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differentiation decreased from the initial β = .55 to a non-significant β = .23 (p = .33) with 
emotional reaction as a mediator (see. Figure 4.1).  
We may thus conclude that group members’ emotional reaction to the undermining 
of the prescriptive norm accounts for 58.18 percent [1 – (.23/.55)] of the effect of norm-
endorsement on differentiation between deviant and normative ingroup members. 
Furthermore, the decrease of this effect that is due to the mediation of Emotional Reaction 
is significant, z = 1.93, p = .054.33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the whole, these results show that, in a societal context that undermines a 
prescriptive ingroup norm, individuals derogate ingroup deviants – who add to the 
undermining of that norm – and upgrade normative ingroup members. More importantly, 
the results also indicate that individuals’ emotional reaction, associated with their 
                                                 
33 In this analysis we employed the following modification of Sobel’s test (e.g. Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 
1998): z = a*b / SQRT (b2*Sa2 + a2*Sb2 – Sa2*Sb2); a = beta coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone, b 
= beta coefficient of DV predicted from Mediator with IV also in the model, Sa = standard error of a, Sb = 
standard error of b. 
Norm-Endorsement 
Emotional Reaction 
to Threat 
Intragroup 
Differentiation 
(Normative – Deviant)  
β = .58 β = .55
β = .55
(β = .23)
Figure 4.1. Mediation analysis in the Ingroup/Norm-Undermining condition: Norm-
Endorsement as predictor, Intragroup Differentiation as outcome and Emotional 
Reaction to Threat as mediator. 
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awareness of the threatening character of the context, mediates their more extreme 
judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members. 
The present results thus yield further support the idea that, a threat to the legitimacy 
of norms that contribute to establish positive ingroup differentiation leads individuals to 
attempt to restore such legitimacy by, simultaneously, derogating ingroup deviants, and by 
upgrading normative ingroup members. Perhaps more importantly in the present 
experiment is the fact that it shows that these responses depend on the extent to which 
individuals endorse the threatened norm and its emotional consequences. 
Experiment 6 
An assumption that underlies the experiments we reported thus far is that different 
types of threat to the ingroup (e.g. an uncertain ingroup status, lack of intragroup 
uniformity around a valued standard, or lack of external consensus about such a standard) 
elicit individuals’ adoption of a prescriptive focus in their judgments of ingroup members. 
This assumption is also present in previous experiments that have been in the context of 
subjective group dynamics research. However, this research has not directly address the 
impact of group members’ descriptive features on how they are judged. For example, 
across our five previous experiments, targets were described solely in terms of their group 
membership and their “prescriptive status”. These targets were always described as being 
either normative or deviant in light of a prescriptive norm, but the extent to which they 
were typical of their group has never been varied. 
An assumption of self-categorization theory is that individuals strive to maintain a 
clear-cut perception of intergroup differences to the detriment of intragroup differences, 
the metacontrast ratio (cf. Chapter 2). Typical group members are instrumental to increase 
that ratio, and, therefore, individual’s certainty about the correctness of their perceptions of 
the situation in terms of their distinctive group memberships (e.g. Hogg & Hardie, 1992; 
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Hogg et al., 1995). An important implication of this assumption is that individuals prefer 
typical to atypical group members because whereas the former help clarifying intergroup 
boundaries, the latter tend to blur such boundaries (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Turner et al., 1987).  
Further, as Turner (1999) pointed out, as regards referent information influence, the 
more a group member is prototypical “… the more he or she will be perceived as 
representative of the ingroup as a whole […], and the more influential will he or she be 
within the ingroup” (p. 17; cf. Chapter 2). Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
behavior and attitudes of typical ingroup members will be highly relevant in the creation of 
intergroup distinctiveness and, specifically, of positive ingroup differentiation. 
The subjective group dynamics model proposes that behavior or attitudes of group 
members that emerge along prescriptive norm are tributary of previously constructed 
intergroup differentiation. As a result, such behavior and attitudes should not affect the 
actors’ perceived group membership. On the contrary, it would be the actors’ perceived 
group membership that affected the perception of their behavior and attitudes. This 
assumption suggests that prescriptive deviance exhibited by typical ingroup members will 
elicit stronger prescriptive focus than similar prescriptive deviance exhibited by less 
representative ingroup members. 
We may thus predict that individuals will more strongly derogate descriptively 
typical ingroup members who act in a prescriptively deviant way than other members. By 
the same token, individuals will more strongly upgrade descriptively typical ingroup 
members who act in a prescriptively normative way than they will upgrade other members. 
However, it is more easily to disentangle the relative impacts of descriptive and 
prescriptive norms in reactions to deviant than normative ingroup members, because the 
latter are always expects to be more favorably judged than outgroup members. In turn, 
ingroup prescriptive deviants would be judged more favorably than similar outgroup 
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members if descriptive focus had a greater impact than prescriptive focus. However, if 
ingroup deviants are more negatively judged than similar outgroup members, we may rule 
out the impact of descriptive norms in this result. Therefore, if descriptively typical, but 
prescriptively deviant, ingroup members were more negatively evaluated than similar 
outgroup members, we could be reasonably convinced that this effect stems from the 
adoption of a prescriptive focus by those who make such evaluations. 
Method 
Participants34  
Forty-two (10 male and 32 female) second year students from a nursing school, 
aged from 18 to 22 years-old (Mean age = 18.38; SD = 0.77), volunteered to participate in 
the experiment. Gender and age, F (1, 36) < 1, were similarly distributed across 
conditions.35 Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and ranged between 10 
and 12 per condition. 
Procedure and Design 
The procedure was inspired by that of Experiment 2 with the necessary 
modifications to test the present hypotheses. Therefore, we will only refer to the procedural 
specificities of the present experiment. 
In the first session, the test that allowed categorizing participants in two perceptual 
types (“Abstract-Pictorial” vs. “Picto-Experiential”) included a task that was purportedly 
aimed to determine the extent to which the person would be typical of each type of 
perception. This task consisted in having participants estimating the number of dots 
                                                 
34 Twelve students that took part in the first session of the experiment did not participate in second session. 
The causes for this dropout were completely unrelated with the experiment itself. Other eight participants 
were discarded from the analyses either for failing in any of the manipulation checks (five participants) or for 
not answering most of the questions (three participants).      
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contained in a picture that was presented to them for less than one second and completing a 
“meaningless” picture (see Appendix 7). 
In the validation session, all participants could read that they were highly typical 
members of the Abstract-Pictorial type, and that the judgmental targets (normative and 
deviant members) were either highly typical or atypical of their perceptual types (typicality 
manipulation). The design of the experiment is thus a 2 (Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 
(Typicality: Low Typicality vs. High Typicality) x 2 (Member: Normative vs. Deviant). 
Group and Typicality are between-subjects factors, and Member is a within-subject factor. 
Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
Dependent Measures 
Dependent measures were the same as in Experiment 2 with two exceptions. First, 
the post-experimental manipulation checks included questions aimed to insure that 
participants accurately remembered their level of typicality in their perceptual type, as well 
as the levels of typicality of the normative and deviants target members in their perceptual 
types. Second, we adapted the questions used in Experiment 3 to measure attraction to the 
ingroup and to the outgroup as a whole to the present artificial categories. 
From the participants’ answers, we computed Attraction to the Ingroup and 
Attraction to the Outgroup scores (Cronbach’s α = .91, and .87, respectively). We also 
created a Normative Member and Deviant Member scores (Cronbach’s α = .93, and .81, 
respectively). 
                                                                                                                                                    
35 Given the small number of male participants in all conditions we do not report a χ2 for Gender. However 
the number of male participants was similarly distributed across conditions (from 2 to 4 per condition). Two 
participants did not report their age. 
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
The group categorization was equally effective across conditions. A Group x 
Typicality ANOVA, revealed no significant effects on participants perceptions of the tests’ 
accuracy (highest F1, 38 = 1.98, ns). Participants considered that the test had correctly 
detected their type of perception, Overall Mean = 7.62, SD = 1.38, as shown by the 
comparison with the scale midpoint (5), t (41) = 12.31, p < .001. 
The manipulation checks collected at the end of the study revealed that all 
participants were able to remember correctly their own type of perception, their typicality 
in that type, as well as the perceptual types and typicality of the target members, as well as 
their personal positions on the homosexuality continuum. An open-ended question 
revealed that none of the participants suspected of the real purposes of the study. 
Attraction to the Ingroup and to the Outgroup 
As in the previous studies, we submitted the group attraction measures to an 
ANOVA, with Attraction to the Ingroup and Attraction to the Outgroup as repeated 
measures. The analysis revealed only a significant effect of Group Attraction, F (1, 38) = 
124.68, p < .001, η2 = .77 (remaining F1, 38 < 2.11, ns). Participants reported higher 
attraction to the ingroup, M = 7.30, SD = 1.21, than to the outgroup, M = 3.55, SD = 1.23. 
The comparison with the midpoint (5) of the scale showed that participants were positively 
attracted to the ingroup, t (41) = 12.35, p < .001, and negatively attracted to the outgroup, t 
(41) = 7.65, p < .001. 
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Table 4.2 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Membership 
and Typicality (Experiment 6) 
  Typicality 
  Low Typicality High Typicality 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
7.22 
(1.12) 
6.73 
(1.02) 
8.10 
(1.35) 
6.68 
(1.33) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
4.06 
(0.95) 
3.60 
(1.03) 
2.70 
(1.40) 
4.06 
(1.66) 
     Note: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 9 (attractive). 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
We submitted the normative and the deviant members’ attractiveness scores to a 
Typicality x Group x Member ANOVA. This analysis revealed significant effects of 
Member, F (1, 38) = 147.46, p < .001, η2 = .80, Group x Member, F (1, 38) = 5.67, p = 
.02, η2 = .13, and Typicality x Group x Member, F (1, 38) = 5.46, p = .03, η2 = .13 
(highest remaining F1, 38 = 2.15, ns). 
The effect of Member shows that participants judged the normative target more 
favorably, M = 7.16, SD = 1.29, than the deviant target, M = 3.60, SD = 1.35. The Group x 
Member interaction indicates that, irrespective of their descriptive typicality, normative 
ingroup members, M = 7.66, SD = 1.29, were judged more positively than normative 
outgroup members, M = 6.71, SD = 1.15, F (1, 40) = 6.42, p = .02, whereas deviant 
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ingroup, M = 3.38, SD = 1.35, and outgroup members, M = 3.81, SD = 1.34, were similarly 
judged, F (1, 40) = 1.06, ns.  
We broke down the Typicality x Group x Member second-order interaction in terms 
of the Typicality factor. No significant effects emerged in the Low Typicality condition, in 
which the target group members were presented as descriptively atypical of their group, 
highest F (1, 39) = 1.95, ns. However, consistent with our hypothesis, in the High 
Typicality condition, the Group x Member interaction was significant, F (1, 39) = 10.36, p 
= .003 (remaining F1, 39 < 1). As illustrated in Figure 4.2 (cf. also Table 4.2), this result 
indicates that participants judged the normative ingroup member more favorably than the 
equivalent outgroup member, F (1, 39) = 6.91, p = .01. Simultaneously, participants 
derogated the deviant ingroup member more than the corresponding outgroup member, F 
(1, 39) = 5.60, p = .02.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group 
Membership and Typicality (Experiment 6) 
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Descriptive and Prescriptive Typicality 
According to our second hypothesis, judgments within the ingroup should differ as 
a function of targets’ typicality, but this should not occur in judgments of outgroup 
members. Indeed, participants similarly judged the normative and the deviant outgroup 
members, both F (1, 39) < 1, regardless of whether they were typical or atypical of their 
group. Partly consistent with our predictions, participants more strongly derogated the 
descriptively typical deviant ingroup member, M = 2.70, than the descriptively atypical 
deviant ingroup member, M = 4.06, F (1, 39) = 5.60, p = .02. However, contrary to our 
predictions, judgments of normative members, typical, M = 8.10, or atypical, M = 7.22, did 
not differ significantly, F (1, 39) = 2.34, ns.36 
The present findings support the idea that individuals may perceive typical ingroup 
members to be particularly relevant to the group’s positive image. Typical ingroup targets 
those targets that are in a better position to help differentiate the ingroup from the 
outgroup. However, when they deviate from prescriptive norms, these targets are more 
strongly derogated than similarly deviant, but less typical ingroup targets. Overall, this 
seems consistent with a joint operation of prescriptive and descriptive focus on the 
judgments of groups and their members as proposed by the subjective group dynamics 
model. 
                                                 
36 We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the 
Normative Member Score described earlier: higher intragroup differentiation scores indicate stronger 
differentiation between the normative and the deviant member. The scores of each condition were submitted 
to a contrast analysis entering the values -1, -1, +3, and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, 
Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality, and Outgroup/High Typicality conditions. Results were 
consistent with our prediction showing that intragroup differentiation was stronger in the Ingroup/High 
Typicality, M = 5.40, DP = 1.97, than in the Outgroup/High Typicality, M = 2.62, DP = 2.43, Ingroup/Low 
Typicality, M = 3.16, DP = 1.58, and Outgroup/Low Typicality, M = 3.13, DP = 1.57, conditions, t (38) = 
3.52, p = .001. A contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation 
entering the contrast values +1, +1, 0 and -2, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low 
Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality, revealed a non-significant result, t (38) < 
1.  
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Experiment 7 
In our final experiment, we attempted to replicate findings of Experiment 6, but, 
more importantly, we attempted to explore further the factors associated with individuals’ 
tendency to more strongly derogate typical than atypical deviant ingroup members. We 
employed the same experimental paradigm as that of Experiment 6, but introduced 
additional measures to test the operation of two factors that we expected to mediate 
participants’ reactions to normative and deviant members. Specifically, we introduced the 
same three measures of emotional reaction we used in Experiments 4 and 5, and we created 
three measures of threat to the group derived from the results regarding “image conveyed 
of the group” used in experiments 1 trough 3. These measures are reported along with the 
results. 
As in the previous experiment, we hypothesized that descriptively typical ingroup 
members would be more strongly upgraded, if they are prescriptively normative, or 
derogated, if they are prescriptively deviant, than less typical ingroup members, or typical 
or atypical outgroup members. Further, we expected a mediating effect of both emotional 
reaction and perceived threat of ingroup targets on differentiation between normative and 
deviant ingroup members. But, in line with the preceding experiment, we predicted that 
this mediation would emerge only in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition. 
Method 
Participants  
Sixty-one (7 male and 54 female) first year students of a Communication course, 
aged from 17 to 27 years-old (Mean age = 19.57; SD = 1.81), volunteered to participate in 
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the study. Gender37 and age, highest F (1, 57) = 3.00, ns, were similarly distributed across 
conditions.38 
Procedure and Design 
The procedure was similar to that of the previous experiment. The design was a 2 
(Group: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Typicality: Low Typicality vs. High Typicality) x 2 
(Member: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Typicality are between-subjects factors and 
Member is within-subject factor. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions and 
ranged between 15 and 16 per condition. 
Dependent Measures 
We used the same manipulation checks described in the previous experiment. The 
dependent measures were also the same, except that we included measures of emotional 
reaction to targets and perceived threat of target members to their group’s image, in the 
questionnaire that was presented to participants. These measures allowed us to test the 
mediating effect of emotional reaction and perceived threat of ingroup targets on 
judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members 
Emotional reaction. In the second session, before judging each of the target 
members, participants were asked to state how they felt when they learned which were the 
statements chosen by person A and person B in the seven statement continuum. 
Participants answered to the following statement: “After knowing the answer given by 
Person A (B) to the value inventory you felt …” (1 = very happy, very pleased, in a very 
good mood, 9 = very unhappy, very annoyed, in a very bad mood). We averaged the three 
                                                 
37 Given the small count of male participants in all conditions, we do not report a χ2 for Gender. However, the 
number of male participants was similarly distributed across conditions (from 1 to 2 per condition). 
38 Eleven students that took part in Phase 1 of the experiment did not participate in Phase 2. Again, the causes 
for this to occurrence were completely unrelated with the experiment itself. Other twelve participants were 
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items to create two scores: Emotional Reaction to the Normative Member and Emotional 
Reaction to the Deviant Member (Cronbach’s α = .76 and .74, respectively).  
We also created a single score representing participants’ emotional reaction to both 
the normative and the deviant member. Emotional Reaction to Target Members Score 
corresponds to the subtraction of the Emotional Reaction to the Deviant Member score to 
the Emotional Reaction to the Normative Member score, so that a higher score represents a 
more negative emotional reaction. 
Perceived threat. Participants also indicated the extent to which each target member 
represented a threat to the group as a whole: (1) “To what extent can this person affect 
negatively the way others think about this person’s perceptual type?” (1 = not at all; 9 = 
very much); (2) “To what extent can this person represent a threat to the good image of 
their type?” (1 = not at all; 9 = very much); (3) “In your opinion, what kind of image does 
this person convey about people who belong to their type?” (1 = very good image; 9 = very 
bad image). These items were averaged to a Normative Member Threat Score and a 
Deviant Member Threat Score (Cronbach’s α = .81, and .74, respectively). With these two 
scores we computed a Perceived Threat Score, by subtracting the former from the latter. 
Thus, a higher score indicates a higher perceived threat. 
Attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup. We averaged the questions used to 
tap attraction to the ingroup and to the outgroup to and Attraction to the Ingroup Score and 
an Attraction to the Outgroup Score (Cronbach’s α = .91, and .87, respectively). 
Attractiveness of normative and deviant members. We averaged the six items used 
to measure attractiveness of normative and deviant members to a Normative Member 
Score and a Deviant Member Score (Cronbach’s α = .87, and .84, respectively). 
                                                                                                                                                    
discarded from the sample either for failing in any of the manipulation checks (8 participants) or for not 
answering all the questions across the dependent measures (4 participants).      
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
The minimal group categorization was equally effective across conditions, as 
shown by the Group x Typicality ANOVA (highest F1, 57 = 2.29, ns). Participants 
considered that the test was accurate in identifying their perception type, Overall Mean = 
7.84, SD = 1.24. This score’s difference from the scale midpoint (5) was also significant, t 
(60) = 17.85, p < .001. In addition, the post-experimental manipulation checks, showed 
that all participants correctly recalled the information used to manipulate their own group 
membership and typicality, as well as the equivalent information concerning the target 
group members. None of the participants revealed suspicion regarding the experiment’s 
goals or the manipulations involved. 
Attraction to the Ingroup and to the Outgroup 
An ANOVA conducted on Attraction to the Ingroup and Attraction to the Outgroup 
revealed only a significant effect of Group Attraction, F (1, 57) = 99.01, p < .001, η2 = .63 
(remaining F1, 57 < 1.69, ns). Participants felt more attracted to the ingroup, M = 7.06, SD 
= 1.29, than to the outgroup, M = 4.23, SD = 1.21. The comparison of these two means 
with the scale midpoint (5), shows that participants were positively attracted to the 
ingroup, t (60) = 12.46, p < .001, and negatively attracted to the outgroup, t (60) = 4.99, p 
< .001. 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members 
We submitted the normative and deviant member scores to a Typicality x Group x 
Member ANOVA. We found significant effects of Member, F (1, 57) = 284.93, p < .00, η2 
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= .83, and Typicality x Group x Member, F (1, 57) = 8.43, p = .005, η2 = .13 (highest 
remaining F1, 57 = 1.68, ns).  
By decomposing the second-order interaction, we found results consistent with our 
predictions and with the findings of Experiment 6. In the Low Typicality condition, the 
effects of Group and Group x Member were not significant, highest F (1, 58) = 1.81, ns. 
However, in the High Typicality condition we found a significant Group x Member 
interaction, F (1, 58) = 7.89, p = .007 (remaining F1, 58 = 1.52, ns). As predicted, and 
consistent with results of Experiment 6, participants upgraded the normative ingroup 
member, F (1, 58) = 4.19, p < .05, and concomitantly derogated the deviant typical ingroup 
member, F (1, 58) = 5.09, p = .03 as compared to the equivalent outgroup member (see 
Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 
Attractiveness of Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Group Membership 
and Typicality (Experiment 7) 
  Typicality 
  Low Typicality High Typicality 
  Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Normative Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
7.30 
(0.82) 
7.40 
(1.37) 
7.91 
(0.92) 
7.17 
(3.02) 
Deviant Member      
M 
(SD) 
 
3.90 
(1.33) 
3.12 
(1.73) 
3.02 
(1.17) 
4.09 
(0.96) 
Note: Ratings range from 1 (non attractive) to 9 (attractive). 
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Regarding our second hypothesis involving targets’ attractiveness, results were 
similar to those of Experiment 6 and again only partially corroborated our predictions. In 
line with our hypothesis, participants more strongly derogated the descriptively typical 
than the atypical deviant ingroup member, F (1, 58) = 4.08, p = .05. However, participants 
only marginally differentiated between typical and atypical normative ingroup members, F 
(1, 58) = 2.81, p = .10. In the outgroup condition, participants did not differentiate between 
typical and atypical normative members, F (1, 58) < 1, but tended to judge atypical 
outgroup deviants more negatively than typical outgroup deviants, F (1, 58) = 3.49, p = 
.07.39 
Emotional Reaction and Perceived Threat 
We predicted that participants’ emotional reaction to the deviant and the normative 
targets would be stronger in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition than in all others. 
Participants would react more negatively to the deviant and more positively to the 
normative targets in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition than in all the other conditions. 
Concomitantly, in this condition more than in all the others, participants should consider 
the deviant to be a stronger threat to, and the normative to be more protective of, the 
group’s image. 
To test these predictions we performed a contrast analysis on the Emotional 
Reaction score and on the Perceived Threat score across the four conditions. We used the 
                                                 
39 We computed an Intragroup Differentiation Score by subtracting the Deviant Member Score to the 
Normative Member Score: higher values indicate stronger differentiation between the normative and the 
deviant member. The scores we submitted to a contrast analysis assigning the values -1, -1, +3, and -1 on the 
scores of Intragroup Differentiation, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, M = 3.40, DP = 1.70, 
Outgroup/Low Typicality, M = 4.28, DP = 2.31, Ingroup/High Typicality, M = 4.89, DP = 1.80, and 
Outgroup/High Typicality, M = 3.08, , DP = 1.28, conditions. Results were consistent with those of the 
Experiment 6 and showed that participants differentiated more strongly between deviant and normative 
targets when these were ingroup members and were highly typical of that category, t (57) = 2.47, p = .02. We 
also performed a contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation 
entering the contrast values -1, +2, 0 and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low 
Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality. The result of the analysis was non-
significant, t (57) = 1.83, ns.  
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contrast values of -1, -1, +3, and -1, in the two analyses, respectively for the Ingroup/Low 
Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality, and Outgroup/High 
Typicality conditions.  
Table 4.4 
Emotional Reaction to Target Members and Perceived Threat to the Group as a Function 
of Group Membership and Typicality (Experiment 7) 
 Typicality 
 Low Typicality  High Typicality 
 Ingroup Outgroup  Ingroup Outgroup 
Emotional Reaction             
(Deviant-Normative)1 
     
M 
(SD) 
5.48 
(5.40) 
5.40 
(2.32) 
 
5.83 
(2.29) 
5.49 
(2.09) 
Perceived Threat                  
(Deviant-Normative)2 
     
M 
(SD) 
4.04 
(2.15) 
2.56 
(2.74) 
 5.19 
(2.62) 
4.36 
(1.77) 
Notes: 1. In the Emotional Reaction score, the higher the values the more participants react negatively to 
the deviant and positively to the normative member; 2. In the Perceived Threat score, the higher the 
values the more participants consider the deviant to pose a threat to the group and the normative less 
so. 
As we may see in Table 4.4, contrary to our prediction, the effect was not 
significant on participants’ emotional reaction to the deviant and normative targets, t (57) < 
1. As the means across conditions illustrate, participants negative emotional reaction to the 
deviant and the simultaneous positive emotional reaction to the normative member were 
equivalent, regardless of whether the targets were typical or atypical, or ingroup or 
outgroup, members. In turn, results on the score of Members’ Threat to the Group were 
consistent with our hypothesis. As predicted, when judging highly typical ingroup 
members, participants considered the deviant as a threat and the normative to be protective 
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of the group’ image as a whole, more strongly than in all other conditions, t (57) = 2.24, p 
= .03.40 Also consistent with our hypothesis, in this condition, the correlation between the 
deviant member’s and the normative member’s perceived threat scores, was stronger than 
in all the other conditions, r = -.87, p < .001.41 
Mediators of Intragroup Differentiation: Emotional Reaction and Perceived Threat 
We predicted that participants’ emotional reaction to the target members and the 
extent to which they would perceive targets as threatening to the group should mediate 
their judgments. Specifically, we expected that, in contrast with the remaining conditions, 
in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition, stronger attraction to the ingroup predicts 
stronger upgrading of the normative member and stronger derogation of the deviant 
member (i.e., stronger intragroup differentiation). However, we also expect this effect to be 
mediated, on the one hand, by the intensity of participants’ emotional reaction to these 
members, and, on the other hand, by how threatening to the group they perceive them to 
be. 
We used the Intragroup Differentiation Score as outcome variable, the Attraction to 
the Ingroup Score as a predictor, and, Emotional Reaction or Perceived Threat as a 
mediator. 
Emotional reaction as a mediator. In Figure 4.3, we illustrate the mediating effect 
of participants’ emotional reaction on judgments of the deviant and normative members. 
As predicted, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition attraction to the ingroup predicted 
                                                 
40 We also performed a contrast analysis comparing the three conditions with lower intragroup differentiation 
entering the contrast values -1, +2, 0 and -1, respectively for the Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low 
Typicality, Ingroup/High Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality. The result of the analysis was non-
significant, t (57) = 1.83, ns.  
41 In the remaining conditions the highest correlation was obtained in the Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, r 
= -.43, ns; lowest z = 4.70, p < .001. 
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participants’ judgments of normative and deviant members, only when they were typical 
ingroup members.42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As expected, when participants evaluated normative and deviant highly typical 
ingroup members, the more they were attracted to the ingroup the more they differentiated 
between these members, β = .55 (R2 = .30; F1, 14 = 6.08, p = .03). Furthermore, in line 
with our predictions, results show that attraction to the ingroup marginally predicts 
stronger negative emotional reaction to the deviant ingroup member, and positive 
emotional reaction to normative ingroup member, β = .42 (R2 = .18; F1, 14 = 3.04, p = 
.10). This result indicates that the more participants were attracted to the ingroup the more 
                                                 
42 The results for the first two steps in the remaining three conditions were as follows, respectively for 
Ingroup/Low Typicality, Outgroup/Low Typicality and Outgroup/High Typicality conditions: (1) regression 
of Intragroup Differentiation on Attraction to the Ingroup: β = -.07 (R2 = .00; F1, 13 < 1); β = .28 (R2 = .08; 
F1, 13 = 1.05, ns); β = .22 (R2 = .05; F1, 13 < 1); (2) regression of Emotional Reaction to Target Members on 
Attraction to the Ingroup: β = .32 (R2 = .10; F1, 13 = 1.50, ns); β = .33 (R2 = .11; F1, 13 = 1.54, ns); β = .56 
(R2 = .31; F1, 13 = 5.92, p = .03).  
Attraction to the 
Ingroup 
Emotional Reaction 
(Deviant – Normative) 
Intragroup 
Differentiation 
(Normative – Deviant)  
β = .42 β = .62
β = .55
(β = .29)
Figure 4.3. Mediation analysis in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition: Attraction to 
the Ingroup as predictor, Intragroup Differentiation as outcome and Emotional 
Reaction to Target Members as mediator. 
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negative were their emotions relative to the deviant ingroup member, and the more positive 
were their emotions with respect to the normative ingroup member. 
The results of these two regression analyses show that only the first requisite for 
mediation is significantly met. However, given the somewhat restrict number of 
observations involved (n = 16), we decided to undertake the remaining step of the 
mediation analysis (cf. Kenny et al., 1998; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Indeed, the results of 
the multiple regression entering Emotional Reaction to Target Members in the equation fit 
our prediction, R = .78 (R2 = .61, F2, 13 = 10.33, p = .002).43 As predicted, the analysis 
revealed that the more participants experienced negative emotions about the deviant and 
positive emotions about the normative member, the more they differentiated between the 
two members in terms of their attractiveness β = .62 (p = .007). Finally, results also show 
that the effect of attraction to the ingroup on intragroup differentiation decreased from the 
initial β = .55 to a non-significant β = .29 (p = .15). These findings indicate that 47.27 
percent of the initial effect of attraction to the ingroup on intragroup differentiation may be 
attributed to participants’ emotional reaction to the prescriptive status exhibited by the 
target members. Likely due to the small sample size, the test of the reduction of the initial 
effect due to the mediation of Emotional Reaction to Target Members only approached 
significance, z = 1.60, p = .11.44 
Perceived threat as a mediator. Figure 4.4, shows the results the results of the 
mediation of Perceived Threat between Attraction to the Ingroup and Intragroup 
Differentiation scores, in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition.45  
                                                 
43 Results in the remaining three conditions were the following: Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, R = .13 
(R2 = .02, F2, 12 < 1); Outgroup/Low Typicality condition, R = .80 (R2 = .63, F2, 12 = 10.40, p = .002); 
Outgroup/High Typicality condition, R = .40 (R2 = .16, F2, 12 = 1.11, ns). 
44 In this analysis we employed the following modification of Sobel’s test: z = a*b / SQRT (b2*Sa2 + a2*Sb2 – 
Sa2*Sb2); a = beta coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone, b = beta coefficient of DV predicted from 
Mediator with IV also in the model, Sa = standard error of a, Sb = standard error of b (e.g. Kenny et al., 1998). 
45 Results of the regression of Members’ Threat to the Group on Attraction to the Ingroup in the remaining 
three conditions were as follows: Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, β = .05 (R2 = .00; F1, 13 < 1); 
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The results show that the more participants were attracted to the ingroup the more 
they differentiated between the contributions of the normative and deviant members to the 
group’s image, β = .51 (R2 = .26; F1, 14 = 5.01, p = .04). The multiple regression analysis 
entering Members’ Threat to the Group in the equation was significant, R = .71 (R2 = .50, 
F2, 13 = 6.43, p = .01).46 This analysis revealed that the more participants consider the 
deviant member as a threat, and the normative member as having a positive impact on the 
ingroup, the more they upgraded the normative member and derogated the deviant 
member, β = .51 (p = .04). In addition, results indicate that initial effect of attraction to the 
ingroup on intragroup differentiation decreased from the initial β = .55 to a non-significant 
β = .29 (p = .23; 47.27 percent of the effect may be attributed to the mediator). The test to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Outgroup/Low Typicality condition, β = .17 (R2 = .03; F1, 13 < 1); Outgroup/High Typicality condition, β = 
.25 (R2 = .06; F1, 13 < 1). The results for the regression of Intragroup Differentiation on Attraction to the 
Ingroup were presented in the previous mediation analysis. 
46 Results in the remaining three conditions were the following: Ingroup/Low Typicality condition, R = .71 
(R2 = .50, F2, 12 = 5.95, p = .02); Outgroup/Low Typicality condition, R = .54 (R2 = .29, F2, 12 = 2.43, ns); 
Outgroup/High Typicality condition, R = .54, (R2 = .29, F2, 12 = 2.41, ns). 
Attraction to the 
Ingroup 
Perceived Threat 
(Deviant – Normative) 
Intragroup 
Differentiation 
(Normative – Deviant)  
β = .51 β = .51
β = .55
(β = .29)
Figure 4.4. Mediation analysis in the Ingroup/High Typicality condition: Attraction to 
the Ingroup as predictor, Intragroup Differentiation as outcome and Perceived Threat 
to the Group as Mediator. 
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the reduction of the initial effect due to the mediation of Targets’ Threat to the Group 
approached significance, z = 1.67, p = .09.47 Again, it is likely that the small sample size 
reduced the significance of this effect. 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
The experiments reported in this chapter draw a general picture of the interplay 
between threats to the overall positive ingroup’s image, individuals’ emotional reactions to 
such threats, and their judgments of normative and deviant ingroup members. In 
Experiment 5, we found that the perception of an outside threat to the validity of the 
ingroup’s norm lead participants to comparatively derogate ingroup deviants and upgrade 
ingroup normative members as compared to their outgroup counterparts. This was a 
function of participants’ level of endorsement of the threatened norm, so that the higher 
this endorsement, the more strongly they derogated the deviant members and upgraded the 
normative members of their group. However, we also observed that this process was 
mediated by participants’ emotional reaction to threatening context. In short, a context that 
threatens a strongly endorsed norm leads individuals to react more harshly to those who 
oppose that norm, while acknowledging the contribution of those who support the norm. 
Yet, this emerges exclusively with respect to ingroup members, who are directly relevant 
to the individuals’ identity. 
In Experiment 6, we observed the impact of deviant and normative members on 
individuals’ judgments from another angle. We found that ingroup members who deviate 
from valued standards are not always equivalent in terms of the reactions they evoke. 
Deviant members whose characteristics led them to be perceived as best ingroup 
                                                 
47 As in the previous analysis we employed a modification of Sobel’s test: z = a*b / SQRT (b2*Sa2 + a2*Sb2 – 
Sa2*Sb2); a = beta coefficient of Mediator predicted from IV alone, b = beta coefficient of DV predicted from 
Mediator with IV also in the model, Sa = standard error of a, Sb = standard error of b (e.g. Kenny, Kashy & 
Bolger, 1998). 
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representatives, are more harshly treated than less representative ingroup deviants. This is 
likely due to the extent to which the former threaten the individuals’ identity. We directly 
addressed this question in Experiment 7. 
In Experiment 7, we found that individuals more strongly derogate ingroup deviants 
who are descriptively typical, than less typical ingroup deviants. More importantly, we 
found that this process is associated with the extent to which individuals are attracted to 
their group in association with the emotional concomitants of the perceived deviance 
(either in terms of evoked emotions, or in terms of the perceived threat of deviants to the 
group). 
The above process clearly establishes the existence of two levels of judgment in 
subjective group dynamics. One level, at which individuals are concerned with the 
characteristics that define their social category, and one level, at which individuals are 
more concerned with the criteria that sustain such that category’s positiveness. Our results 
suggest that, rather than corresponding to different levels of abstraction used for judgment, 
as might be proposed by self-categorization theory, these two levels strongly, and 
simultaneously, interact with each other, in promoting a distinctive, positive social identity  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The study of large-scale reactions to deviance is typically a subject matter for 
sociology. In social psychology, deviance has most often been dealt with in terms of opinion 
disagreement in the realm of face to face groups. Throughout the present work, we hope to 
have convincingly demonstrated that social psychology is not only well equipped to 
contribute an explanation for reactions to deviance in large scale social categories, both 
theoretically and empirically, but also that such a contribution is required for a proper 
understanding of the antecedents and functions of social deviance.  
As we wrote elsewhere (Marques & Serôdio, 2000), the work of Gustave Le Bon 
(1841-1931) is often referred to as being at the origin of the study of how individuals behave 
in group settings (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Le Bon made a case to the 
central idea of this thesis, 
“suppressing internal conflict is a fundamental requirement for our 
national life. We would be helpless against outside foes if, at the same 
time, we had to fight against inside enemies […]. No society would 
survive for long without keeping internal peace. From the ancient Greeks 
to the modern Poles, those peoples who were unable to relinquish from 
their dissensions succumbed to servitude and lost the very right to hold an 
history” (LeBon, 1916, pp. 13-14, our translation).48 
 
This contention appears to be in line with a large amount of literature that has been 
produced by social psychological research, and, specifically, by research inspired in the 
small group approach. As we saw in Chapter 1, that research assumes that group members 
                                                 
48 In the original, “Supprimer les luttes intestines est une condition indispensable de notre vie nationale. Contre 
les ennemis du dehors nous serions impuissants si nous devions en même temps lutter contre les ennemis du 
dedans (…). Sans le maintien de la paix à l’intérieur une société ne saurait subsister longtemps. Des Grecs de 
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attempt to establish consensus about important beliefs, congregate their efforts to achieve 
collective goals, and expect other members to behave in the same way, especially when 
they face outside challenges (e.g. Festinger, 1950; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Shaw, 1976). In 
addition, there is little doubt that normative group members appear motivated to eradicate 
deviance from their group, and, as illustrated in Le Bon’s contention, that such motivation 
is increased when the group faces external pressures for the successful accomplishment of 
collective tasks (e.g. Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950). In the present work, we argued 
that this is one component of the more general process according to which deviance 
contributes to increase individuals’ commitment to the group and, most likely, to reinforce 
intragroup cohesiveness. 
However, contrary to a common assertion by authors in the small group approach, 
we disagree with the idea that such cohesiveness corresponds to the reinforcement of 
interpersonal ties within the group. Based on the subjective group dynamics model, we 
argued ingroup deviance facilitates this process. Ingroup deviance should increase 
individuals’ awareness of the prescriptive standards that underlie their positive social 
identity. As a result, in deprecating ingroup deviants, individuals’ would reinforce their 
commitment to such standards. Therefore, negative reactions towards ingroup deviants and 
increased intragroup cohesiveness would be caused by social identity concerns, but would 
also have as one of its consequences, the reinforcement of social identity. 
The above assumption is one major claim of subjective group dynamics (cf. 
Marques, 2004, in preparation; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) and clearly shows that 
this model is strongly indebted to the social identification framework. However, as we also 
discussed in Chapter 1, the social identification framework raises one general problem to 
this general idea. Specifically, it assumes that social behavior is primarily organized in 
                                                                                                                                                    
l’antiquité aux Polonais modernes, les peuples n’ayant pas su renoncer à leurs dissensions sombrèrent dans la 
servitude et perdirent jusqu’au droit d’avoir une histoire”. 
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terms of inter-categorical distinctions, and that any distinctions arising within such 
previously established distinctions will be automatically re-elaborated in terms of 
alternative inter-category distinctions. In other terms, individuals will mainly focus on the 
prototypical features of groups and of group members. Where the situation is not consistent 
with these features, they will reconstruct it in terms of new inter-categorical positions that 
will better fit the situation. This corresponds to the interplay between comparative fit and 
normative fit that we discussed in Chapter 1. 
Obviously, the above idea challenges the assumption that ingroup deviance may 
increase individuals’ commitment to ingroup norms, if only because the operation of the 
metacontrast principle would automatically convert a deviant occurrence within the 
ingroup into an outgroup occurrence based on an alternative categorization. The subjective 
group dynamics therefore needed to find other support to the structuring function it assigns 
to deviance in large social categories. Previous theoretical work has attempted to do so by 
resorting to classical work on the sociology of deviance, and, specifically, within the 
durkheimian tradition (cf. Marques, 2004; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, in 
preparation). In the present work, we followed this path by establishing a parallel between 
large societal processes and group processes. Durkheimian theory and research proposes 
that groups counteract anomie, by defining more strict limits for behavior, thus creating a 
larger number of opportunities for their members to engage in punitive action against 
deviance. In so doing, groups ascertain their boundaries and insure their uniqueness 
relative to other groups (e.g. Erikson, 1966). 
Based on previous work by Marques and colleagues, we espoused the idea that a 
similar process occurs in groups defined by a common social identity of their members. 
Therefore, our most important assumption throughout the present work has been that in 
order to fully understand the antecedents, implications, and consequences of individuals’ 
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reactions to deviance, one must account not only for the intragroup context created by the 
emergence of such deviance, but also to the more general context which surrounds the 
group, including the relationships the group entertains with other groups (Marques & Páez, 
1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1989). 
As proposed by the subjective group dynamics model, deviance, specifically, 
ingroup deviance would lead individuals to adopt a prescriptive focus that is, nevertheless 
tributary to a descriptive focus in terms of which individuals had previously defined their 
group membership and associated identity. In common-identity groups, then, ingroup 
deviance would decrease normative members’ tolerance while reinforcing their 
commitment to the violated norms, would engender feelings of threat as regards their 
identity, and would generate negative emotions that lead these members to engage in 
hostile reactions towards the deviants. Those attitudinal, belief, and behavioral reactions 
would contribute to the maintenance of a subjectively valid positive social identity. In a 
nutshell, this is the thesis we defended in this work. 
We believe that the results of our experiments provide relevant support to that 
thesis, while supporting some claims of the subjective group dynamics model that had not 
yet been empirically tested (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). Obviously, we did not, and could not, 
directly test all the relationships involved in the general process that we described above. 
But, in the end of this work, we hope to have been able to contribute to the development of 
the subjective group dynamics model and to have been able to persuade our readers that 
this effort was worth to be pursued. 
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SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA 
 
Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo 
tempo de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior 
da Universidade. 
No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos 
a conduzir um inquérito acerca do que os estudantes das várias faculdades da Universidade do 
Porto pensam acerca da praxe. 
Pedimos-lhe que responda a um pequeno número de questões, que não lhe tomarão muito 
tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e confidenciais e serão 
utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua colaboração. 
FACULDADE QUE FREQUENTA:  ANO DE ESTUDOS:  
CURSO:  ANOS DE FREQUÊNCIA:  
IDADE:  anos SEXO:       
 
Em frente a cada uma das 7 afirmações do quadro abaixo encontra-se um quadrado: 
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no quadrado que correspondente à afirmação que melhor 
traduz a sua opinião acerca da praxe. 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que 
eu concordo absolutamente, e que deve ser obrigatória 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, 
e que deve ser encorajada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser 
bem vista 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem 
concordo nem discordo com ela 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser 
criticada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo 
muito, e que deve ser desencorajada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que 
eu discordo absolutamente, e que deve ser proibida 
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SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA 
 
 
Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo 
tempo de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior 
da Universidade. 
No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos 
a conduzir um inquérito acerca do que os estudantes das várias faculdades da Universidade do 
Porto pensam acerca da praxe. 
Numa primeira fase deste inquérito, pedimos a uma amostra de 50 estudantes da Faculdade de 
Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação-UP [vs. Faculdade de Direito da UP] que das frases 
escritas na página seguinte, indicassem aquela que melhor traduzia a sua opinião acerca da 
praxe. Nesta segunda fase pretendemos validar os resultados desse inquérito. Por isso, se foi 
um dos que respondeu à primeira fase, POR FAVOR NÃO RESPONDA A ESTA. 
ANTES DE VIRAR A PÁGINA, pedimos-lhe que responda a um pequeno número de questões, 
que não lhe tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são 
anónimas e confidenciais e serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos 
a sua colaboração. 
FACULDADE QUE FREQUENTA:  ANO DE ESTUDOS:  
CURSO:  ANOS DE FREQUÊNCIA:  
IDADE:  anos SEXO:       
 
INDIQUE NAS ESCALAS SEGUINTES QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO GERAL ACERCA DA PRAXE (em cada escala, 
marque uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião) 
DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA 
MUITO POSITIVA        MUITO NEGATIVA 
DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA 
MUITO ÚTIL        MUITO INÚTIL 
DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A MINHA POSIÇÃO EM RELAÇÃO À PRAXE É DE 
CONCORDÂNCIA 
ABSOLUTA 
       DISCORDÂNCIA 
ABSOLUTA 
DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE DEVIA SER 
OBRIGATÓRIA        PROIBIDA 
 
DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, EM TERMOS DAS SUAS OPINIÕES ACERCA DA PRAXE OS ALUNOS DESTA 
FACULDADE SÃO 
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A PERCENTAGEM DE ALUNOS DESTA FACULDADE QUE 
SÃO GLOBALMENTE A FAVOR DA PRAXE? 
 %
  
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A PERCENTAGEM DE ALUNOS DESTA FACULDADE QUE 
SÃO GLOBALMENTE CONTRA A PRAXE? 
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Abaixo figuram as mesmas afirmações que apresentámos já aos 50 estudantes que constituíram 
a amostra da FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] 
 
*Version 1: Norm-Validating condition  
 
 A B 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente 
útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que deve ser obrigatória 2  
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu 
concordo muito, e que deve ser encorajada 3  
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que 
devia ser bem vista 4  
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e  
eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela 6  
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e 
que devia ser criticada 17  
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu 
discordo muito, e que deve ser desencorajada 16  
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente 
inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que deve ser proibida 2  
 =50  
 
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO: 
Na coluna A, em frente a cada afirmação, pode ver o número de alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. 
FDUP] que, de entre os 50 interrogados, afirmaram concordar com essa afirmação, 
discordando das restantes. Por favor observe esses números. 
Na coluna B, em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo: 
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a 
sua opinião acerca da praxe. 
- Inscreva um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação a partir da qual está 
em desacordo. 
%
  
*Version 2: Norm-Undermining condition 
 
 A B 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente 
útil, com que eu concordo absolutamente, e que deve ser obrigatória 2  
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu 
concordo muito, e que deve ser encorajada 16  
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que 
devia ser bem vista 17  
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e  
eu nem concordo nem discordo com ela 6  
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e 
que devia ser criticada 4  
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu 
discordo muito, e que deve ser desencorajada 3  
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente 
inútil, com que eu discordo absolutamente, e que deve ser proibida 2  
 =50  
 
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO: 
Na coluna A, em frente a cada afirmação, pode ver o número de alunos da FPCE-UP [vs. 
FDUP] que, de entre os 50 interrogados, afirmaram concordar com essa afirmação, 
discordando das restantes. Por favor observe esses números. 
Na coluna B, em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo: 
- Inscreva um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a 
sua opinião acerca da praxe. 
- Inscreva um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação a partir da qual está 
em desacordo. 
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Apresentamos-lhe agora algumas questões para finalizar este pequeno questionário. Por favor 
leia cada questão com atenção e marque uma cruz na casa da escala correspondente a cada 
uma delas que melhor traduz a sua opinião. 
 
QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] QUE DERAM A 
RESPOSTA ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MAIS (+) NA COLUNA 
B DA PÁGINA ANTERIOR? 
MUITO POSITIVA        MUITO NEGATIVA 
 
SÃO BONS COLEGAS        SÃO MAUS COLEGAS 
 
MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS        NADA SOLIDÁRIOS 
  
EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU 
HARMONIA ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM? 
MUITO        NADA 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A IMAGEM QUE ESTAS PESSOAS DÃO DOS ALUNOS DA FACULDADE A QUE 
PERTENCEM? 
MUITO BOA        MUITO MÁ 
 
QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FPCE-UP [vs. FDUP] QUE DERAM UMA DAS 
RESPOSTAS ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MENOS (-) NA 
COLUNA B DA PÁGINA ANTERIOR? 
MUITO POSITIVA        MUITO NEGATIVA 
 
SÃO BONS COLEGAS        SÃO MAUS COLEGAS 
 
MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS        NADA SOLIDÁRIOS 
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU 
HARMONIA ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM? 
MUITO        NADA 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, QUAL É A IMAGEM QUE ESTAS PESSOAS DÃO DOS ALUNOS DA FACULDADE A QUE 
PERTENCEM? 
MUITO BOA        MUITO MÁ 
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AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T. 
- Caderno 1 - 
 
 
 Na folha de aferição do teste APT foi-lhe apresentada informação sobre o estilo de percepção a que você 
pertence.  
Nesta segunda  fase da aferição do teste APT pedimos-lhe que responda às questões que se seguem, que estão 
divididas em três cadernos. Antes de começar a responder, leia a explicação que se segue. 
 
 
(O exemplo que se segue serve para ilustrar como deve dar a sua resposta a cada pergunta do questionário.) 
 
Exemplo: Se a pergunta fosse: 
 
 “Em que medida acha que é importante apanhar sol?” 
 
Nada importante        Muito importante 
 
 . Se achasse que é mesmo muito importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 7ª casa a contar da esquerda; 
 . Se achasse que não era mesmo nada importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 1ª casa a contar da esquerda; 
 . Se achasse nem muito nem pouco importante apanhar sol, colocaria a cruz na 4ª casa. 
 
 Assim, tem sempre 7 possibilidades de resposta diferentes. Quanto mais a sua opinião se aproximar de um dos 
extremos da escala, mais próximo dele deve colocar a cruz. 
 Por favor, não se esqueça de responder a todas as perguntas. Se não o fizer, não será possível ter em conta o 
seu questionário. 
 Coloque uma e só uma cruz em cada pergunta. 
 
 
1. Em que medida acha que o teste APT acertou relativamente ao seu estilo perceptivo? 
 
Provavelmente errou        Provavelmente acertou  
 
2. Em que medida lhe agrada pertencer ao seu estilo perceptivo? 
 
Agrada-me pouco        Agrada-me muito 
 
3. Gosta de ser uma pessoa com estilo perceptivo do tipo Abstracto-Pictórico? 
 
Gosto pouco        Gosto muito 
 
4. Em que medida se identifica com o seu estilo perceptivo? 
 
Nada        Muito  
 
5. Em que medida sente que pertence ao estilo Abstracto-Pictórico? 
 
Gosto pouco        Gosto muito 
 
 
  
 
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T. 
- Caderno 2 - 
 
 
 
 
 
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO O QUE SE SEGUE: 
 
 
 
 
Neste estudo de aferição do teste APT existe uma terceira fase em que se vão realizar 
sessões de discussão sobre alguns dos temas acerca dos quais você deu a sua opinião na primeira 
fase. Nessas sessões, procura-se obter mais informação sobre os valores ético-morais dos dois 
estilos perceptivos. 
 
Para podermos decidir acerca das pessoas que participarão nas sessões da terceira fase, 
pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se encontram neste caderno.  
 
 Para lhe permitir responder a essas perguntas, apresentamos-lhe as respostas dadas por duas 
pessoas que são do estilo perceptivo Abstracto-Pictórico [Picto-Experiencial]. 
 
  
 
6. Relativamente à pessoa A que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que responda às seguintes 
questões: 
 
6.1. Qual é a sua opinião acerca dessa pessoa? 
 
Negativa        Positiva 
 
6.2. Em sua opinião esta pessoa é: 
 
Desagradável        Agradável  
 
6.3. Qual é a imagem que esta pessoa dá do estilo perceptivo a que você também pertence? 
 
Muito má imagem        Muito boa imagem 
 
6.4.Em sua opinião, a pessoa A deve ser: 
 
 
Má pessoa        Boa pessoa 
 
Insensível        Sensível 
 
Mau colega        Bom colega 
 
 
 
  
 
7. Relativamente à pessoa B que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que responda às seguintes 
questões: 
 
7.1. Qual é a sua opinião acerca dessa pessoa? 
 
Negativa        Positiva 
 
7.2. Em sua opinião esta pessoa é: 
 
Desagradável        Agradável  
 
7.3. Qual é a imagem que esta pessoa dá do estilo perceptivo a que você também pertence? 
 
Muito má imagem        Muito boa imagem 
 
 
7.4. Em sua opinião, a pessoa B deve ser: 
 
Má pessoa        Boa pessoa 
 
Insensível        Sensível 
 
Mau colega        Bom colega 
 
 
7.5.  Se vier a participar na terceira fase com esta pessoa, em que medida estará disposto(a) a convencê-la a mudar de 
opinião? 
 
Nada        Muito 
 
  
 
AFERIÇÃO DO TESTE A.P.T. 
- Caderno 3 - 
 
 
 
 
As perguntas seguintes destinam-se a melhorar a apresentação de estudos a realizar no 
futuro, assim como a preparar uma apresentação dos resultados deste estudo. Por favor, responda o 
mais claramente possível a cada uma delas: 
 
 
 
1. Qual é o seu estilo perceptivo? Abstracto-Pictórico   Picto-Experiencial  
 
 
 
2. A que estilo perceptivo pertencem as pessoas cujas respostas lhe foram apresentadas? 
 
     Abstracto-Pictórico   Picto-Experiencial  
 
 
 
3. Qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela pessoa A de entre as sete possíveis? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                     
 
 
 
4. Qual foi a afirmação escolhida pela pessoa B de entre as sete possíveis? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                     
 
 
 
5. Segundo os resultados até agora obtidos, qual dos dois estilos perceptivos parece ter um nível de 
valores ético-morais mais elevados? 
 
Abstracto-Pictórico   Picto-Experiencial   Obtiveram resultados semelhantes  
 
 
 
6. Diga nas suas próprias palavras quais são os objectivos deste estudo? 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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Nesta investigação pretende-se realizar a aferição para a população portuguesa do 
Inventário de Valores – Versão Reduzida. Na sua versão mais extensa (Fennigan, 1987), este 
inventário é composto por um total de 25 questões, na sua maioria sob a forma de dilemas, as 
quais foram reduzidas a 5 na versão reduzida (Value Inventory – Short Version; Karl Fennigan, 
1994). Uma vez estabelecidos os valores padrão, este permite conhecer com elevada precisão o 
nível de desenvolvimento moral de cada indivíduo.  
 
Estudos recentes de Bernstein e Jones (1993, 1997) indicam que, de entre outros factores, 
o tipo de formação escolar superior pode estar relacionado com os comportamentos e atitudes 
que as pessoas exibem na sua vida quotidiana. No entanto, não existe certeza sobre este 
aspecto. Esta investigação tem também como objectivo saber se existe de facto alguma relação 
entre os padrões éticos e morais das pessoas e o tipo de formação escolar superior. Para tal, 
estamos a realizar a investigação com estudantes do curso de Medicina Dentária e do curso de 
Psicologia Clínica do ISCS-N.  
 
No processo de aferição de qualquer instrumento de avaliação, é imprescindível 
caracterizar a amostra a que se recorre, no maior número de características possível. Para tal, 
nas páginas que se seguem, pedimos-lhe que responda a um conjunto de questões a seu 
respeito.  
As suas respostas são totalmente anónimas e confidenciais. Apenas serão utilizadas para 
fins estatísticos.  
Contudo, é nosso objectivo proporcionar a cada uma das pessoas que se voluntaria a 
participar nesta investigação os seus próprios resultados. Assim, por forma a manter o seu 
anonimato, pedimos-lhe que inscreva um código em alguns dos cadernos de resposta que vai 
utilizar. Este código pode ser o que bem entender, mas convém que não permita a identificação 
do seu autor. 
 
 
AFERIÇÃO DO V.I.-S.V 
  
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUIÇÃO DE ENSINO QUE FREQUENTA: 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CURSO QUE FREQUENTA: ANO QUE FREQUENTA:                                                                           
 _________________________________________ 1º    2º    3º    4º    5º    6º    
Nº DE ANOS NO ENSINO SUPERIOR: IDADE:                                        SEXO: 
 ________   Anos   ________   Anos  Masculino      Feminino  
 
 
 
POR FAVOR INDIQUE A SUA OPINIÃO EM CADA UMA DAS ESCALAS SEGUINTES  
(Em cada escala, marque apenas uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião. Não se esqueça de que pode 
usar qualquer um dos quadrados. Quanto mais próximo colocar a cruz de um dos pólos da escala mais a sua opinião está 
próxima dele.) 
 
PARA MIM, FREQUENTAR UM CURSO SUPERIOR É UMA COISA: 
 NADA IMPORTANTE          MUITO IMPORTANTE 
 
GOSTO DE SER ALUNO DO CURSO DE MEDICINA DENTÁRIA. 
 DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
 
ÀS VEZES SINTO QUE SERIA MELHOR ESTAR NOUTRO CURSO, POR EXEMPLO O DE PSICOLOGIA CLÍNICA. 
 DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
 
EM QUE MEDIDA LHE AGRADA PERTENCER AO CURSO DE MEDICINA DENTÁRIA. 
 AGRADA-ME POUCO          AGRADA-ME MUITO 
 
EM QUE MEDIDA LHE AGRADAVA PERTENCER AO CURSO DE PSICOLOGIA CLÍNICA. 
 AGRADAVA-ME POUCO          AGRADAVA-ME MUITO 
  
EM QUE MEDIDA SE IDENTIFICA COM O CURSO DE MEDICINA DENTÁRIA. 
 IDENTIFICO-ME POUCO          IDENTIFICO-ME MUITO 
 
EM QUE MEDIDA SE IDENTIFICA COM O CURSO DE PSICOLOGIA CLÍNICA. 
 IDENTIFICO-ME POUCO          IDENTIFICO-ME MUITO 
 
 
 
AFERIÇÃO DO V.I.-S.V 
POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS PERGUNTAS 
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AFERIÇÃO DO V.I.-S.V. 
- Caderno 1 - 
- Fase Complementar - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assinale abaixo qual é o seu curso: 
Medicina Dentária  Psicologia Clínica 
  
 
AFERIÇÃO DO V.I.-S.V. 
- Caderno 1 - 
- Fase Complementar - 
 
 
 
 
Como certamente se recordará, nesta investigação procuramos averiguar se existe relação 
entre os padrões éticos e morais das pessoas e o seu tipo de formação escolar superior.  
 
Como acabamos de o(a) informar, os resultados obtidos na primeira fase com os alunos do 
curso de Medicina Dentária e do curso de Psicologia Clínica do ISCS-N, permitiram-nos obter uma 
caracterização preliminar das pessoas dos dois cursos em termos do seu nível de valores ético-
morais médio.  
  
 
Nesta investigação existe uma terceira fase em que se vão realizar sessões de discussão 
sobre alguns dos temas acerca dos quais você deu a sua opinião na primeira fase, no Inventário de 
Valores de Fennigan. Nessas sessões, pretenderemos obter mais informação sobre os valores ético-
morais dos dois cursos. 
 
Para podermos decidir acerca das pessoas que participarão nas sessões da terceira fase, 
pedimos-lhe que responda às perguntas que se encontram neste caderno.  
 
Para lhe permitir responder a essas perguntas, apresentamos-lhe as respostas dadas na 
primeira fase a uma das questões do Inventário de Valores de Fennigan, por dois alunos do curso de 
Medicina Dentária. 
 
Obviamente, para garantir a total confidencialidade das respostas eliminámos todas as 
informações que possam identificar estes alunos. Assim, estão apenas identificadas como A ou B. 
 
Pedimos-lhe, então, que examine atentamente as cópias das respostas destes dois alunos.  
 
  
Agora que já analisou as cópias das respostas dos alunos A e B, pedimos-lhe que responda 
às perguntas que se seguem.  
 
Relativamente ao Aluno A que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que preencha a informação seguinte 
para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados. 
 
O Aluno A pertence a qual dos dois cursos? 
Medicina Dentária  Psicologia Clínica  
 
Qual é a sua opinião acerca desse aluno? 
Negativa          Positiva  
Má pessoa          Boa pessoa  
 
Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase do estudo, este aluno pode afectar aquilo 
que os outros podem pensar dos alunos de Medicina Dentária? 
Muito negativamente          Muito positivamente 
 
Em sua opinião, qual é a imagem que este aluno dá do curso de Medicina Dentária? 
Muito má imagem          Muito boa imagem 
 
 Em sua opinião, o Aluno A deve ser uma pessoa: 
Desonesta          Honesta 
Egoísta          Altruísta 
Hipócrita          Sincera 
Invejosa          Generosa 
Insensível          Sensível 
Mau colega          Bom colega 
Nada solidário          Muito solidário 
Desleal          Leal 
POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
  
 
Relativamente ao Aluno B que lhe apresentámos, pedimos-lhe que preencha a informação seguinte 
para evitar problemas na introdução dos dados. 
 
O Aluno B pertence a qual dos dois cursos? 
Medicina Dentária  Psicologia Clínica  
 
Qual é a sua opinião acerca desse aluno? 
Negativa          Positiva  
Má pessoa          Boa pessoa  
 
Em que medida considera que, no decurso da terceira fase do estudo, este aluno pode afectar aquilo 
que os outros podem pensar dos alunos de Medicina Dentária? 
Muito negativamente          Muito positivamente 
 
Em sua opinião, qual é a imagem que este aluno dá do curso de Medicina Dentária? 
Muito má imagem          Muito boa imagem 
 
 Em sua opinião, o Aluno B deve ser uma pessoa: 
Desonesta          Honesta 
Egoísta          Altruísta 
Hipócrita          Sincera 
Invejosa          Generosa 
Insensível          Sensível 
Mau colega          Bom colega 
Nada solidário          Muito solidário 
Desleal          Leal 
 
Se vier a participar na terceira fase com este aluno, em que medida estará disposto(a) a convencê-lo 
a mudar de opinião? 
Nada          Muito  
 
 
POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
  
 
AFERIÇÃO DO V.I.-S.V. 
- Caderno 2 - 
- Fase Complementar - 
 
 
 
 
As perguntas seguintes destinam-se a melhorar a apresentação de estudos a realizar no 
futuro, assim como a preparar uma apresentação dos resultados deste estudo. Por favor, responda o 
mais claramente possível a cada uma delas: 
 
 
De acordo com os resultados até ao momento obtidos, qual dos dois cursos apresenta nível de 
valores ético-morais superior? 
Psicologia Clínica Medicina Dentária Não foi possível determinar 
 
A que curso pertence o Aluno A que lhe apresentámos: 
Psicologia Clínica Medicina Dentária Não se lembra 
A que curso pertence o Aluno B que lhe apresentámos: 
Psicologia Clínica Medicina Dentária Não se lembra 
 
Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pelo Aluno A de entre as sete 
possíveis? 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
       
Na questão do inventário de valores, qual foi a afirmação escolhida pelo Aluno B de entre as sete 
possíveis? 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
       
 
Como descreveria este estudo nas suas palavras? 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
POR FAVOR VERIFIQUE SE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
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SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA 
 
 
Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo tempo de 
um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior da 
Universidade. 
No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos a 
conduzir um inquérito acerca do que as pessoas em geral e os estudantes das várias faculdades da 
Universidade do Porto pensam acerca da praxe e da vida académica em geral. 
Numa primeira fase deste inquérito, pedimos a uma amostra composta por estudantes da Faculdade de 
Ciências (FCUP) e da Faculdade de Letras (FLUP) e por pessoas que não são estudantes que dessem 
a sua opinião acerca da praxe académica. Nesta segunda fase pretendemos validar os resultados 
desse inquérito. Por isso, se foi um dos que respondeu à primeira fase, POR FAVOR NÃO RESPONDA 
A ESTA. 
ANTES DE VIRAR A PÁGINA, pedimos-lhe que responda a um conjunto de questões, que não lhe 
tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e confidenciais e 
serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua colaboração. 
 
FACULDADE QUE REPRESENTA: 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CURSO: 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ANO QUE FREQUENTA:                                                                             Nº DE ANOS NA UNIVERSIDADE: 
 1º ano  2º ano   3º ano  4º ano  5º ano   ______  Anos 
IDADE:                                                                                               SEXO: 
  ________   Anos  Masculino              Feminino  
 
 
POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
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INDIQUE NAS ESCALAS SEGUINTES QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO SOBRE SEMANA DE RECEPÇÃO AO CALOIRO E 
SOBRE A VIDA UNIVERSITÁRIA EM GERAL (Em cada escala, marque uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua 
opinião. Não se esqueça de que pode usar qualquer um dos quadrados). 
 
PARA MIM, FREQUENTAR UM CURSO SUPERIOR É UMA COISA 
 NADA IMPORTANTE          MUITO IMPORTANTE 
 
GOSTO DE SER ALUNO DA FCUP. 
 DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
 
TENHO LAÇOS FORTES COM A MINHA FACULDADE. 
 DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
 
IDENTIFICO-ME COM A MINHA FACULDADE. 
 DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
 
VEJO-ME COMO UM MEMBRO DA MINHA FACULDADE. 
 DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
  
Page 3 (NORM-VALIDATING CONDITION) 
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO: 
 
Neste momento já conhecemos os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo relativos às pessoas que 
não são estudantes universitários. Estes resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas pessoas não 
estudantes são a favor da praxe académica. 
 
ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A): 
 NADA SATISFEITO(A)          MUITO SATISFEITO(A) 
 NADA DESILUDIDO(A)          MUITO DESILUDIDO(A) 
 MAL DISPOSTO(A)          BEM DISPOSTO(A) 
 
 
Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não 
estudantes, mas também os estudantes das duas faculdades que participaram na primeira fase do 
inquérito. Por favor, leia-as com atenção.  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu 
discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, 
e que devia ser desencorajada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser 
criticada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem 
concordo nem discordo com ela 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem 
vista 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e 
que devia ser encorajada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que 
eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória 
 
Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo, pedimos-lhe que: 
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua 
posição em relação à praxe. 
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais 
discorda em relação à praxe. 
Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-). 
 
Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes 
que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a 
afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Depois, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião acerca 
daqueles estudantes cuja opinião em relação à praxe corresponde à afirmação que você assinalou 
com o sinal de menos (-).  
POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
  
 
Page 3 (NORM-UNDERMINING CONDITION) 
 
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO: 
 
Neste momento já conhecemos os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo relativos às pessoas que 
não são estudantes universitários. Estes resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas pessoas não 
estudantes são contra a praxe académica. 
 
 
ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A): 
 NADA SATISFEITO(A)          MUITO SATISFEITO(A) 
 NADA DESILUDIDO(A)          MUITO DESILUDIDO(A) 
 MAL DISPOSTO(A)          BEM DISPOSTO(A) 
 
 
Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não 
estudantes, mas também os estudantes das duas faculdades que participaram na primeira fase do 
inquérito. Por favor, leia-as com atenção.  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu 
discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, 
e que devia ser desencorajada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser 
criticada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem 
concordo nem discordo com ela 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem 
vista 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e 
que devia ser encorajada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que 
eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória 
 
Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo, pedimos-lhe que: 
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua 
posição em relação à praxe. 
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais 
discorda em relação à praxe. 
Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-). 
 
Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes 
que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a 
afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Depois, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião acerca 
POR FAVOR NÃO PASSE À PÁGINA SEGUINTE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
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Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e, em cada uma delas, coloque uma cruz na casa da 
escala que melhor traduz a sua opinião. 
 
QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO SOBRE OS ALUNOS DA FCUP [vs. FLUP] QUE DERAM A RESPOSTA ACERCA 
DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MAIS (+) NA PÁGINA ANTERIOR? 
 
 NEGATIVA          POSITIVA 
 SÃO MAUS COLEGAS          SÃO BONS COLEGAS 
 SÃO DESLEAIS          SÃO LEAIS 
 SÃO NADA SOLIDÁRIOS          SÃO MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS 
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA 
ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FCUP [vs. FLUP]? 
 
 NADA          MUITO 
 
 
 
QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO SOBRE OS ALUNOS DA FCUP  [vs. FLUP] QUE DERAM A RESPOSTA 
ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MENOS (-) NA PÁGINA ANTERIOR? 
 
 NEGATIVA          POSITIVA 
 SÃO MAUS COLEGAS          SÃO BONS COLEGAS 
 SÃO DESLEAIS          SÃO LEAIS 
 SÃO NADA SOLIDÁRIOS          SÃO MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS 
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA 
ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FCUP [vs. FLUP]? 
 
 NADA          MUITO 
 
 
 
 
 
POR FAVOR NÃO ENTREGUE SEM VERIFICAR QUE RESPONDEU A TODAS AS QUESTÕES 
  
Appendix 6 
Materials used in Experiment 5 
  
 
Page 1 
SONDAGEM SOBRE A PRAXE ACADÉMICA 
 
Como sabe, a praxe é um tema que tem levantado alguma polémica, tratando-se, ao mesmo tempo 
de um dos aspectos mais marcantes da vida académica tanto no interior como no exterior da 
Universidade. 
No quadro de um grupo de estudos acerca de diferentes aspectos da vida universitária, estamos a 
conduzir um inquérito acerca do que as pessoas em geral e os estudantes das várias faculdades da 
Universidade do Porto pensam acerca da praxe e da vida académica em geral. 
Numa primeira fase deste inquérito, pedimos a uma amostra composta por estudantes da 
Faculdade de Ciências (FC-UP) e da Faculdade de Letras (FL-UP) e por pessoas que não são 
estudantes que dessem a sua opinião acerca da praxe académica. Nesta segunda fase 
pretendemos validar os resultados desse inquérito. Por isso, se foi um dos que respondeu à 
primeira fase, POR FAVOR NÃO RESPONDA A ESTA. 
ANTES DE VIRAR A PÁGINA, pedimos-lhe que responda a um conjunto de questões, que não lhe 
tomarão muito tempo. Não precisa de se identificar. As suas respostas são anónimas e 
confidenciais e serão utilizadas apenas com fins estatísticos. Desde já agradecemos a sua 
colaboração. 
 
FACULDADE QUE FREQUENTA:  ANO QUE FREQUENTA:  
CURSO:  Nº DE ANOS NA UNIVERSIDADE:  
IDADE:  Anos SEXO:  
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INDIQUE NAS ESCALAS SEGUINTES QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DA PRAXE E DA VIDA UNIVERSITÁRIA 
EM GERAL (Em cada escala, marque uma cruz no quadrado que melhor traduz a sua opinião. Não se esqueça de que 
pode usar qualquer um dos quadrados.) 
NA MINHA FACULDADE, A PRAXE É 
PIOR DO QUE NAS 
OUTRAS 
         MELHOR DO QUE NAS 
OUTRAS 
DE MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA 
EXTREMAMENTE 
NEGATIVA 
         EXTREMAMENTE 
POSITIVA 
DE MANEIRA GERAL, A PRAXE É UMA COISA 
EXTREMAMENTE 
INÚTIL  
         EXTREMAMENTE          
ÚTIL 
DE MANEIRA GERAL, NA INTEGRAÇÃO DOS NOVOS ALUNOS, A PRAXE É UMA COISA 
 NADA 
      IMPORTANTE 
         EXTREMAMENTE 
IMPORTANTE 
A MINHA POSIÇÃO EM RELAÇÃO À PRAXE É DE 
DISCORDÂNCIA 
ABSOLUTA  
         CONCORDÂNCIA 
ABSOLUTA 
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Leia cada questão com atenção e, em cada uma delas, coloque uma cruz na casa da escala que 
melhor traduz a sua opinião. 
PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DE UM PAÍS, A UNIVERSIDADE É: 
NADA IMPORTANTE          MUITO IMPORTANTE 
PARA MIM, FREQUENTAR UM CURSO SUPERIOR É UMA COISA: 
NADA IMPORTANTE          MUITO IMPORTANTE 
GOSTO DE SER ALUNO DA MINHA FACULDADE. 
DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
TENHO LAÇOS FORTES COM A MINHA FACULDADE. 
DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
IDENTIFICO-ME COM A MINHA FACULDADE 
DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
É IMPORTANTE PARA A IMAGEM DE UM PAÍS TER ENSINO SUPERIOR DE QUALIDADE RECONHECIDA. 
DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
VEJO-ME COMO UM MEMBRO DA MINHA FACULDADE. 
DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
TODOS OS INDIVÍDUOS DEVIAM PODER FREQUENTAR O ENSINO SUPERIOR. 
DISCORDO COMPLETAMENTE          CONCORDO COMPLETAMENTE 
  
Page 4 (NORM-VALIDATING CONDITION) 
 
POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO: 
 
Os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo foram conclusivos relativamente à opinião das pessoas 
que não são estudantes universitários em relação à praxe académica. Tendo em conta as respostas 
das pessoas que participaram no inquérito, os resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas 
pessoas não estudantes são a favor da praxe académica.  
 
ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A): 
 
NADA SATISFEITO(A)          MUITO SATISFEITO(A) 
 
NADA 
    DESILUDIDO(A) 
         MUITO                             
DESILUDIDO(A) 
 
MAL DISPOSTO(A)          BEM DISPOSTO(A) 
 
 
Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não 
estudantes, mas também os estudantes que participaram na primeira fase do inquérito. Por favor, 
leia-as com atenção.  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu 
discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, 
e que devia ser desencorajada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser 
criticada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem 
concordo nem discordo com ela 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem 
vista 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e 
que devia ser encorajada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que 
eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória 
 
Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo branco, pedimos-lhe que: 
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua 
posição em relação à praxe. 
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais 
discorda em relação à praxe. 
Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-). 
 
Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes 
que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a 
afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Seguidamente, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião 
acerca daqueles estudantes cuja opinião em relação à praxe corresponde à afirmação que você 
assinalou com o sinal de menos (-). 
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POR FAVOR LEIA COM ATENÇÃO: 
 
Os resultados da primeira fase deste estudo foram conclusivos relativamente à opinião das pessoas 
que não são estudantes universitários em relação à praxe académica. Tendo em conta as respostas 
das pessoas que participaram no inquérito, os resultados mostram que a clara maioria dessas 
pessoas não estudantes são contra a praxe académica.  
 
ESTE RESULTADO, DEIXOU-O(A): 
 
NADA SATISFEITO(A)          MUITO SATISFEITO(A) 
 
NADA 
    DESILUDIDO(A) 
         MUITO                             
DESILUDIDO(A) 
 
MAL DISPOSTO(A)          BEM DISPOSTO(A) 
 
 
Abaixo apresentamos-lhe afirmações sobre as quais tiveram que se pronunciar essas pessoas não 
estudantes, mas também os estudantes que participaram na primeira fase do inquérito. Por favor, 
leia-as com atenção.  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 1: A praxe é algo extremamente negativo e extremamente inútil, com que eu 
discordo absolutamente, e que devia ser proibida  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 2: A praxe é algo muito negativo e muito inútil, com que eu discordo muito, 
e que devia ser desencorajada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 3: A praxe é algo negativo e inútil, com que eu discordo, e que devia ser 
criticada  
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 4: A praxe não é positiva nem negativa, nem útil nem inútil, e eu nem 
concordo nem discordo com ela 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 5: A praxe é algo positivo e útil, com que eu concordo, e que devia ser bem 
vista 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 6: A praxe é algo muito positivo e muito útil, com que eu concordo muito, e 
que devia ser encorajada 
 
AFIRMAÇÃO 7: A praxe é algo extremamente necessário e extremamente útil, com que 
eu concordo absolutamente, e que devia ser obrigatória 
 
Em frente a cada afirmação encontra-se um círculo branco, pedimos-lhe que: 
- Coloque um sinal de mais (+) no círculo correspondente à afirmação que melhor traduz a sua 
posição em relação à praxe. 
- Coloque um sinal de menos (-) no círculo correspondente à afirmação com que você mais 
discorda em relação à praxe. 
Por favor coloque apenas um sinal de mais (+) e um sinal de menos (-). 
 
Na página seguinte, pedimos-lhe, em primeiro lugar, que dê a sua opinião acerca dos estudantes 
que responderam que a afirmação que melhor traduzia a opinião deles em relação à praxe é a 
afirmação que você assinalou com o sinal de mais (+). Seguidamente, pedimos-lhe a sua opinião 
acerca daqueles estudantes cuja opinião em relação à praxe corresponde à afirmação que você 
assinalou com o sinal de menos (-). 
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Por favor leia cada questão com atenção e, em cada uma delas, coloque uma cruz na casa da 
escala que melhor traduz a sua opinião. 
 
QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FC-UP [vs. FL-UP] QUE DERAM A RESPOSTA 
ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MAIS (+) NA PÁGINA ANTERIOR? 
 
NEGATIVA          POSITIVA  
 
SÃO MAUS COLEGAS          SÃO BONS COLEGAS  
 
SÃO DESLEAIS          SÃO LEAIS  
 
SÃO NADA SOLIDÁRIOS          SÃO MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS  
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA 
ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM? 
 
NADA          MUITO  
 
QUAL É A SUA OPINIÃO ACERCA DOS ALUNOS DA FC-UP [vs. FL-UP] QUE DERAM A RESPOSTA 
ACERCA DA PRAXE QUE VOCÊ ASSINALOU COM O SINAL DE MENOS (-) NA PÁGINA ANTERIOR? 
 
NEGATIVA          POSITIVA  
 
SÃO MAUS COLEGAS          SÃO BONS COLEGAS  
 
SÃO DESLEAIS          SÃO LEAIS  
 
SÃO NADA SOLIDÁRIOS          SÃO MUITO SOLIDÁRIOS  
 
EM SUA OPINIÃO, EM QUE MEDIDA ESTAS PESSOAS PODEM CONTRIBUIR PARA A COESÃO OU HARMONIA 
ENTRE OS ESTUDANTES DA FACULDADE A QUE PERTENCEM? 
 
NADA          MUITO  
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Materials used in Experiment 6 
 
  
SESSION 1: 
a. Stimulus presented in the “Athematic-Perception Test”. 
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b. Response sheets of the “Athematic-Perception Test”. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
c. Coding-sheet of the “Athematic-Perception Test”. 
 
 
  
d. Response sheets of the “Value Inventory – Short Version”. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
SESSION 2: 
e. “Booklet 1” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
f. “Booklet 2” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
g. “Booklet 3” 
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b. Response sheets of the “Athematic-Perception Test”. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
c. Coding-sheet of the “Athematic-Perception Test”. 
 
 
  
d. Response sheets of the “Value Inventory – Short Version”. 
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e. “Booklet 1” 
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